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How can we accomplish the changes needed 
to live sustainably on and with planet Earth? 
Today, few other questions seem to have 
an urgency to match this one. In It’s Alive! 
Ecological genomics and the promise of a new 
relationship with nature, Sanne van der Hout 
critically reflects on the opportunities offered 
by emerging ecotechnologies for realising a 
new, more sustainable relationship between 
humans, technology and nature. Her reflections 
focus on a particular case study: ‘ecological 
genomics’ or ‘ecogenomics’. This research 
field not only shows the potential of ecotech-
nologies for attaining a more sustainable future, 
but also demonstrates the difficulties entailed 
in the transition towards a new relationship with 
nature. 
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national park: the ‘red rock wonderland’ of Arches. Overwhelmed by 
the more than 2000 natural sandstone arches, our attention is suddenly 
struck by an information sign, saying “It’s Alive!” We see a cartoon of a 
big shoe and a bunch of scared, tiny creatures about to be crushed by 
it. The information sign warns us to stay on the trails; along the trails, we 
may notice patches of ‘cryptobiotic crust’, a remarkable plant community 
holding the desert sands together. The patches of black crust are “so 
fragile that one footprint can wipe out years of growth.”
 The extent to which soil is imbued with life only became clear to 
me after I started with this PhD project. Trying to come to grips with the 
claims and promises in ecological genomics, I found out that a gram of 
soil contains more organisms than there are human beings on this Earth! 
Thus, it is not surprising that the soil has been defined as “the most 
useful and valuable habitat on earth” (Handelsman et al. 1998, 245). Soil 
plays a crucial role in preserving the health and productivity of crops, 
and in purifying our drinking water. Moreover, soil has been – and still 
is – essential to the discovery of new medicines such as antibiotics. 
In spite of this, “the human species often treats soil like dirt, polluting 
and degrading it” (Idem, 245). Why is this so? Why are we inclined to 
neglect the importance of soil? One reason might be our ignorance of 
soil life; the great majority of the processes beneath our feet are not 
only invisible but also unknown to us. Another possible reason has 
already been mentioned in the quotation; we tend to associate soil 
with ‘dirt’. This association is clearly reflected in the English concept 
‘soiled’, meaning ‘dirty’. As I will show in the following pages, the overall 
objective of this thesis is to reflect on the potential of ecotechnology 
for realising a more sustainable future, using ecological genomics as a 
case study. However, ‘zooming in’ on this particular field of research, 
this thesis might also help to improve the image of soil, in other words, 
to promote soil sense and trigger our sensitivity to soil.1 
In an article for the Dutch journal Filosofie & Praktijk, I have referred to ‘soil 
sense’ as ‘bodembewustzijn’ (Van der Hout 2012).
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July 2011. As a PhD researcher, I participate in the ISHPSSB – 
‘Ishkabibble’ for insiders – conference in Salt Lake City. Being there, my 
family and I grasp the opportunity to visit some of Utah’s and Arizona’s 
marvellous national parks. Having faced the wonders of Bryce Canyon, 
Grand Canyon, Sedona, Walnut Canyon, and Monument Valley, it is time 
to go home. On our way back to Salt Lake City, from where we will fly 
back to the Netherlands, we decide to make a detour to visit one final 
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Introduction
Towards a new relationship with 
nature?
1514
How can we accomplish the changes needed to live sustainably on 
and with the Earth? Today, few – if any – other questions seem to have 
an urgency to match this one. “We live in a time of unprecedented 
and dramatic global change, in which the effects of human activities 
challenge the ability of natural ecosystems to buffer them” (Committee 
on Metagenomics 2007, 20). Because of its crucial role in exposing 
environmental damage as well as in controlling it, technoscience is 
often identified as “the ally and saviour of the environment” (Plumwood 
2002, 38). Considering recent developments in the life sciences, its 
contribution to achieving the required changes seems very promising 
indeed; “having reached the limits of nature’s tolerance” (Benyus 2002, 
1), we seem to have entered a new technological era in which we are 
‘re-inventing’ our relationship with nature. Whereas more traditional 
technological approaches tend to disturb or interfere with the dynamics 
of nature (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006), new technologies approach the 
natural world in a radically different way: they are increasingly inspired 
by “nature’s surprisingly effective design principles” (McDonough & 
Braungart 2002, 6). The desire to produce technological devices that 
mimic the natural world as closely as possible reveals an ecotechnological 
turn, meaning that nature’s own strategies, evolved over time, provide 
the models for our innovations. 
Since the global catastrophe began its partial unveiling, a new 
manifestation of the absolute imperative has come into the world, one that 
directs itself at everyone and nobody in the form of a sharp admonition: 
“Change your life! Otherwise its complete disclosure will demonstrate to 
you, sooner or later, what you failed to do during the time of portents!”
– Peter Sloterdijk 2009a
1.1 Towards a more ‘natural’ natural 
  science?
Atlas (detail). Sculpture by Reinhold Begas, 1897-1901; picture by James Steakly, 
2007.
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2006, 1), generally referred to as ecological genomics or ecogenomics. 
Nico van Straalen and Dick Roelofs, authors of the first textbook entirely 
dedicated to this field, define ecological genomics as
“a scientific discipline that studies the structure and functioning of 
a genome with the aim of understanding the relationship between 
the organism and its biotic and abiotic environments” (Idem, 1). 
Following this definition, it might appear that the main objective of 
ecological genomics is to apply a new ‘tool’ – i.e. genomics – to the 
analysis of fundamental ecological questions. However, Van Straalen 
and Roelofs emphasise that “the merging of genomics with ecology 
includes more than the incorporation of a toolbox, because with 
the new technology new scientific questions emerge and existing 
questions [in ecology] can be answered in a way that was not considered 
before” (Idem, 1). Similar expectations are expressed by Mark Ungerer 
and colleagues: “Such an integration of fields […] will revolutionize our 
understanding of a broad range of biological phenomena” (Ungerer 
et al. 2008, 178). Moreover, Martin Feder and Thomas Mitchell-Olds, 
generally referred to as the ‘founding fathers’ of ecological genomics, 
underline that “this approach has provided new insights that 
were not available from its disciplinary components in isolation” 
(Feder & Mitchell-Olds 2003, 649).
 Why is ecological genomics considered such a great leap forward? 
What kinds of new questions emerge with the new technology? And why 
is the field believed to provide new ways of tackling existing problems? 
To answer these questions, we first of all need to understand that 
ecological genomics seeks to bring about a marriage between 
disciplines that are rooted in different – some would even say hostile – 
research traditions:
“Ecological and laboratory-based genetic/genomic investigations 
traditionally have occupied different areas of the biological 
sciences […]. With a few notable exceptions, research programs 
 The emerging ecotechnologies promise to dispense with traditional 
modes of science: whereas the latter are held responsible for producing 
the environmental crisis, the former are said to take the lead in curing 
it (Benyus 2002; McDonough & Braungart 2002; Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 
2006). This thesis critically reflects on the opportunities offered by 
ecotechnologies to bring about a new, more sustainable relationship 
between humans, technology and nature, by ‘zooming in’ on a 
particular case study: ecological genomics, sometimes abbreviated 
to ecogenomics. As I will show in the following sections, this research 
field not only gives a clear account of the potential of ecotechnology for 
realising a more sustainable future, but also shows the difficulties of the 
transition from ‘old’ to ‘new’ approaches to nature.
1.2 The ecogenomics revolution
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, our understanding of the 
role of genes in living systems has increased dramatically. The “century 
of the gene” (Keller 2000) started in 1900 with the rediscovery of Gregor 
Mendel’s work on plant hybridization by Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns, 
and Erich von Tschermak, and ended with the announcement that the 
Human Genome Project (HGP) – devoted to the identification of all the 
genes on the human genome – was rapidly approaching its completion 
(Zwart 2007). In the years that followed, it became evident that genomics 
comprises more than the HGP alone. Even though the HGP “has 
been extremely important in creating public awareness of the science, 
from the perspective of the researchers it is really a sideline” (Parry 
& Dupré 2010, 4). The HGP played a crucial role “in mobilizing and 
channelling resources into genomics, thus having ramifications across 
the wider area” (Idem, 5). 
 One of the areas strongly affected by the ‘genomics revolution’ is 
ecology. “In the ecological arena, the interaction between genomics and 
ecology has led to a new field of research” (Van Straalen & Roelofs 
1918
expanse of research questions it opens to investigation. [The field] has 
the potential to revolutionize our understanding of the entire living 
world” (2007, 2). Ecological genomics is indeed expected to lead to 
a whole new way of looking at natural systems. In conversations with 
ecological genomic experts, it was frequently mentioned that the 
integration of ecology with genomics resulted from the readiness of 
scientists “to look beyond the boundaries of their own research 
disciplines” (Nicole van Dam, interview, August 2010). Or, as Nico 
van Straalen put it, the field makes use of universal, rather than 
clear-cut principles (Interview, March 2009). In scientific publications, 
the transdisciplinary nature of ecological genomics is said to reveal 
a holistic approach. Kemperman and colleagues, for instance, 
claim that ecological genomics allows “a wider, more holistic 
approach” to the analysis of ecosystem processes (Kemperman 
et al. 2010, 3224 – my emphasis; cf. Guazzaroni et al. 2010, 56; Van 
Straalen & Feder 2012, 4). Some experts even go so far as to refer to the 
field as the “genomics of Gaia” (Committee on Metagenomics 2007, 139). 
 The second claim at the core of ecological genomics includes 
promises for society as well as for nature: ecological genomics is 
presented as a field that will serve human needs, while at the same 
time respecting the integrity of ecosystems. Notably in programmatic 
documents, ecological genomics is presented as a field with high 
potentials for nature-friendly applications in the areas of agriculture and 
environment. This is for example claimed by the Dutch Ecogenomics 
Innovation Center (ECOLINC) – formerly known as the Ecogenomics 
Consortium – whose objective is to enhance “our understanding 
of the functioning of ecosystems, with the aim to unlock the full 
genetic potential for sustainable use of ecosystems for agricultural 
SenterNovem [http://www.senternovem.nl/bsik/projecten/artikelen/gezond 
heidsdoorbraken/ecogenomics] – last accessed 8 October 2009. SenterNovem 
no longer exists as a separate agency; it has been incorporated in the 
Netherlands Enterprise Agency (Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland), 
which is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (RVO.nl).
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are generally positioned in one domain or the other, but do not 
regularly cross the boundary that separates these disciplines by 
utilizing the tools and approaches of both” (Ungerer et al. 2008, 178). 
Joop Ouborg and Wim Vriezen provide a clear description of the 
differences between both types of investigations:
“Molecular biologists prefer to work in controlled environments and 
with homogeneous well-defined genetic material, aiming to remove 
as much variation as possible. For ecologists, environmental and 
genotypic variation is their core business, which they try to incorporate 
in experimental designs rather than controlling for it” (2007, 13). 
Ecological genomics seeks “to fine-tune the experimental designs of 
ecology and molecular biology in order to accomplish true integration 
of the data that originate from these two fields” (Idem, 14). Such an 
integration is expected to be beneficial to both partners in the ecological 
genomics marriage: “ecology is enriched by genomics technology and 
genomics is enriched by ecological questioning and evolutionary views” 
(Van Straalen & Roelofs 2006, 3).
1.3 Promises in ecological genomics
The emerging field of ecological genomics is “couched in promissory 
terms” (Parry & Dupré 2010, 4). The claims, promises, and suggestions 
surrounding the field are developed in a number of directions. First 
of all, the ‘ecogenomics revolution’ is pictured as a new form of 
knowledge production in ecology. By bringing together field-based 
ecological research and laboratory-based genomic investigations, 
ecological genomics is believed to bring about a “paradigm shift”2 in 
ecology. The Committee on Metagenomics compares the emergence 
of ecological genomics “to a reinvention of the microscope in the 
2120
we seem to have entered a new chapter in the history of technology, 
in which we redefine our relationship with nature (cf. Ball 2001; 
McDonough & Braungart 2002; Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006). Whereas 
more traditional technological approaches see nature basically as 
“a conglomeration of natural resources, a storehouse of materials” 
(Evernden 1993, 10), new technological approaches are increasingly 
inspired by the design principles of nature. They borrow from nature’s 
own pool of technologies and initiate applications that are strikingly 
similar to nature’s own processes, up to the molecular scale. As has 
been argued at the beginning of this chapter, this wish to develop 
technological devices that mimic nature’s processes as closely as 
possible reveals an ecotechnological turn, meaning that nature’s own 
evolutionary strategies provide the models for our innovations.
 Various contemporary environmental thinkers have reflected on 
the ecotechnological turn. The German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk 
characterises modern technoscience by drawing a distinction between 
homeotechnologies and allotechnologies. He places the majority 
of human technologies that have been developed so far into the 
latter category. According to Sloterdijk, the classic design of human 
technology is based on principles that are different from, and often 
disturb or interfere with the dynamics of nature. With the term 
‘allotechnology’ (derived from the Ancient Greek άλλος, meaning ‘other’ 
or ‘alien’), he indicates that traditional human technologies put to work 
“reductionist and authoritarian intentions. [They display a] reckless 
exploitation of life chances […] as well as a senseless wasting 
of so-called resources” (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006, 330).6 Yet, 
according to Sloterdijk, the 21st century announces “a change 
of paradigm in the basic idea of technology” (Idem, 329). With the 
rise of biotechnology, neuroscience, and nanotechnology, the 
fundamental principles of traditional human technologies are 
In the reference list at the end of this thesis, I have added the English 
language editions that I have used as guidelines in translating Sloterdijk’s 
work from German to English.
6
ECOLINC [http://www.ecogenomics.nl/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=41&lang=english] – last accessed 13 
February 2014.
ECOLINC [http://www.ecogenomics.nl/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=11&Itemid=33&lang=english] – last accessed 11 
February 2014.
Idem
3
4
5
and other anthropogenic purposes.”3 According to ECOLINC, 
ecological genomics will provide “essential services for improved 
environmental protection,”4 for instance by developing tools “for 
monitoring the impact of pollutants on ecosystems and for cleaning 
up contaminated environments” (George et al. 2010, 119). The field 
is therefore said to break the ground for a sustainable “Biotechnology 
for Nature.”5 
 It is interesting to see how the above-mentioned claims are connected: 
the idea is that by means of a more thorough understanding of 
ecosystem processes, societal needs can be met in more intelligent, 
sustainable, and even ‘natural’ ways. Thus, it is precisely as a new, 
more comprehensive form of knowledge production that 
ecological genomics is expected to meet human needs in a more 
sustainable fashion.
1.4 The ecotechnological turn
The claims and promises surrounding the ecological genomics field 
should not be considered in isolation: they are representative of broader 
developments within today’s life sciences. Over the past few decades, 
we have discovered that nature’s mechanisms and processes are 
much more complex, intricate and interwoven than we ever imagined. 
Moreover, we have become increasingly aware of the Earth’s 
vulnerability to human interventions. As “[w]e can see, more clearly 
than ever before, how nature works her miracles” (Benyus 2002, 6), 
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also been described by contemporary environmental thinkers such as 
Sloterdijk. A central claim entailed in (philosophical assessments of) 
ecotechnological discourse is that a more thorough understanding 
of nature’s own dynamics will help us to meet human needs in a more 
sustainable manner. In this thesis, I will critically reflect on this claim, 
using ecological genomics as a case study. Earlier I argued that, 
as a new, more comprehensive form of knowledge production, 
ecological genomics is expected to form the basis of a more 
sustainable use of ecosystems for a variety of societal purposes. 
However, ecogenomics discourse shows that this claim comes with a 
number of tensions and ambiguities that require to be more explicitly 
addressed. Such an exploration will not only deepen our understanding 
of what is at stake in this particular field of research, but will also 
prove to be relevant for interpreting the ecotechnological turn in a 
broader sense.
 A first tension relates to the epistemological profile of ecological 
genomics, i.e. to the kinds of insights and forms of knowledge 
the field is expected to produce. To put it differently: it deals with 
ecological genomics as a new form of knowledge production in ecology. 
Ecological genomics is presented as a field that promises to bridge 
the gap between ecological and genomic investigations. However, the 
focus in ecological genomics as it has developed so far seems to 
reflect a ‘genomicalisation’ of ecology rather than an ‘ecologisation’ of 
genomics. As Ouborg and Vriezen argue, “due to the current nature of 
technical tools and model species [ecological genomics] currently seems 
to be orientated more towards ‘genomics’ than towards ‘eco’” (Ouborg & 
Vriezen 2007, 14; cf. Feder & Mitchell-Olds 2003; Ungerer et al. 2008). 
Thus, in spite of the attempt to reconcile the languages of ecology and 
genomics, the two as yet seem to have only partially met.
 A second tension relates to the normative profile of ecological 
genomics, notably the claim that ecological genomics will meet human 
needs, while at the same time respecting the integrity of ecosystems. 
As mentioned before, this claim includes promises for society as well 
as for nature. Or, to put it differently, it contains both an anthropocentric 
under revision. “We are witnessing that with intelligent technologies a 
non-dominant form of operativity is emerging, for which we propose the 
name homeotechnology” (Sloterdijk 2001, 227). Whereas allotechnologies 
neglect nature’s own principles of operation, homeotechnologies 
(derived from the Ancient Greek όμοιος, meaning ‘alike’ or ‘similar’) 
are similar to and compatible with nature’s own processes. Instead 
of enslaving and exploiting nature, “the ‘materials’ are […] conceived 
in accordance with their own stubbornness, and are integrated into 
operations with respect to their maximum aptitude” (Idem, 227).
 There are some similarities between Sloterdijk’s concept of 
homeotechnology and the ‘learning from nature’ movement put forward 
by Janine Benyus as biomimicry: “a new science that studies nature’s 
models and then imitates or takes inspiration from these designs and 
processes to solve human problems” (2002, front pages). According to 
Benyus, the ‘Biomimicry Revolution’ puts an end to the era in which the 
general belief was that “the world was put here exclusively for our use” 
(Idem, 8):
“In a society accustomed to dominating or ‘improving’ nature, this 
respectful imitation is a radically new approach, a revolution really. 
Unlike the Industrial Revolution, the Biomimicry Revolution introduces 
an era based not on what we can extract from nature, but on what 
we can learn from her” (Benyus 2002, 2; cf. Bensaude-Vincent et 
al. 2002, 2).
1.5 Tensions in ecological genomics
In the previous section, I explained that the claims and promises 
at the core of ecological genomics are representative of a broader 
‘ecotechnological turn’, meaning that nature’s own principles of operation 
increasingly provide the models for human innovations. This turn 
cannot only be observed in various areas of the life sciences, but has 
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3. An ecological promise: ecological genomics will meet these 
 needs in more intelligent, sustainable, and even ‘natural’ ways.
These three promises, we must remember, are interlinked: exactly 
as a more comprehensive form of knowledge production, ecological 
genomics will enable us to meet human needs in a manner “consistent 
with the ecological fabric of the greater life system” (Mathews 2011, 366). 
Moreover, these promises are not exclusive to ecological genomics, 
but are representative of broader developments within the life sciences, 
in which we can observe an ‘ecotechnological turn’, i.e. a turn in which 
nature’s own principles of operation increasingly provide the models for 
our innovations.
Figure 1. 
Promises in ecological genomics
and an ecocentric element: the opportunities created by ecological 
genomics are not only beneficial to humans, but will also ‘serve’ 
the natural environment. This twofold promise is for example 
expressed in the statement that ecological genomics will help us to 
“maintain the health of the soil for agriculture as well as for nature”7, 
or in the assertion that the field will “reveal ways to meet myriad 
challenges in biomedicine, agriculture, and environmental stewardship” 
(Committee on Metagenomics 2007, 31). However, there is a tension 
between the societal and ecological promises of ecological genomics. 
This tension is revealed by disagreements about the future direction of 
the (Dutch) ecological genomics field. Whereas part of the community 
mainly seeks to exploit the field’s potential for useful applications, others 
fear that this focus on economic ‘valorisation’ will undermine the “further 
development of basic and fundamental scientific knowledge” (Ouborg 
et al. 2009, 3). The difficulty of integrating societal and ecological goals 
is also reflected in the images, metaphors, and narrative structures 
with which ecological genomicists seek to illustrate and legitimise their 
research activities. The imagery that currently dominates ecological 
genomics discourse expresses a “productivity outlook on nature” (Worster 
1994, 271), for instance when the metagenomic practice of uncovering 
the Earth’s microbial diversity is compared with a quest for a treasure 
(e.g. Oh et al. 2003, 248; Schoenfeld et al. 2010, 20).
To sum up, the tensions revealed in ecological genomics discourse 
revolve around three promises:
1. A scientific promise: ecological genomics will bring about 
 a marriage between genomics and ecology.
2. A societal promise: ecological genomics has great potential for 
 serving agricultural, medical, industrial and other societal 
 needs.
SenterNovem [http://www.senternovem.nl/bsik/projecten/artikelen/gezond 
heidsdoorbraken/ecogenomics] – last accessed 8 October 2009.
7
2726
designed as semi-structured philosophical conversations, in which 
I acted as a ‘necessary irritant’ – or, to use the more gentle words 
of one of my interviewees, as a ‘moral critic’ (Van Straalen, interview, 
February 2009). The interviews helped me to clarify the tensions and 
ambiguities that remained hidden in the more ‘official’ presentations 
of ecological genomics. Moreover, to improve my understanding of 
ecological genomics practices, I visited various labs and witnessed how 
research data are integrated in specialised databases. It is important to 
mention that studying these practices has never been a goal in itself, 
but has always been a means to clarify ecological genomics discourse.
 Secondly, I will explore how the ecotechnological turn has been 
addressed in philosophical discourse. How have (contemporary) 
environmental thinkers reflected on the kinds of promises and tensions 
at the heart of ecological genomics and other ecotechnologies? How 
can these reflections help us to interpret the ecotechnological turn? 
Many philosophers – especially in the fields of environmental philosophy 
and philosophy of technology – have reflected on the relationship 
between science and technology and the ecological crisis. I will ‘zoom 
in’ on the work of a number of these thinkers, notably the Australian 
eco-feminist Val Plumwood (1939-2008), and the German philosopher 
and cultural theorist Peter Sloterdijk (1947). In her last book 
Environmental Culture: the Ecological Crisis of Reason (2002), 
Plumwood explores the origins and cultural illusions behind the 
ecological crisis. She understands the degradation of the Earth’s 
ecosystems as a result of western culture’s dualistic conception of 
reality. We human beings situate ourselves not only outside, but also 
above nature. Thus, we have developed conceptions of ourselves as 
“belonging to a superior sphere apart, a rational sphere of exclusively 
‘human’ ethics, technology and culture dissociated from nature and 
ecology” (Plumwood 2002, 100). This dualistic framework has also 
affected our view of the relationship between science and the 
ecological crisis: we are inclined “to overestimate and overvalue our 
own technological control and to vastly underestimate [science’s] 
potential for negative impacts on us and on the more-than-human world” 
1.6 Towards a new relationship with  
  nature?
This thesis uses ecological genomics as a case study to reflect on the 
promises of ecotechnology. As a research field, ecogenomics not only 
endorses the expectations (described above) concerning the potential 
of ecotechnology for realising a more sustainable future, but also shows 
the difficulties entailed in this transition towards a new relationship 
with nature. The research question to be addressed in this thesis is 
as follows: 
To what extent does ecological genomics discourse, as an exemplification 
of the ecotechnological turn, reflect the possibility of a new relationship 
between humans, technology and nature? 
This overarching question contains a number of sub-questions, such 
as: What exactly are the promises entailed in ecological genomics 
discourse? How can a new relationship between humans, technology 
and nature be achieved and how can ecological genomics contribute 
to this?
 In answering these questions, I will follow two ‘paths’. Firstly, I 
will analyse self-presentations and self-understandings of ecological 
genomics as articulated in scientific publications, programmatic 
documents, research proposals, conference talks, etc. Earlier, I explained 
that ecological genomics seeks to bring about a marriage between 
disciplines that are rooted in different research traditions. The disciplines 
at the core of the field “interpret the natural environment in different ways 
according to their own internal logic” (Clingerman et al. 2013, 4). By 
exploring (some of) the tensions and ambiguities revealed in 
ecogenomics discourse, I not only wish to clarify what is at stake 
in this particular field of research, but also to shed light on the 
ecotechnological turn in a more general sense. In addition to the 
analysis of the above-mentioned sources, I interviewed several of the 
key players in the ecological genomics field. These interviews were 
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Studying the work of environmental thinkers can help us to critically 
assess the claims and promises at the core of ecological genomics 
and other ecotechnologies. However, philosophical reflections on 
ecotechnology remain to a large extent external, and provide a rather 
general assessment of the turn towards a more ‘natural’ natural science. 
Therefore, the focus on a case study (in my case: ecological genomics) 
will add value to the debate in the sense that it will allow me to elaborate 
the idea of an ecotechnological turn in more detail. As ‘ecotechnology 
in practice’, ecological genomics gives us a fuller picture of the issues 
at stake.
1.7 The core of this thesis: four papers 
The core of this thesis consists of four papers, which, although 
clearly connected, can also be considered as independent pieces 
of work, concentrating on different tensions and addressing slightly 
different audiences. Whereas the first two papers clarify the most 
significant tensions within the ecological genomics field, the third and 
fourth paper offer a more general reflection on how the relationship 
between humans, technology and nature has changed as a result of 
recent developments in the life sciences. The connection between the 
four papers can be made in a number of ways. In the above, I already 
explained that all four papers, in one way or another, combine ecological 
genomics discourse with philosophical reflections. Moreover, each 
paper focusses on one or more of the promises at the core of ecological 
genomics and other instances of ecotechnology. Furthermore, all 
papers concentrate on a tension between ‘old’ (i.e. ‘traditional) and 
‘new’ (i.e ‘ecotechnological’) approaches to nature. In the next two 
subsections, I will show the connection between the four papers based 
on (a) the promises they deal with; and on (b) the way they reflect 
a tension between ‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches to nature.
(Idem, 239). In interpreting the ecological crisis, Sloterdijk also refers 
to the rationalist, dualistic framework of western culture. Yet, as we 
already saw in section 1.4, he has a more positive view of the role of 
contemporary science and technology in accomplishing the changes 
needed to live sustainably on planet Earth. Thanks to the emergence of 
non-dominant, co-operative homeotechnologies, technoscience itself will 
be capable of initiating the shift towards a more peaceful co-existence 
between humans and nature (Sloterdijk 2001, 230-231).
 I decided to concentrate on the writings of these two philosophers 
because both Plumwood and Sloterdijk explicitly address the promises 
at the core of ecological genomics and other ecotechnologies. Whereas 
Sloterdijk gives a positive notion of what ecotechnology could afford, 
Plumwood reflects on the broader cultural framework within which 
ecotechnology could be successfully implemented. Thus, their reflections 
can be regarded as complementary. Although Plumwood’s work will not 
be as thoroughly discussed as that of Sloterdijk, her writings have been 
of great importance for defining the focus of this thesis.
 Besides Plumwood and Sloterdijk, there is a third author whose 
work occupies a special position in this thesis: the natural science writer 
and innovation consultant Janine Benyus (1958). As mentioned earlier, 
Benyus is one of the founders of the biomimicry movement. I will present 
this movement as an example or ‘case’ of ecotechnology, alongside 
ecological genomics. However, as an innovation consultant, Benyus has 
also critically reflected on the role of technoscience in combating the 
ecological crisis. Being both a scientist and a critical thinker, her work 
can build a bridge between scientific and philosophical discourses of 
the ecotechnological turn.
The two ‘paths’ or types of discourses described above form a leitmotif 
for this thesis. Initially, the main focus will be on ecogenomics discourse. 
As my exploration unfolds, the focus will gradually shift to philosophical 
reflections on the ecotechnological turn. The two paths are complementary 
(the one will help me raise a number of critical questions concerning the 
other and vice versa), and will prove to be mutually supportive in the end. 
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assumes that an increased understanding of the dynamics of nature 
(promise 1) will, more or less in and of itself, lead to an attitude towards 
nature that no longer strives for mastery and domination (promise 3). 
I will problematise this assumption, using examples from the ecogenomics 
field as an illustration.
 (b) Between ‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches to nature 
The marriage between genomics and ecology promises to undermine the 
deterministic, reductionist approach of laboratory culture, and to allow 
“a wider, more holistic approach” (Kemperman et al. 2010, 3224) to the 
analysis of ecosystem functioning. Although ecological genomics has 
already taken some important steps towards a more comprehensive 
approach to nature, genomics is still the dominant partner in the 
ecogenomics marriage. As I will argue at the end of the first paper, the 
‘genomic language’ at the heart of ecological genomics tends to push 
aside other narratives that seek to describe nature in general, and 
complex ecological processes in particular.
 In the second paper, I will ‘zoom in’ on a case from the Dutch 
ecogenomics field to explore how normative aspects – whilst often 
remaining hidden and inarticulate – influence the way in which 
ecogenomicists (and other ecotechnologists) conduct their research and 
practice their profession. During an important inaugural meeting, the 
director of one of the most sizeable Dutch ecogenomics centres gave 
a presentation in which he introduced the term ‘nature mining’. Part of the 
audience immediately embraced the term, but others were very reluctant. 
I will argue that we cannot fully understand this turmoil by reducing 
it to a strategic conflict about the field’s research direction; the term 
‘nature mining’ is part of a vocabulary that emphasises the beneficial 
‘goods’ produced by nature. Whereas part of the audience saw no 
harm in this commodification of nature, others objected to the reduction 
of nature to a reservoir to be exploited using the latest technologies.
 In the third paper, we will again look at the normativity hidden in 
the vocabulary used by ecotechnologists. We will explore how nature is 
presented in two ‘narrative self-presentations’ of ecotechnology. Using 
 (a) Analysing the promises
Ecological genomics is presented as a field of research that promises 
to bridge the gap between ecological and genomic investigations 
(promise 1). In the first paper, I will reflect on this promise by exploring 
how ecology and genomics are integrated in the two approaches that 
dominate this field today: the organism-centred approach, concentrating 
on (individual) model organisms, and the metagenomic approach, 
focussing on entire microbial communities composed of a variety 
of species.
 In the second paper, I will make a start with exploring the 
ambivalence between the societal and ecological promises in ecological 
genomics. Ecogenomicists claim that the field will serve human 
needs (promise 2), while at the same time respecting the integrity of 
ecosystems (promise 3). However, the desire to exploit the field’s 
potential for useful applications threatens to undermine the ecological 
promise. ‘Zooming in’ on a case from the Dutch ecogenomics field, 
I will show how the tension between the societal and ecological 
promises reveals itself in a disagreement about the field’s (future) 
research direction.
 In the third paper, co-authored by Martin Drenthen, we will again 
look at the tension between the societal and ecological promises. Yet, 
instead of merely concentrating on ecological genomics discourse, 
we will explore how this tension is expressed in two ‘narratives of 
ecotechnology’: the treasure quest narrative, used by metagenomicists 
to draw attention to the wealth of products yet to be discovered in the 
soil, and the teacher-student narrative, used by biomimics to underline 
that in order to do justice to nature’s own creative processes, we should 
“view nature as a source of ideas instead of goods.”8  
 In the fourth paper, I will explore how the philosophical writings of 
Peter Sloterdijk can be used as a starting point to reflect on a tension 
that has not yet been fully addressed in the previous papers. Sloterdijk 
Biomimicry 3.8 [http://biomimicry.net/about/biomimicry/conversation-with-
janine/] – last accessed 18 November 2013.
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I agree with Val Plumwood that “[t]he problems of representing another […] 
species communication […] pale before the enormity of failing to represent 
them at all, or of representing them as non-communicative and non-intentional 
beings. This is an incomparably greater failing” (2002, 61).
10
they will be used in a rather ‘loose’ way, not as theoretically well-founded 
concepts. A few clarifying remarks are nevertheless appropriate.
Nature
Western culture traditionally defines nature in dualistic terms, i.e. as 
that which is somehow separate from humanity (nature versus culture, 
society, technology, etc.). Throughout this thesis, phrases are used 
that (seem to) endorse such a dualistic conception of nature. However, 
such phrases usually are part of ecogenomics discourse as analysed in 
this thesis. To the extent that this discourse is ‘read aloud’, its phrasing 
of the relationship between nature and humanity is taken up as well. 
Personally, however, I support an inclusive conception of nature, “one 
that accommodates both the human and the nonhuman components 
of the greater life system, without collapsing the distinction between 
them” (Mathews 2011, 365-366). Therefore, whenever I take the floor 
myself, whenever the analysis of contemporary discourse gives way to 
formulating an assessment of my own, a more inclusive conception of 
nature will be used as a point of departure.10
Ecology
In ecological genomics discourse, the term ‘ecology’ is primarily used to 
refer to the scientific discipline of ecology, i.e. the study of interactions 
between organisms and their environments (their οἶκος). However, 
sometimes the term is used in an idealised sense, “connoting something 
quite different from its academic namesake” (Evernden 1993, 5). Used in 
this second sense, the term ecology refers to a particular world-view or 
way of life. This is for example expressed by Edward Goldsmith, who 
distinguishes two fundamental principles that necessarily underlie an 
ecological world-view: “The living world or ecosphere is the basic source 
of all benefits and hence of all wealth […], but will only dispense these 
modern film as an illustration, we will show that even those scientists – like 
Benyus – who seek to give a less instrumental, less reductionist account 
of the stakes of ecotechnology, tend to underestimate the ambiguity 
and moral ambivalence of the cultural narratives to which their 
self-presentations (implicitly) refer.
 To emphasise how ecotechnologies can be distinguished from 
more traditional approaches to nature, Sloterdijk draws a distinction 
between allotechnology and homeotechnology. In the final paper, I will 
critically assess the assumptions underlying homeotechnology by 
concentrating on the three concepts Sloterdijk uses to describe its 
paradigmatic nature: imitation, non-domination and co-operation. 
1.8 Slippery terms
Holmes Rolston has also reflected on the complexity of the term ‘nature’: 
“Nature is an absolutely indispensable English word, but there are few others 
with such a tapestry of meanings. In this respect it is like other monumental 
words round which life turns to such a high degree that we often capitalize 
them – Freedom, the Good, the Right, Beauty, Truth, God, my Country, 
Democracy, the Church – words that demand an ethical response, words 
that we cannot altogether and at once keep in logical perspective, but 
can only attack piecemeal, always reasoning out of the personal backing of 
our responsive perceptual experience” (Rolston 1979, 9).
9
In this thesis, I will use a number of terms the meaning of which is 
notoriously fluid, such as ‘nature’, ‘ecology’, and ‘sustainability’, to name 
the most prominent ones. Probably the most complicated of these 
terms is ‘nature’, a term which is as ‘impossible’ as it is ‘inevitable’. As 
Sarah Parry and John Dupré argue, “Nature continues to be one of the 
slipperiest, most complex words in the English language. […] The topic of 
nature is vast, and the quantity of books and papers already penned on 
it is inspiring and daunting in equal measure” (2010, 6-7, cf. Clingerman 
et al. 2013, 6).9 In this thesis, I will use the above-mentioned terms as I 
encountered them in ecological genomics discourse. This implies that 
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1.9 Outline
As the history of ecological genomics has not yet been fully 
documented, Chapter 2 starts with an exploration of how this research 
field evolved. How were the most important pillars of ecological 
genomics set up? Which publications played a key role in establishing 
the principles of the field?15 The focal point of this chapter, however, 
will be to explore how ecology and genomics are integrated in the 
two approaches that currently dominate ecological genomics: the 
organism-centred and the metagenomic approaches. I will argue that 
both approaches have already made important progress towards 
bridging the gap between ecology and genomics. Thanks to the 
introduction of next-generation sequencing methodology (NGS), 
the organism-centred approach does not need to stick to classical 
model organisms like Arabidopsis and Drosophila anymore; instead, it 
now proves to be able to apply genomic tools to ecologically interesting 
species, i.e. species that provide insight in critical ecological 
interactions, such as the water flea Daphnia pulex. The metagenomic 
approach allows the study of microbial communities in their native 
habitats, rather than in controlled laboratory settings. However, in the 
marriage between genomics and ecology, genomics still appears to be 
the dominant partner. This applies especially to the organism-centred 
approach, which continues to study its (new) models in the artificial 
environment of the laboratory. Furthermore, in understanding 
critical ecological interactions, both the organism-centred and the 
metagenomic approaches employ a gene-centred perspective. 
This perspective tends to overshadow other narratives of nature. 
Although chapter 2 mainly draws from ecogenomics discourse, it will be 
supported by philosophical reflections: I seek to clarify the meaning 
of the attempt to reconcile the ecological and genomic languages by 
connecting it to similar (previous and ongoing) discussions, such as 
An important contribution in this direction has already been made by Van 
Straalen and Roelofs (2006), among others.
15
This economic use of the term ecogenomics does not represent Bailey’s own 
vision.
The Brundtland Report defines sustainable development as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, 1).
Christian Becker: “Sustainability Ethics” [http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.1626013] – last accessed 1 May 2014.
Sometimes, the meaning of the term ‘sustainability’ in ecogenomics 
discourse seems to be interchangeable with ‘nature-friendliness’ (in Dutch: 
‘natuurvriendelijkheid’).
11
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benefits to us if we preserve its critical order” (1998, xv). Moreover, “the 
overriding goal of this behavior pattern of an ecological society must be 
to preserve the critical order of the natural world or of the cosmos that 
encompasses it” (Idem, xv; cf. Bookchin 1982; Zweers 2000).
 Finally, we can also distinguish a third use of the ‘eco’ in ecological 
genomics, which can be found among those researchers using the 
abbreviated version ‘ecogenomics’. Some of them actually, without irony, 
think the prefix ‘eco’ stands for economy instead of ecology, in the 
sense of the economic benefits expected to be brought about by the 
field (Mark Bailey, interview, May 2010).11  Thus, some users of the term 
ecogenomics fail to see its ecological meaning entirely!
Sustainability
Although ‘sustainability’ has become a prominent term in academic and 
public discussions, there is not much agreement on its exact definition. 
One could say that the term has been so successful and has been 
used in so many contexts and in so many ways, that its content has 
eroded. In the most common definitions – for instance the one given 
by the Brundtland Commission’s acclaimed report Our Common Future 
(WCED 1987)12 – the term ‘sustainability’ refers to three fundamental 
relationships of the human being: “The relation with other contemporaries, 
with nature, and with past and future generations.”13 In ecological 
genomics discourse, the term ‘sustainability’ is used mainly to 
specifically refer to one of these three relationships, namely the one 
between humans and nature.14
13
14
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meaningful order. For instance, it might further develop the image of 
land as a ‘collective organism’, as proposed by Aldo Leopold.
 The case study in chapter 3 reveals how ‘tainted’ terminology 
may function as a catalyst to reveal the normative dimensions of 
ecogenomicists’ – and other ecotechnologists’ – conceptions of 
nature. In Chapter 4 (co-authored by Martin Drenthen), the normativity 
hidden in particular concepts and phrases will be explored in more 
detail. To illustrate how ecotechnologies can be distinguished 
from more traditional approaches to nature, scientists make use of 
different narrative structures, metaphors, and images. With these 
narrative self-presentations, they want to clarify and legitimise their 
research activities. This chapter concentrates on two ‘narratives of 
ecotechnology’ in order to assess how the ecotechnological turn is 
reflected in the imagery used by scientists of the ‘new style’: 
the treasure quest narrative, used by metagenomicists, and the 
teacher-student narrative, used in the ecotechnological practice of 
biomimicry. These two narrative self-presentations are used because 
they supposedly provide sympathetic models with positive connotations 
only. Yet, their scientific users tend to underestimate the complex, 
multi-layered character of the broader cultural narratives to which 
they refer and from which they derive their motivational force. We will 
show the ambivalence of both the treasure quest and teacher-student 
narratives by using well-known movies as illustrations. As an example 
of an archetypical moral narrative about treasure hunting, we will look 
at Steven Spielberg’s first Indiana Jones movie Raiders of the Lost Ark 
(1981). To illustrate what is at stake in the teacher-student narrative, 
we believe that the theme of the sorcerer’s apprentice is the most 
influential. We chose to explore not so much Goethe’s classic poem, 
but rather its much more popular 20th century depiction in Walt Disney’s 
The Sorcerer’s Apprentice (1940).
 In Chapter 5, I will put ecological genomics discourse aside for a 
moment, to explore how the ecotechnological turn has been addressed 
in the philosophical writings of Peter Sloterdijk. Using Sloterdijk’s 
distinction between traditional allotechnologies and the newly emerging 
those regarding the cultural divide between laboratory and field science 
(cf. Kohler 2002) and the much-debated tension between reductionist 
and holistic forms of science (e.g. Worster 1994; Zwart 2007). 
 Between chapters 2 and 3, I have inserted a short Intermezzo. 
In this intermezzo, I draw attention to confusions brought about by 
differences in terminology among the various scientific communities 
involved in the ecogenomics field, for instance concerning the labels 
used to describe their research activities.
 In the second chapter, we get acquainted with ecological genomics 
as a field of research that – as yet – has only partially succeeded in 
bridging the gap between ecology and genomics. As a next step, 
Chapter 3 shows how the disciplinary divide running through the field 
reveals itself in a tension between different normative conceptions of 
nature among the various research communities active in this area. I will 
‘zoom in’ on a memorable Dutch ecogenomics meeting to demonstrate 
what happens when normative aspects suddenly rise to the surface 
and ‘collide’. During the very first National Ecogenomics Day (February 
2008), Bram Brouwer – one of the leading experts of the Dutch 
ecogenomics community – gave a presentation in which he introduced 
the term ‘nature mining’. Part of the audience instantly embraced 
the term, but others had major reservations. This mixed response is 
generally explained as a culmination of growing tension about the future 
direction of the field: due to new funding schemes, a shift had occurred 
from fundamental research to research more interested in ‘valorisation’. 
In addition to this interpretation, I will argue that the turmoil caused by 
the use of the term ‘nature mining’ also reveals a more fundamental 
difference between the various parties involved. By introducing this 
term, Brouwer unintentionally revealed that the members of the Dutch 
ecogenomics community endorse different, even conflicting conceptions 
of nature; this term is part of a vocabulary in which nature appears as a 
resource, as a slave and servant (cf. Leopold 1949, 223). I will conclude 
by arguing that although at present the core of Dutch ecogenomics 
research reflects a more or less instrumental attitude towards nature, the 
field also harbours other interpretations of nature as a significant and 
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Next, I will show that ecogenomics discourse also reveals a different, 
more humble story of nature, albeit as an undercurrent. Finally, building 
on the work of Val Plumwood, this thesis closes with the consideration 
that, to protect ecological genomics and other ecotechnologies from 
becoming spokesmen of an instrumental and reductionist mode of 
thought, they must be integrated in ‘democratic’ forms of science which 
include the entire “material and sensory world of nature” (Plumwood 
2002, 47).
homeotechnologies as a starting point, I will critically reflect on the 
potential of ecotechnology to bring about a new, more sustainable 
relationship between humans, technology and nature. Sloterdijk uses 
three concepts to describe the revolutionary nature of homeotechnology. 
First, he claims that homeotechnology is “founded on an imitatio naturae” 
(Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006, 329). Second, Sloterdijk characterises 
homeotechnology as a “non-dominant form of operativity” (Sloterdijk 
2001, 227). The third concept related to homeotechnology is co-operation 
(Idem, 228). Although I appreciate the evocative and inspiring 
manner in which Sloterdijk unfolds what homeotechnology could unleash, 
I will argue that his reflections are based on a series of problematic 
assumptions. First of all, the conviction that we are able to copy even 
nature’s most intricate and refined processes appears to be quite 
hubristic. Even if we assume that at some point, our understanding 
of nature’s modus operandi is sufficiently developed to imitate these 
processes, this does not as a matter of course preclude domination; 
it opens up new prospects for exploitation, for instance by means 
of genetic manipulation and ‘nature mining’. Moreover, as today’s 
technoscience obscures the classical distinction between ‘biomachines’ 
and ‘manmade machines’, this exploitation runs the risk of becoming 
increasingly subtle and cloaked. Thus, homeotechnology may result 
in strengthening our control over nature even on a molecular level. 
I will conclude chapter 5 by arguing that the question of whether 
homeotechnology will contribute to a more sustainable future, largely 
depends on the broader framework within which it is implemented. 
Building on the work of Val Plumwood, I will present some preliminary 
thoughts on the “political and social circumstances [in which 
homeotechnological] solutions could be stable and effective” 
(Plumwood 2002, 8).
 In the final Chapter 6, I will present the main conclusions of this 
thesis, starting with a review of the promises contained in ecological 
genomics discourse. I will discuss that, despite the promise of 
redefining the bond between humans, technology and nature, 
ecogenomics still strongly reflects an instrumental outlook on nature. 
Chapter 2
Bridging the lab-field divide?  
The ‘eco’ in ecological genomics
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All particulars become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which 
they jointly constitute.
– Michael Polanyi, 1962
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, our understanding of the 
role of genes in living systems has evolved rapidly. The “century of 
the gene” (Keller 2000) started in 1900 with the rediscovery of Gregor 
Mendel’s work on plant hybridization by Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns, and 
Erich von Tschermak, and ended with the Human Genome Project (HGP), 
devoted to the identification of all the genes on the human genome. After 
the completion of the HGP in 2003, the ‘genomics revolution’ expanded 
beyond genetics, and started to influence many other areas of the life 
sciences, including ecology (Van Straalen & Roelofs 2006).
In this paper, I will focus on ecological genomics, an area of research 
that seeks to incorporate techniques and approaches originating from 
genomics into the context of ecology. As field-based ecological research 
and laboratory-based molecular investigations traditionally occupied 
different areas within the biological sciences, this merging of ecology and 
genomics promises to “revolutionize our understanding of a broad range 
of biological phenomena” (Ungerer et al. 2008, 178). The focal point of this 
paper will be to explore how ecology and genomics are integrated in the 
two different approaches that currently dominate ecological genomics: the 
organism-centred and the metagenomic approaches. Whereas the first 
2.1 Introduction16
This chapter has been published in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 
(2013), Volume 35, Number 4, pp. 577-598. The headings have been 
numbered to fit the lay-out of the thesis. I would like to convey my special 
thanks to Hub Zwart, Martin Drenthen, Nico van Straalen, Staffan Mueller-Wille, 
and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments that helped to 
improve this text.
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field of emerging research, as well as to clarify its methodological and 
epistemological challenges. As the field is still in its infancy, such an 
endeavour will be relevant not only for involved researchers, but also 
for policy makers and other users of the kind of knowledge ecological 
genomics is producing. I will start with a section that describes how 
the most important components of the field were set up by Feder and 
Mitchell-Olds in their paper “Ecological and Evolutionary Functional 
Genomics” (2003). Next, I will explore how ecological genomics seeks 
to bridge the gap between ecological and genomic research, as its very 
name suggests it will. Third, I will analyse how ecology and genomics are 
integrated in the organism-centred approach on the one hand, and the 
metagenomic approach on the other.
2.2  The inception of ecological  
  genomics
In August 2003, Martin Feder and Thomas Mitchell-Olds published the 
article “Evolutionary and Ecological Functional Genomics” [EEFG] in 
Nature Reviews Genetics. This publication laid the ground for a new 
field of research. The authors claimed that “a unique combination 
of disciplines is emerging – evolutionary and ecological functional 
genomics – which focuses on the genes that affect ecological success 
and evolutionary fitness in natural environments and populations.” The 
goal of EEFG is to understand how wild-type organisms can flourish 
in nature in spite of severe challenges from their biotic and abiotic 
environments. This can be accomplished by a detailed study of “the 
biological mechanisms that influence or underlie ecologically important 
traits.” Feder and Mitchell-Olds maintain that such a study requires a 
multidisciplinary approach: “Understanding a given trait usually requires 
the simultaneous use of molecular, cellular, organismal, population and 
ecological approaches” (Feder & Mitchell-Olds 2003, 649).
 
approach seeks to improve our understanding of ecosystem functioning 
by focussing on the level of the individual (model) organism, the second 
concentrates on (the metagenome of) entire microbial communities 
composed of a variety of species.17 I will argue that the organism-centred 
and metagenomic approaches have already made notable progress 
towards closing the gap between ecology and genomics. Thanks to 
the introduction of next-generation sequencing methodology, which 
became widely available in 2007 (Evanko & Rusk 2008), the organism-
centred approach does not need to stick to classical model organisms 
like Arabidopsis and Drosophila anymore. Instead, it now proves to 
be able to apply genomic tools to ecologically interesting species, i.e. 
species that provide insight in critical ecological interactions, such as 
amphibians, reptiles and birds. The metagenomic approach has found 
other ways to give ecology a more prominent place in its investigations. 
It has revolutionised the field of microbiology (the field from which it 
originates) by enabling the study of microbial populations in their native 
habitats. Thus, instead of studying communities of microorganisms under 
controlled laboratory settings, metagenomics allows us to explore them 
under nature’s own conditions. The organism-centred and metagenomic 
approaches, however, still seem to be “orientated more towards 
‘genomics’ than towards ‘eco’” (Ouborg & Vriezen 2007, 14). This applies 
especially to the organism-centred approach, which continues to study 
its new ecological models in the artificial environment of the laboratory. 
Moreover, in understanding ecosystem processes, the organism-centred 
and metagenomic approaches employ a gene-centred perspective. DNA 
is regarded as the main determining factor, and not as “just one of the 
many functioning components of a larger interacting molecular system” 
(Barnes & Dupré 2008, 73).
 By exploring the latest developments within ecological genomics, 
this paper seeks to contribute to a better understanding of this intriguing 
In principle, the metagenomic approach could also be applied to identify 
eukaryote species assemblages (cf. Chariton et al. 2010). This type of 
research, however, is not (yet) dominant in ecological genomics.
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of Experimental Zoology. Three years later, he further elaborated his 
views in an article that was published in Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS). 
Nevo presents ecological genomics as a new approach, building 
on ecological genetics, a discipline going back to the 1960s. It was 
founded by the English biologist Edmund Brisco Ford, who aimed to 
shed light on the reciprocal relationships between organisms and their 
environment. Ford and colleagues tried to accomplish this by studying 
phenotypic evolution in wild populations. Nevo argues that thanks to the 
genomic revolution, evolutionary processes can now be studied in much 
greater detail: “Ecological genetics advanced by Ford […] could now 
develop into the new science of ecological genomics, interacting with 
comparative structural and functional genomics” (Nevo 2001, 6239).
 So actually, Nevo was the first to use the term ecological genomics 
in an academic publication, preceding Feder and Mitchell-Olds’s 
paper by five years. He explained his motivation for introducing this 
term as follows: “I did not see it elsewhere and used it because I 
very much believe in the interdisciplinarity of science and all my work 
has shown that the evolutionary process is dependent on the linkage 
between ecology and genetics or now between ecology and genomics” 
(E-mail correspondence, November 2010). However, although Nevo’s 
interpretation is very similar to the view presented by Feder and Mitchell-
Olds, the real breakthrough in ecological genomics only came after the 
publication by the latter two authors.20 One of the reasons for Feder 
and Mitchell-Olds’s success might be that they were able to gather a 
large research network around them. This network was formalised by 
the 2003 Gordon Research Conference on Evolutionary and Ecological 
Functional Genomics, which was intended to be the “conference of 
record” for the EEFG community.21 The importance of Feder and Mitchell-
Olds’s publication is also reflected in the following statements. Loretta 
In spite of the fact that Nevo is no stranger in the ecological genomics 
community, neither Feder and Mitchell-Olds (2003), nor Van Straalen and 
Roelofs (2006) refer to his publications.
20
 A number of key scientists refer to Feder and Mitchell-Olds’s 
paper as the manifesto of a new research area, generally referred to 
as ‘ecological genomics’ – sometimes abbreviated to ‘eco-genomics’ or 
‘ecogenomics’ (Ouborg & Vriezen 2007, 9; Maphosa et al. 2010, 308, 
Gobler et al. 2011, 4352).18 For instance, in An Introduction to Ecological 
Genomics (2006), the first textbook entirely dedicated to this field, Van 
Straalen and Roelofs claim that in the ecological arena, “the interaction 
between genomics and ecology has led to a new field of research, 
evolutionary and ecological functional genomics” (Van Straalen & 
Roelofs 2006, 1 – authors’ emphasis).19  Renn and Siemens also refer 
to Feder and Mitchell-Olds’s paper as the birth of ecological genomics: 
“Inception of the field [i.e. ecological genomics] was formalized in a 
publication by Feder & Mitchell-Olds (2003) with the descriptive title 
‘Evolutionary and Ecological Functional Genomics’” (Renn & Siemens 
2010, 3025).
 Why was the publication by Feder and Mitchell-Olds considered 
such a crucial moment in the history of ecological genomics? In an 
interview, Van Straalen explained that in this paper, genomics was 
directly linked to ecology for the first time (Interview, May 2010). Strictly 
speaking, this singling out of Feder and Mitchell-Olds as the founding 
fathers of the new field may be called into question, as there are some 
earlier examples. Notably, the Israeli biology professor Eviatar Nevo 
published a plea for an integrated ecological genomics discipline as 
early as 1998. Nevo explicitly gave the proposed synthesis the name 
‘ecological genomics’. He introduced the concept in an article entitled 
“Molecular evolution and ecological stress at global, regional and local 
scales: The Israeli perspective” (1998), which appeared in the Journal 
Sometimes, the field is also referred to as ‘environmental genomics’ (e.g. Van 
Straalen & Feder 2011, 3). The latter term, however, is more frequently used 
as a synonym for metagenomics (e.g. Venter et al. 2004, 1; Quince et al. 
2011, 1).
As ecological genomics has evolved very fast since 2006, the first edition 
of Van Straalen and Roelofs’s textbook was followed by a second edition 
in 2012, describing the latest developments in the field. For chronological 
purposes I will refer to the first edition.
18
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research communities” (Feder & Mitchell-Olds 2003, 649). A similar 
message can be found in Feder’s proposal to the National Science 
Foundation, in which he explains how each of the four components of 
EEFG are necessary to achieve the goals of the field. As EEFG seeks 
“to understand the interaction of genes, function, environment and time 
in a rigorous, comprehensive sense, corresponding investigations will 
need to include genetics/genomics, function, ecology, and evolutionary 
biology” (Feder 2000, 1).
2.3 Crossing the lab-field border
It is interesting to note that from the very beginning, readers of Feder 
and Mitchell-Olds’s paper paid particular attention to two of the four 
components that shape EEFG: ecology and genomics. This becomes 
apparent in their definitions of the field. Van Straalen and Roelofs define 
ecological genomics as “a scientific discipline that studies the structure 
and functioning of a genome with the aim of understanding the relationship 
between the organism and its biotic and abiotic environments” (Van 
Straalen & Roelofs 2006, 1). Ungerer, Johnson and Herman give a 
similar definition: “We define ecological genomics as an integrative field 
of study that seeks to understand the genetic mechanisms underlying 
responses of organisms to their natural environment” (Ungerer et al. 
2008, 178). Based on these definitions, it might appear that ecological 
genomics merely applies a new tool – i.e. genomics – for the purpose of 
analysing fundamental ecological questions. Van Straalen and Roelofs 
nevertheless emphasise that “the merging of genomics with ecology 
includes more than the incorporation of a toolbox, because with the new 
technology new scientific questions emerge and existing questions [in 
ecology] can be answered in a way that was not considered before” 
(Van Straalen & Roelofs 2006, 1). Ungerer and colleagues have great 
expectations of the field as well: “Such an integration of fields […] 
will revolutionize our understanding of a broad range of biological 
Johnson, co-director of the Ecological Genomics Institute (EcoGen) at 
Kansas State University, explained to me that “everyone was very much 
influenced by the seminar paper by Feder and Mitchell-Olds (2003) 
in Nature Reviews Genetics” (E-mail correspondence, January 2011). 
Ouborg and Vriezen go even further, claiming Feder and Mitchell-Olds 
were the first to use the exact term eco-genomics: “This approach, 
which has been named ‘eco-genomics’ (Feder and Mitchell-Olds 2003), 
integrates the disciplines of ecology and molecular biology” (Ouborg & 
Vriezen 2007, 9).22
 Feder and Mitchell-Olds themselves, however, neither used the 
terms ecogenomics nor ecological genomics in their 2003 paper, 
but only the more extended version EEFG. What is more, their main 
motivation for writing “Evolutionary and Ecological Functional Genomics” 
was not to introduce a new research area, but to emphasise the role of 
evolution in ecological processes. In an interview, Feder argued that 
in his experience, “ecologists are sometimes not strongly evolutionary. 
[...] the notion of time is not extremely important to some of them. 
There is time in the sense of community succession, but the idea that 
the species themselves change over time in the process of evolution 
is not one that they worry about a great deal” (Interview, May 2010). 
Feder and Mitchell-Olds stress that, in order to understand wild type 
organisms and their evolution, an interdisciplinary approach is required: 
“The molecular tools and functional understanding that are required 
to accomplish the goals of the field are beyond the capacity of any 
single investigator, which necessitates sustained interactions among 
Gordon Research Conferences [http://www.grc.org/programs.
aspx?year=2003&program=evolecol] – last accessed 25 September 2013. 
The term ‘ecogenomics’ was in fact introduced by the marine biologist 
Robert Chapman in the article “EcoGenomics - a consilience of comparative 
immunology” (2001), which appeared in Developmental and Comparative 
Immunology. Chapman characterises ecogenomics as “a convenient 
descriptor for the application of the tools of genomics [...] to ecology. Its 
purpose is to provide insight into the physiological status of organisms and 
to translate this into an understanding of the responses and interactions of 
organisms to the environment and to one another” (Chapman 2001, 549).
21
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2.4 Overcoming reductionism
The difference between laboratory (molecular) and field (ecological) 
research is sometimes described as the difference between a 
reductionist and a holistic approach (Bergandi & Blandin 1998; Gierer 
 The book Landscapes and Labscapes (2002) by the historian and 
sociologist of science Robert Kohler sheds light on the gap between 
ecological and molecular investigations. In this book, he explores the 
cultural differences between laboratory and field science from the 1890s 
to the 1950s by concentrating on the subset of field disciplines that 
were most strongly influenced by lab culture in those days: ecology 
and evolution. Although the book was written before ecological 
genomics had become a research field of international prominence, 
Kohler’s exploration helps us to understand the cultural gap between 
the two research traditions that are at the core of ecological genomics. 
According to Kohler, laboratory and field work are marked by various 
differences. Firstly, the notion of ‘place’ figures differently in lab and 
field practices. Laboratory workers try to eliminate the element of place 
from their experiments: “It is precisely the stripped-down simplicity 
and invariability of labs – their placelessness – that gives them their 
credibility.” By contrast, field biologists consider “places [to be] as 
much the object of their work as the creatures that live in them. […] 
Plants and animals are elements of natural environments, along with 
topography, habitat, and weather: they are not mere passive guests 
as they are in labs, but actively alter their environments.” A second 
difference between lab and field is that the former are pre-eminently 
controlled environments. On the contrary, natural places are particular 
and variable places, “each the result of a unique local history, never 
the same from one moment to the next, unpredictable, unrepeatable, 
beyond human control” (Kohler 2002, 6–7; my emphases). In the next 
section, I will apply Kohler’s insights to the case of ecological genomics.
phenomena” (Ungerer et al. 2008, 178).
 Why are these scientists so convinced that the merging of genomics 
and ecology will be a great leap forward? Ungerer and colleagues 
answer this question as follows:
 “Ecological and laboratory-based genetic/genomic investigations 
 traditionally have occupied different areas of the biological sciences 
 […]. With a few notable exceptions, research programs are 
 generally positioned in one domain or the other, but do not regularly 
 cross the boundary that separates these disciplines by utilizing the 
 tools and approaches of both” (Ungerer et al. 2008, 178).
EEFG, and consequently ecological genomics, seek to integrate these 
disciplines by incorporating techniques and approaches originating 
from genomic research in an ecological context. Ouborg and Vriezen 
have a similar view of the revolutionary potential of ecological genomics. 
Ecology and molecular biology, they stress, are rooted in different 
research traditions:
 “Molecular biologists prefer to work in controlled environments 
 and with homogeneous well-defined genetic material, aiming to 
 remove as much variation as possible. For ecologists, 
 environmental and genotypic variation is their core business, which 
 they try to incorporate in experimental designs rather than controlling 
 for it” (Ouborg & Vriezen 2007, 13).
Although Ouborg and Vriezen present ecological genomics as a very 
promising field, they emphasise that achieving a true synthesis between 
ecological and molecular investigations will prove to be a major 
challenge: “The challenge to ecogenomics is to fine-tune experimental 
designs of ecology and molecular biology in order to accomplish true 
integration of the data that originate from these two fields” (Idem, 13).
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impact of one gene on the phenotype can only be understood in the 
context of the expression of several other genes or, in fact, of all other 
genes in the genome, plus their products, metabolites, cell structures, 
and all the interactions between them” (Van Straalen & Roelofs 2006, 
3). The authors argue that, by integrating ecological and genomic 
investigations, it has become possible to conduct a detailed study 
of ecosystem functioning both on the macro- and micro-level. Thus, 
ecological genomics enables us to explore phenotypic biodiversity 
as well as genome diversity: “With this new discipline, ecology is 
enriched by genomics technology and genomics is enriched by 
ecological questioning and evolutionary views” (Idem, 3). In a focus 
issue on ecological genomics of the journal Environmental Science 
and Technology, Van Straalen and Feder explicitly call the genomic 
approach holistic. “The typical approach of genomics”, they claim, “is to 
look upon the organism as a unitary whole, that is, to try and analyse as 
many genes as possible […]. Such a holistic view of organism function 
has been made possible by technological and computational advances” 
(Van Straalen & Feder 2012, 4).
 How can we interpret these claims? Should we conclude that 
ecological genomics has already succeeded in bridging the gap 
between ecological and molecular investigations? All in all, it appears to 
be too early for such a statement. It is true that, compared to traditional 
genetics, genomics is much more aware of “any effects elsewhere in 
the genome, outside the system under study” (Van Straalen & Roelofs 
2006, 3). As Zwart argues, whereas classical genetics focussed on a 
limited number of genes, “genomics allows us to simultaneously study 
the function of all the genes on the genome of an organism” (Zwart 
2007, 193 – author’s emphasis). Genomics, however, does not entirely 
escape reductionism. First, it is important to keep in mind that the study 
and analysis of complex relationships still takes place within a laboratory 
setting. Genomicists assume that, thanks to the availability of new 
research tools (high throughput analysis, bioinformatics, computational 
biology, micro-array research), laboratory experiments are consistent 
with actual ecological processes. Second, in understanding the system 
2002; Zwart 2007). Zwart draws a distinction between a strong and 
weak version of reductionism. According to the strong version (also 
referred to as ‘ontological reductionism’), “all phenomena in nature can 
ultimately be reduced to a limited number of causal units […]. These 
primal causal units are regarded as determinants of everything else” 
(Zwart 2007, 192). Representatives of the weak version of reductionism 
do not actually believe that the system as a whole can be explained 
on the basis of a limited set of mono-causal relationships. They see 
reductionism as a methodological requirement. In the context of 
laboratory research, it is impossible to do justice to the complexity of 
the real world. The number of factors that can be meaningfully studied 
is limited. “Once the relationships between these factors have been 
established, researchers will try to extrapolate their research findings to 
the real world, in the expectation that, out there, things will prove to be 
much more complicated” (Idem, 193). Holists maintain that “breaking 
nature down into its atomistic parts cannot result in a true understanding 
of the whole” (Worster 1994, 22). The whole of nature is more than, 
or something other than, the sum of its parts. As ecologists frequently 
argue that “special qualities emerge out of interactions and collectives” 
(Idem, 22), ecology is often seen as one of the exemplary approaches 
to holism. This applies especially to ecosystem ecology, as this field 
emphasises “the interconnections among things and events sometimes 
distant in space and time” (Burns 1990, 193).
 In the preceding section, I explained that ecological genomics 
aims to reconcile the experimental languages of ecologists and 
molecular biologists. Using the concepts set out in the above, it could 
be argued that the holistic and reductionist research cultures of ecology 
and molecular biology must learn to speak a common language. Van 
Straalen and Roelofs, however, seem to suggest that in the research 
field of ecological genomics, this confusion of tongues has already 
been overcome; not only ecology, but genomics, too, goes against the 
deterministic, reductionist approach of laboratory culture. Van Straalen 
and Roelofs explain that genomics allows us to study the genome and 
its products as a unitary whole; it is based on the observation that “the 
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 The ‘organism-centred approach’ (cf. Marco 2010, preface)24 
seeks to improve our understanding of critical ecological interactions by 
focussing on the level of individual organisms, for instance by exploring 
how organisms respond to environmental change and how populations 
can adapt to environmental toxicants (Van Straalen & Feder, 2012). As 
a rule, the organism-centred approach is organised around classical 
laboratory-based model organisms, i.e. organisms with well-characterised 
gene expression patterns and large research networks around them. 
Examples of such model species are the plant Arabidopsis thaliana, 
the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, and the nematode Caenorhabditis 
elegans (Jackson et al. 2002, 409; Van Straalen & Roelofs 2006, 4; 
Maher 2009, 695; Ankeny & Leonelli 2011, 316). By exposing the model 
to different environmental conditions (humidity, drought, etc.), the genes 
and gene functions that matter most in a given ecological interaction are 
identified (Ungerer et al. 2008). According to Feder, model organism 
studies are based on the assumption that such studies “can provide 
insight into the biology of some or many (if not most or even all) other 
organisms” (Feder 2006, 163 – author’s emphasis). Recent advances 
in genomics have validated this assumption: “… large amounts of the 
genomes sequenced to data are clearly homologous among organisms” 
(Idem, 163). Thanks to these homologies, the data and theories obtained 
from the models are expected to also be applicable to ecologically 
interesting species (Aparicio et al. 2002).
 The ‘metagenomic approach’ does not concentrate on the level 
of the individual organism, but aims to study ecosystems as a whole; 
the starting material is not derived from a single species, but from 
many different organisms (Dale et al. 2012). This approach is also 
referred to as environmental genomics (Venter et al. 2004; Mitchell-
Olds et al. 2008), community genomics (Dupré & O’Malley 2007; Xu 
Kloet et al. (2011) refer to the organism-centred approach as ‘model organism 
ecogenomics’. In the last few years, genomic tools have increasingly 
been applied to non-model species, and the expression ‘model organism 
ecogenomics’ thus appears to be too narrow to cover all research conducted 
under this label. That is why I prefer the term ‘organism-centred approach’.
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2.5  Two approaches in ecological 
  genomics
Earlier, I explained that ecological genomics involves a number of 
different research communities. As Ungerer and colleagues argue, a 
deeper understanding of the genetic mechanisms underlying responses 
of organisms to their natural environments requires a multidisciplinary 
approach, “combining organismal analyses with molecular genetics and 
genomics, laboratory experiments with field studies and all within an 
ecologically relevant framework” (Ungerer et al. 2008, 187). Currently, 
the field is dominated by two different approaches, one focussing on 
the level of the individual organism, the other on entire ecosystems 
(Feder & Mitchell-Olds 2003; Ungerer et al. 2008; Mitchell-Olds et al. 
2008). Ungerer and colleagues describe the difference between both 
approaches as follows:
“One goal of ecological genomic studies is to understand the 
genetic mechanisms underlying responses of organisms to their 
natural environments. This question typically is focused at the level of 
the organism. Another goal of ecological genomic research is to 
understand how genomes interact at higher levels of organization, 
for example, is there a ‘community genome’ and if so, can we 
understand how it functions” (Ungerer et al. 2008, 181 – my 
emphasis).
as a whole, DNA is still considered the main determining factor, 
instead of being “reconceptualized as just one of the many functioning 
components of a larger interacting molecular system” (Barnes & Dupré 
2008, 73).23
Barnes and Dupré do not make it explicit whether or not they share this view 
of genomics as a (partly) reductionist approach; their aim is to reflect on the 
implications of different interpretations of genomics.
23
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2.6  The organism-centred approach:  
  to model or not to model?
In the preceding section, I explained that the organism-centred 
approach is usually organised around classical model organisms with 
fully sequenced genomes. As the genomes of organisms share a 
significant degree of homology with related species, research on model 
organisms is expected to provide insight into the biology of ecologically 
interesting species as well. The general applicability of standard 
model organisms in ecological genomics studies, however, needs to 
be critically assessed. According to Feder, the question of whether or 
not to use these species depends very much on the issue we want to 
address: “... if the underlying research question is general (e.g., Does 
susceptibility to environmental stress increase during development?), 
then standard model systems are often […] readily applicable” (Feder 
2006, 164). By contrast,
 “If the underlying research question is specific and species-driven 
 (e.g., How does the fairy shrimp tolerate extreme temperatures or 
 [high salt] concentrations early in development?), then application 
 of standard model systems is likely to be as problematic as the 
 phylogenetic and ecological distance between the nearest standard 
 model and the species under investigation” (Idem, 164).
The physiologist August Krogh warned against uncritical generalisations 
from model systems to solve physiological problems as early as 1929. In 
an article entitled “The progress of Physiology”, he argued that “a general 
physiology which can describe the essential characteristics of matter in 
the living state is an ideal to which we may hope that our successors 
may attain after many generations” (Krogh 1929, 4). He claimed that 
“the route by which we can strive toward the ideal is by a study of the 
vital functions in all their aspects throughout the myriads of organisms” 
(Idem, 4 – my emphasis). In 1975, Krogh’s considerations inspired the 
physician and biochemist Hans Krebs to formulate the August Krogh 
2010),25 and environmental community genomics (Van Straalen & Feder 
2012). Sometimes, ecogenomics and ecological genomics are used as 
synonyms for metagenomics as well (Béjà 2004; DeLong 2005; Dupré & 
O’Malley 2007; Xu 2010).  Metagenomics makes possible “the culture-
independent genomic analysis of microbial communities” (Schloss & 
Handelsman 2003, 303). It started as a method to study the chemical 
diversity of soil life. In the nineties, most microbiologists still assumed 
that the majority of soil microbes could be recovered by culturing them 
in the laboratory. An increasing amount of evidence nevertheless shows 
that “fewer than 0.1% of the microorganisms in soil are readily cultured 
using current techniques. […] the other 99.9% of soil microflora is 
emerging as a world of stunning, novel genetic diversity” (Handelsman 
et al. 1998, 245). By providing access to the previously unknown world 
of microorganisms, metagenomics has revolutionised our understanding 
of the Earth’s microbial diversity.26  
 Mitchell-Olds, Feder and Wray argue that, taken together, the two 
approaches discussed above “offer great potential for uncovering the 
molecular mechanisms responsible for adaptation” (Mitchell-Olds et al. 
2008, 100). In other words: the organism-centred and metagenomic 
approaches help us understand the mechanistic causes of fitness 
variation (Ouborg & Vriezen 2007). In the next four sections, I will 
discuss the two approaches in more detail. In particular, I will focus 
on the question how and to what extent ecology is integrated in both 
approaches.
In the intermezzo following this chapter, I will draw attention to confusions 
brought about by differences in terminology among the various scientific 
communities active in the ecological genomics field.
Van Straalen and Roelofs (2006) also distinguish a third approach, to which 
they refer as ‘comparative genomics’. This approach studies the relationship 
between genome structure and function among different species. As 
comparative genomics is generally based on model organism studies, I will 
not treat this as a separate approach, but as part of the organism-centred 
approach.
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in the field.” Examples of species that fit these criteria are reptiles, 
amphibians, molluscs, annelids, birds and non-insect arthropods. For 
these organisms, however, adequate genomics resources (funding, 
research programmes, research consortia) are not always available. 
As Van Straalen and Roelofs argue, “many popular ecological models 
have a poorly characterized genome and lack a large community of 
investigators” (Van Straalen & Roelofs 2006, 8-9; cf. Jackson et al. 2002).
 Ecological genomicists are thus faced with a dilemma: “Should 
the ecology of selected organisms that may not be very representative 
be studied, or should the genomic capabilities of more ecologically 
interesting taxa be developed?” (Ungerer et al. 2008, 181). Feder and 
Mitchell-Olds describe this model versus non-model question as a
“near-philosophical debate, the extremes of which are whether 
to make the customary biomedical model organisms do ‘double 
duty’ as model wild organisms, for which they are often not well 
suited, or to forego the advantages of massive community support 
to optimize the insights that are emerging from the study of non-
classical model organisms” (Feder & Mitchell-Olds 2003, 654).
2.7 New models for the organism- 
  centred approach
In the editorial Evolutionary and ecological functional genomics (2008), 
building on the 2003 article with the same title, Mitchell-Olds and 
colleagues argue that thanks to “changing technology and decreasing 
costs, the time is approaching when genomic tools can be applied to 
diverse non-model species, characterizing new levels of complexity 
in natural systems and enabling tests of fundamental hypotheses in 
ecology and evolution” (Mitchell-Olds et al. 2008, 101). Ungerer and 
colleagues have similar expectations for the future: “Genomic resources 
are now also being developed for several species with rich histories 
principle, which assumes that for every physiological problem, there is an 
animal in which this problem can be most conveniently studied. Applied 
to ecological genomics, the principle urges us to critically reflect on the 
extent to which model organisms can represent ecologically important 
pathways, processes and structures. Jackson and colleagues are very 
critical in this respect. They argue that species such as Arabidopsis 
and Drosophila have not become models in genomics because of their 
ecological or evolutionary importance or their applicability to ecological 
questions, “but were selected on the basis of particular genetic and 
developmental features (e.g. clonal propagation, self-fertilization 
and short generation times) and for ease of growth in the laboratory” 
(Jackson et al. 2002, 409). Ouborg and Vriezen express the same 
criticism: “These species have become model species of genomics 
because of their suitable properties: small genomes, short generation 
times and easy maintenance in the glasshouse. They are not chosen 
because of their specific ecology, and they certainly do not cover all 
life-history strategies and habitats” (Ouborg & Vriezen 2007, 12; cf. Van 
Straalen & Feder 2011, 3).
 What makes a species a suitable model for ecological genomics? 
Van Straalen and Roelofs come up with three criteria. Number one,
“The new range of models should embrace diverse phylogenetic 
lineages, varying in their physiology and life-history strategy. […] 
Considering the diversity of life histories, species differing in their 
mode of reproduction and dispersal capacity should be chosen; for 
example, hermaphroditism versus gonochorism, parthenogenesis 
versus bisexual reproduction, etc.” 
As a second criteria, species have to take part in critical ecological 
interactions, for instance “mycorrhizae, nitrogen-fixing symbionts, 
pollinators, natural enemies of pests, parasites, etc.” And finally, the new 
‘ecogenomic’ models should be suitable for field research, since “[n]ot 
all species lend themselves to studies of behaviour, foraging strategy, 
habitat choice, population size, age structure, dispersal, or migration 
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contribute more to a genomicalisation of ecology than to an ecologisation 
of genomics (cf. Ouborg & Vriezen 2007). First, the rise of non-classical 
model species does not necessarily imply the end of gene-centredness. 
Although the organism-centred approach promises to go “beyond 
making claims on gene functions in cells or individual organisms” and 
“to generate insight in the relationship between organisms […] and 
their environment” (Kloet et al. 2011, 24 – authors’ emphasis), it is 
mainly interested in understanding the genetic mechanisms underlying 
this relationship. Second, the new ecological models are still studied 
under laboratory rather than field conditions. Earlier, I explained that 
genomicists assume that, thanks to the availability of new research tools, 
complex organism-environment relationships can now be thoroughly 
studied in the lab; ecological research is thus no longer field-bound. The 
introduction of next-generation sequencing methodology has supported 
this assumption. However, a profound understanding of critical 
ecological interactions seems to require more than the replacement of 
classical model organisms by ecologically relevant species. The artificial 
environments created in labs lack the unpredictability and variability of 
natural ecosystems, even if they are studied with the ‘right’ model (cf. 
Kohler 2002). In the next sections, I will explore the extent to which 
metagenomics has succeeded in bridging the gap between ecology 
and genomics.
2.8 The metagenomic approach:
  the era of ecosystems biology
As mentioned before, in the nineties most microbiologists still assumed 
that the majority of microorganisms in a sample could be recovered 
by culturing them. As a result, most knowledge about microorganisms 
was laboratory knowledge, “attained in the unusual and unnatural 
circumstances of growing them optimally in artificial media in pure culture 
without ecological context” (Committee on Metagenomics 2007, 13). 
of ecological investigation; these species will likely emerge as the new 
‘models’ for ecological genomics research” (Ungerer et al. 2008, 182). 
According to Van Straalen, the shift from traditional model organisms 
to ecologically interesting species implies a qualitative change for the 
ecological genomics field (Interview, December 2011).
 Which technological advances have facilitated this shift towards 
new model species? A first step was the development of DNA 
microarrays, first described by Schena and colleagues in 1995. By 
attaching a collection of microscopic DNA spots on a coated glass 
plate, the expression levels of large numbers of genes could be studied 
simultaneously. This now classical technology was subsequently joined 
by technologies such as quantitative RNA sequencing (RNAseq) and 
high-throughput quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR). The 
real breakthrough for the organism-centred approach, however, only 
became possible after the introduction of next-generation sequencing 
methodology (NGS), which became widely available in 2007 (Evanko 
& Rusk 2008). According to Van Straalen and Feder, this technology 
has brought about a new revolution, “as the nonmodel genomes of 
environmental science have become as tractable as genomes of 
classical genetic models” (Van Straalen & Feder 2012, 3). Although 
Feder and Mitchell-Olds already discussed the possibility to study non-
classical model organisms in 2003, it took until 2011 before the entire 
genome of the first real ‘ecological species’ was sequenced, namely 
that of the water flea Daphnia pulex (Van Straalen & Feder 2012). This 
crustacean arthropod is a keystone species of freshwater ecosystems; it 
is not only a principal grazer of algae, but also a primary forage for fish, 
and a protector of lentic inland ecosystems. As water fleas are sensitive 
to modern toxicants in the environment, they can be used to assess the 
ecological impact of environmental change (Colbourne et al. 2011).
 The above shows that the organism-centred approach has recently 
gotten closer to crossing the boundary between ecological and genomic 
investigations. However, a real merging of these disciplines has not yet 
taken place. Rather than bringing about a marriage between ecology 
and genomics, the organism-centred approach currently seems to 
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‘metagenomics’ is ecologically-oriented. Even though metagenomics 
started as a method to study the collective genomes of the soil, the term 
presently covers the investigation of any microbial community: it not 
only refers to the exploration of terrestrial or aquatic ecosystems, but for 
example also to the genomic analysis of the human microbiome, i.e. the 
community of microorganisms living in the human body (cf. Handelsman 
2007; Liebert 2008).27 As Xu argues:
“The broad-sense metagenomics now encompasses any 
investigation involving the application of modern genomics 
techniques to the study of biological communities directly in their 
natural environments, bypassing the need for the isolation, the 
laboratory cultivation and observation of individual organisms” (Xu 
2010, 1 – my emphasis).
In the context of ecological genomics, metagenomics should be 
understood in a more restricted or narrow sense. Here, the term refers 
to the exploration of microbial communities living in natural ecological 
niches, such as soil, water, or air. Such ecologically-oriented investigations 
are at the core of one of the basic experimental approaches applied 
by metagenomicists: the sequence-driven approach. This approach 
concentrates on the screening of microbial communities to reveal the 
overwhelming diversity of its members:
“DNA from the environment of interest is sequenced and subjected to 
computational analysis. The metagenomic sequences are compared 
to sequences deposited in publicly available databases […]. The 
genes are then collected into groups of similar predicted function, 
and the distribution of various functions and types of proteins that 
conduct those functions can be assessed” (Handelsman 2007, 4).
In his contribution to the book New Visions of Nature (Drenthen et al. 2009), 
Eric Juengst argues that metagenomics encourages us to think of human 
beings as ecosystems.
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By enabling the culture-independent analysis of microbial populations, 
metagenomics has revolutionised the field of microbiology in two ways. 
First, “it offers a window on an enormous and previously unknown world 
of microorganisms” (Handelsman 2007, 8). Second, as I will elaborate 
later on, it allows the study of microbial communities in their native 
habitats. Xu therefore argues that metagenomics announces a new era 
in biology, “that of ecosystems biology” (Xu 2010, 1 – my emphasis).
Although microbiologists already started to apply culture-independent 
methods in the nineties, Schloss and Handelsman introduced the term 
‘metagenomics’ as late as 2003. The term ‘metagenome’ – referring to the 
object of research – was launched by Handelsman and colleagues five 
years earlier in an article that appeared in Chemistry & Biology. The prefix 
‘meta’ is derived from the Ancient Greek μετα, meaning to transcend, or 
to go beyond. In the context of metagenomics, ‘meta’ can be interpreted 
as follows. In its approaches and methods, metagenomics “circumvents 
the unculturability and genomic diversity of most microbes” (Committee 
on Metagenomics 2007, 13). In other words, the field transcends the 
technical limitations to understanding microbial diversity (O’Malley & 
Dupré 2010). Furthermore, the prefix ‘meta’ means that “this new science 
seeks to understand biology at the aggregate level, transcending the 
individual organism to focus on the genes in the community and how 
genes might influence each other’s activities in serving collective 
functions” (Committee on Metagenomics 2007, 13). Metagenomics thus 
exceeds “the limitations of a focus on individual genes and particular 
species, as well as the separation of organisms from environments” 
(O’Malley & Dupré 2010, 185).
 In this paper, metagenomics has been presented as one of the two 
approaches that currently dominate ecological genomics research. As 
explained earlier, the organism-centred and metagenomic approaches 
both seek to improve our understanding of critical ecological interactions. 
The difference between these two approaches is that, whereas the first 
focusses on the level of the individual (model) organism, the second 
explores the genome of (terrestrial and aquatic) ecosystems as a whole 
(Ungerer et al. 2008). However, not all research conducted under the label 
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2.9 The ‘eco’ in metagenomics
In this final section, I will explore how ecology is integrated in, as I 
will call it, narrow-sense metagenomics, i.e. in ecologically-oriented 
metagenomic investigations. Van Straalen explains the contribution of 
ecology to narrow-sense metagenomics as follows: microbial DNA is 
not studied under controlled laboratory settings, but under nature’s 
own conditions (Interview, March 2009). Xu, moreover, argues that 
metagenomicists are aware of the fact that the artificial environments 
created in labs are very different from natural environments. In order 
to obtain critical and realistic understanding of microbes in nature, it 
is essential to investigate microbial populations in their native habitats 
(Xu 2010, 2). Because of this move out of the laboratory, metagenomics 
is often referred to as a holistic approach (Leveau 2007; Cubillos-Ruiz 
et al. 2010; Kemperman et al. 2010). Guazzaroni and colleagues, for 
instance, claim that the ultimate goal of metagenomics is to get “a 
holistic view of the functioning of [the] microbial world” (Guazzaroni et 
al. 2010, 56).
 If we consider how metagenomics enabled the shift from laboratory-
based research to the in situ exploration of microbial communities, this 
approach can indeed be described as holistic. Thanks to the move 
from lab to field, metagenomics has provided “access to environmental 
communities in their whole complexity” (George et al. 2010, 121). Thus, 
compared to classical microbiology (the field from which metagenomics 
originates), ecology is given a much more prominent place. Moreover, 
as O’Malley and Dupré point out, metagenomics urges us to reconsider 
the ‘one organism, one genome’ conception of organisms: whereas 
“life is traditionally conceived to be organized around the pivotal unit of 
the individual organism” (O’Malley & Dupré 2010, 189), metagenomics 
As I will show in the third and fourth chapter, function-driven metagenomics – 
restricted to the search of valuable assets that can be discovered in the soil 
and other natural ecological niches – increasingly constitutes the forefront of 
(Dutch) ecological genomics research.
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Metagenomics, however, was not only a method to learn about the 
contributions to the biosphere made by its uncultivable community 
members; “it was also designed for practical gains, such as the 
discovery of new genes and gene products that would lead to new 
medical chemistry, agricultural innovations and industrial processes” 
(Idem, 3-4). This more practical focus is central to the function-driven 
approach. Here, the DNA extracted from the environment is not 
sequenced, but screened for potential applications and products, such as 
antibiotics, vitamins and enzymes. Handelsman claims that the 
potentials of metagenomics are endless: “It […] promises to provide a 
more complete understanding of the global cycles that keep the 
biosphere in balance, offer clues to the basis for many diseases, lead 
to development of new antimicrobial therapies and present solutions to 
environmental and biotechnological challenges” (Idem, 8).28
Figure 2. 
Approaches in ecological genomics and metagenomics
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promise has only been partially fulfilled: in the marriage between ecology 
and genomics, genomics is still the dominant partner. It is not self-evident 
that we should strive for a more equal marriage between genomics and 
ecology. After all, a successful marriage does not necessarily need to be 
an equal marriage. In my view, however, it is important to keep in mind 
that the ‘genomic language’ at the core of ecological genomics tends 
to overshadow other narratives that seek to describe nature in general, 
and complex ecological processes in particular. Both the organism and 
metagenomic approaches within ecological genomics have their own 
histories that have little in common with the ecological tradition as shaped 
by Aldo Leopold, Stephen Forbes, William Ritter, Charles Adams, and 
Edward O. Wilson, to mention a few. The question of whether ecological 
genomics could try to do more justice to this powerful tradition within 
ecology is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Intermezzo
Confusions in terminology
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It is very difficult to know the nature of the wine by looking at the label on 
the bottle. 
– Martin Feder, May 2010
In chapter 2, I argued that ecological genomics as a field of research 
is currently facing a major challenge: it must bring about a marriage 
between field-based ecological research and laboratory-based genomic 
investigations. In this short intermezzo, I would like to draw attention 
to a related challenge: as a merger of different research disciplines, 
ecological genomics also has to deal with the various vocabularies of the 
scientific communities active in this field. The research activities referred 
to in this thesis as ‘ecological genomics’ and ‘metagenomics’ are known 
under a number of different labels: environmental genomics, community 
genomics, population genomics, to name the most prominent ones. 
These labels, moreover, are interpreted in a variety of ways. For example, 
‘environmental genomics’ is used both as a synonym for ecological 
genomics – the study of “the structure and functioning of a genome with 
the aim of understanding the relationship between the organism and its 
biotic and abiotic environment” (Van Straalen & Feder 2011, 3) – and 
as a synonym for metagenomics – the culture-independent analysis of 
microbial communities (cf. Venter et al. 2004; DeLong 2004; Mitchell-Olds 
et al. 2008). Adding to the confusion, the National Institute of Environmental 
Health Sciences (USA) has used this term to refer to an investigation of 
“individual susceptibility to environmental exposures”29. The goal of this 
study, labelled ‘the Environmental Genome Project’, was “to characterize 
how specific human genetic variations, or polymorphisms, contribute to 
environmentally induced disease susceptibility”.30
National Institute of Environmental Health sciences
[http://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsroom/releases/1997/september15/index.
cfm] – last accessed 4 May 2014. 
National Institute of Environmental Health sciences
[http://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/supported/programs/egp/] – last accessed 
14 September 2011.
29
30
Tower of Babel. Engraving by Coenraet Decker from Athanasius Kircher’s Turris 
Babel, 1679.
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In chapter 2, we have nevertheless seen that genomics surpasses its 
‘molecular parent’ – or aims to do so – in at least one important respect: 
it wants to do away with the deterministic, reductionist approach of 
traditional molecular biology. As “the typical approach of genomics is to 
look upon the organism as a unitary whole” (Van Straalen & Feder 2012, 
4), Van Straalen and Feder call this approach holistic. Although I have 
argued that the promise of a more holistic approach – as yet – has only 
been partially fulfilled, I would like to suggest that the difference between 
molecular biology and genomics has at least some significance.
 The differences in terminology described in the above are not merely 
symptoms of a conceptual misunderstanding; they express different 
ways of being-in-the-world. When the term ‘ecological genomics’ was 
introduced, it did not as yet have any defining qualities. However, “once 
the new name is in place, it typically, if it’s successful, will initiate a chain 
reaction of events in which people are attracted to it” (Feder, interview, 
May 2010). The new label has a performative function and is used to 
create new identities. Thus, by trying to define ‘ecogenomics’ and clarify 
the debate, various groups of scientists try to leave their mark on the 
discourse.
 The confusion brought about by the differences in terminology 
became obvious during several international meetings I attended as 
part of my research. Notably, I observed that some of the scientists 
working in the metagenomics field were somewhat taken aback by the 
presentation of metagenomics as one of the two approaches currently 
dominating ecological genomics research; they seemed to be under 
the impression that this particular presentation failed to recognise 
metagenomics as a discipline in its own right. Considering the wide 
currency of the term ‘metagenomics’ compared to the terms ‘ecological 
genomics’ and ‘ecogenomics’, their reaction is not very surprising. Over 
the past few years, I recorded the amount of Google hits generated by the 
queries ‘ecogenomics’ and ‘ecological genomics’ on the one hand, and 
‘metagenomics’ on the other. In June 2009, ‘metagenomics’ yielded four 
times as many hits as ‘ecogenomics’ and ‘ecological genomics’ together. 
In May 2014, ‘metagenomics’ generated even more than ten times as 
many hits! 
 A conceptual confusion of a somewhat different nature is that 
ecological genomics is alternately described as a merging of ecology and 
genomics, and ecology and molecular biology. Could this difference be 
dismissed as irrelevant? According to Joop Ouborg, the terms ‘molecular 
biology’ and ‘genomics’ are interchangeable; the latter discipline 
originates from the first and can hence be seen as a subdiscipline of 
molecular biology (Interview, March 2009). Martin Feder, moreover, 
argued that he did not consider it useful to draw a distinction between 
molecular biology and genomics. As he put it:
“A carpenter does not worry which tool is derived from another, 
but simply uses the tools at hand. Historically, genomics uses 
the toolkit of molecular biology for data production and the toolkit 
of computer science for data management and analysis. Like a 
child, [genomics] is a product of both parents, but different in its 
own rights rather than simply subsidiary” (E-mail correspondence, 
April 2010). 
Chapter 3
Nature is (a) mine:  
Conceptions of nature in the 
Dutch ecogenomics community
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“Have you found the secret that I have lost?”
“Yes. You and the land are one.”
– Excalibur
3.1 Introduction31
“It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist 
without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard 
for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than 
mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense” 
(Leopold 1949, 223).
In the 1940s, ecologist and forester Aldo Leopold (1887-1948) worked 
on a book that continues to stir millions of readers to this very day: A 
Sand County Almanac, published posthumously in 1949. The almanac 
contains a collection of essays in which the author sets forth his views 
on “the delights and dilemmas of one who cannot […] live without wild 
things” (Idem, vii). Leopold concludes his almanac with a plea for a 
‘land ethic’, an admonition to enlarge “the boundaries of the community 
to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land” 
(Idem, 204).
 This study concentrates on one of the core messages of Leopold’s 
‘land ethic’: every field of science, and especially biology, contains 
particular conceptions of nature. These conceptions are not merely 
epistemological or ontological; they have normative dimensions as 
well. They provide an ethos, a framework for moral orientation. These 
normative dimensions, whilst often remaining hidden and inarticulate, 
This chapter has been published in Life Sciences, Society and Policy (2014), 
Volume 10, Number 10, pp. 1-16. I would like to thank Martin Drenthen, Hub 
Zwart, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments that helped 
to improve this text. I am indebted to Joop Ouborg and Nico van Straalen for 
their willingness to contribute to this study.
31
 Mining in Potosí (detail). Engraving by Theodoor de Bry, 1596.
8584
stance to the study of ecological systems, molecular biologists with a 
preference “to work in controlled environments and with homogeneous 
well-defined genetic material” (Ouborg & Vriezen 2007, 13), industrial 
biotechnology experts looking for new market opportunities, and 
representatives of various intermediate positions. Bram Brouwer, director 
of one of the main Dutch ecogenomics centres, but also CEO of a private 
company operating in the fields of biotechnology and diagnostics, 
gave a presentation in which he introduced the term ‘nature mining’. 
Brouwer explained that the Earth’s ecosystems contain a huge number 
of valuable assets that are as yet unknown to us, such as antibiotics and 
enzymes. The emerging field of ecogenomics gives us the opportunity 
to ‘mine’ nature for these hidden goods (cf. Brouwer 2008).
 The term ‘nature mining’ immediately threw the audience into 
disorder; part of the audience instantly embraced the term, whereas 
others had major reservations. The Dutch ecogenomics community had 
been a theatre of tensions for several years at this point. According to 
Roy Kloet and colleagues, they resulted from a disagreement about the 
future direction of the field: due to new funding schemes, a shift from 
fundamental research to research more interested in ‘valorisation’ – i.e. 
the process in which scientific knowledge is made profitable for society 
– had been initiated. Whereas the industrial partners welcomed the 
prospect of applications, some of the academic partners “fundamentally 
disagreed with a focus on economic valorization” (Kloet et al. 2013, 
213-214).
 In this paper I will argue that we cannot fully grasp the turmoil 
caused by Brouwer’s presentation by reducing it to a strategic conflict 
about the field’s research focus; the tensions are also symptomatic of a 
more fundamental difference between the various parties involved. By 
introducing the term ‘nature mining’, Brouwer unintentionally brought to 
light that the members of the Dutch ecogenomics community endorse 
different, even conflicting conceptions of nature; this term is part of a 
vocabulary that emphasises the beneficial ‘goods’ produced by nature. 
Whereas part of the audience saw no harm in this “productivity outlook 
on nature” (Worster 1994, 271), others objected to the reduction of nature 
influence the way in which biologists conduct their research and practice 
their profession. On certain occasions, however, normative aspects may 
suddenly rise to the surface, notably when moral clashes occur and 
biologists are confronted with conflicting images of nature (cf. Merchant 
1989, 4). As environmental philosopher Martin Drenthen argues:
“We are faced with a plethora of moral views of nature, all of which 
are deeply contingent. Our concepts and images of nature are the 
result of processes of interpretation, in which all sorts of cultural 
and historical influences play a part. […] It is only when our basic 
beliefs about nature are challenged by ‘moral strangers’ that we 
become aware of the particularity or perhaps even idiosyncrasy of 
our views” (Drenthen 2005, 318).32 
I will explore the normative dimensions of biology by means of a 
case study from the Dutch ecogenomics field. Ecogenomics – short 
for ‘ecological genomics’ – is an area of research which seeks to 
incorporate techniques and approaches originating from genomics in 
an ecological context. As ecological research and laboratory-based 
molecular investigations traditionally occupied different areas within the 
biological sciences, this merging of ecology and genomics promises 
to “revolutionize our understanding of a broad range of biological 
phenomena” (Ungerer et al. 2008, 178).
 During a memorable research meeting in February 2008, aimed at 
discussing the current state of Dutch ecogenomics research, a clash 
between ‘moral strangers’ took place. The participants in the meeting 
constituted a mixed audience: ecologists who took a more or less holistic 
In the work of Richard Rogers, we can find a similar argument: “Our theories 
do matter to the extent that they are […] produced in a particular historical 
context, existing in a web of ideological affiliations, and potentially effective 
in the social and natural worlds. We must therefore take them seriously – nor 
simply as more babel from the ivory tower, nor as ends in themselves, but as 
part of the ongoing construction of how the world, human beings, and social 
activity can and should operate” (Rogers 1998, 269).
32
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3.2 The establishment of the  
  Ecogenomics Consortium
In 2002, the Dutch government established the Netherlands Genomics 
Initiative (NGI) as an independent taskforce to set up a “world-
class genomics infrastructure”35 in the Netherlands. NGI called upon 
researchers to submit project proposals for the creation of a network of 
large-scale genomics centres. In response to this call, the Genomics 
for Ecology, Toxicology and Sustainable Technology Innovation Center 
(Gnettic)36 wrote a grant application letter envisioning the establishment 
of a centre of excellence in ecological genomics, “a novel, integrative 
field of science, combining ecology, microbiology, environmental & 
soil sciences and molecular biology” (Brouwer 2008, 1). The principal 
applicant of this programme was Bram Brouwer, director of BioDetection 
Systems, a company operating in the fields of biotechnology and 
diagnostics. Apart from Brouwer, the team consisted of various members 
of university research groups, for example in the fields of animal ecology 
and molecular cell physiology.37
 The participants submitted their letter of application, dated 23 
September 2002, under the following heading: “Eco-genomics: the 
multidimensional analysis, experimentation and management of 
ecological systems for sustainable development” (Brouwer et al. 2002, 
1). In this letter, the term eco-genomics (here still with a hyphen) was 
used for the first time in the Netherlands.38 
Netherlands Genomics Initiative [http://www.genomics.nl/Home/NGI/History.
aspx] – last accessed 13 September 2013.
At the end of section 3.10, I have inserted a figure presenting the research 
parties involved in the Dutch ecogenomics community.
Other key participants were Nico van Straalen, professor of animal ecology at 
VU University Amsterdam; Hans Westerhoff, professor of microbial physiology, 
also at VU; Hans van Veen, head of the department of microbial ecology at 
the Netherlands Institute of Ecology; Jan Kammenga, assistant professor at 
the laboratory of nematology of Wageningen University. 
The term ‘ecological genomics’ was introduced by the Israeli biology professor 
Eviatar Nevo (1998). The abbreviation ‘ecogenomics’ first appeared in an 
official publication by marine biologist Robert Chapman (2001).
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to a reservoir to be exploited using the latest technologies (Ouborg, 
interview, September 2012).
 In his work as a conservationist, Leopold noticed a ‘chasm’ similar 
to the one just described. In his view, the divide between different 
conceptions of nature was common to many specialised fields, such 
as forestry, agriculture, and wildlife management. In all these divides, 
Leopold argued, we can recognise the same basic ‘paradoxes’:33
“[M]an the conqueror versus man the biotic citizen; science the 
sharpener of his sword versus science the searchlight on his 
universe; land the slave and servant versus land the collective 
organism” (Idem, 223 – author’s emphasis).
I will use Leopold’s ‘paradoxes’ as a starting point to explore the different 
conceptions of nature within the Dutch ecogenomics community. I will 
start by giving an overview of the developments that preceded the 
aforementioned ecogenomics research meeting.34 Next, I will analyse 
why ‘nature mining’ turned out to be such an explosive and provocative 
term. Finally, I will argue that, although at present the bulk of Dutch 
ecogenomics research reflects a more or less instrumental attitude 
towards nature, the field – in particular the metagenomic approach – also 
harbours other interpretations of nature as a significant and meaningful 
order, which could support a more humble and respectful approach to 
natural systems. A genomic approach to ecology might, for instance, 
cultivate the image of land as a ‘collective organism’, as proposed by 
Leopold.
Leopold’s use of the term ‘paradox’ appears to be somewhat misleading, 
as the views he describes seem to refer to ‘normal’ (i.e. non-paradoxical) 
oppositions.
In concert with my interviewees, I have decided to mention the researchers 
and institutes involved by name. This not only makes my analysis verifiable, 
but also enhances the tangibility and liveliness of the discussion.
33
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The organism-centred approach (cf. Marco 2010, preface) seeks 
to improve our understanding of critical ecological interactions by 
focussing on the level of the individual organism. At the time of the Gnettic 
application, this approach was organised around classical laboratory-
based model organisms, i.e. organisms with well-characterised gene 
expression patterns and large research networks around them, for 
instance the plant Arabidopsis thaliana and the nematode Caenorhabditis 
elegans (Maher 2009, 695; Ankeny & Leonelli 2011, 316). By exposing 
the model to different environmental conditions (humidity, drought, etc.), 
the genes and gene functions that matter most in a given ecological 
interaction were identified (Ungerer et al. 2008). Because of the homology 
among organisms, the insights obtained from classical model organism 
studies were expected to provide insight into the biology of ecologically 
interesting species as well: “We will exploit homologies across species 
to apply the insights obtained from models to other species, which are 
relevant for a wider range of environments than can be covered with the 
models only” (Brouwer et al. 2002, 5).39
 The grant application of Gnettic was accepted by NGI and resulted 
in the establishment of the Ecogenomics Consortium (EC) in 2003. 
Brouwer was appointed as its director. The NGI-funded programme was 
entitled “Assessing the living soil: An ecogenomics approach to explore 
and unlock sustainable life-support functions of soils.” The consortium 
was to receive substantial funding, amounting to 1.8 million euros a year 
for the period of 2004-2009. Brouwer and his partners believed that 
the goals of EC would be best met by substantial investments in basic 
academic research: “research within the cluster is largely fundamental, 
for the simple reason that we know so very little about the living 
component of soil in particular” (NGI Annual Report 2002, 58). This focus 
on academic demands disappointed non-academic partners, “who felt 
they could contribute little to the composition of the board or to the EC’s 
As a result of technological advances (especially the introduction of next-
generation sequencing methodology), the organism-centred approach has 
recently succeeded in shifting its emphasis from research on traditional model 
species to ecologically interesting species, e.g. the water flea Daphnia pulex.
39
The ambition of Gnettic was
“to develop a set of genomics-based tools […] that can be 
used to analyze ecological systems, identify possible threats of 
contamination to the environment and human health, and to guide 
industrial production processes towards sustainable development” 
(Idem, 3).
The rationale for developing such a toolbox was that at the time, the level 
of understanding of ecological systems was inadequate for accurate 
predictions of responses to anthropogenic – i.e. man-made – disturbance. 
The biological instruments used in ecological assessments (biosensors, 
bioreporter systems, bioassays) were, in general, very labour-intensive. 
Moreover, they could only measure a limited number of targets at a 
given moment. The applicants argued that, in order to develop effective 
strategies for the sustainable production of animal and plant resources, 
major innovations were necessary. Genomics-based technologies 
enabled such innovations, “as they have the advantage that a multitude 
of targets can be evaluated at the same time with great responsiveness” 
(Idem, 3).
 In analysing and managing ecological systems, Gnettic intended to 
apply two central approaches: metagenomics and the organism-centred 
approach. The first approach “enables us to study microorganisms in 
the complex communities where they actually live bypassing the need 
to isolate and culture individual community members” (Brouwer 2008, 
1). In the 1990s, most microbiologists still assumed that the majority of 
microorganisms in a sample could be recovered by culturing them in the 
laboratory. An increasing amount of evidence nevertheless shows that 
“fewer than 0.1% of the microorganisms in soil are readily cultured using 
current techniques. […] the other 99.9% of soil microflora is emerging 
as a world of stunning, novel genetic diversity” (Handelsman et al. 1998, 
245). By enabling the culture-independent genomic analysis of microbial 
populations, metagenomics “offers a window on an enormous and 
previously unknown world of microorganisms” (Handelsman 2007, 8). 
9190
(Veldhuis & Peels 2007, cited in Kloet et al. 2013, 214). In order to be 
considered for the second round of funding, EC had to implement NGI’s 
valorisation demands. This led to the establishment of the Ecogenomics 
Innovation Center (ECOLINC), in which the ‘science-based’ focus of 
the 2004-2009 period was replaced by a more practical focus with a 
strong emphasis on “innovative aspects and valorization opportunities” 
(Brouwer 2008, 2). As Brouwer put it, “results and developments from 
the ongoing EC project have stimulated our ambition and increased our 
confidence that it is possible to assess and exploit nature’s vast hidden 
potential to develop sustainable applications in bio-based economy” 
(Idem, 1). ECOLINC received a follow-up grant of 3MEUR for 2009-2013 
(compared to a budget of 11MEUR for 2004-2009).
 The new focus of ECOLINC was clearly reflected in three of its main 
themes of investigation and valorisation. Firstly, the new programme 
sought to develop metagenomics and other ‘-omics’-based tools. The 
second theme dealt with the discovery of new functional capabilities 
of (un)cultivable microorganisms. Citing Brouwer again, “unleashing 
these hidden treasures will create a huge potential for applications in 
the fields of sustainable chemistry, alternative energy, in biorefineries, 
and in bio-construction materials” (Brouwer 2008, 2). Thirdly, ECOLINC 
focussed on the development of “novel genomics-based cellular and 
whole organism test systems as alternatives for non-animal tests” (Idem, 
2). Such alternative test systems were necessary in chemical industry for 
the safety assessment of large numbers of existing chemical compounds.
3.4 The start of a new platform
The consortium’s move from basic ecogenomics research to a more 
practical approach was not unanimously welcomed. Whereas the 
industrial partners were happy with the “new market opportunities”, 
some of the academic partners “fundamentally disagreed with a focus on 
economic valorization” (Kloet et al. 2013, 213-214). To secure the “further 
research agenda. However, most did not complain as the EC funding was 
an additional opportunity to link their R&D activities to basic academic 
research” (Kloet et al. 2013, 212).
3.3 From publication to product
In January 2008, NGI announced that its director Diederik Zijderveld was 
leaving. His departure implied a significant change for EC. Under the 
supervision of the academically oriented Zijderveld, NGI had focussed 
on “creating a solid research infrastructure and a close-knit genomics 
community on the basis of excellent research” (NGI Annual Report 2008, 
5). His successor Colja Laane, who had a background in industry, put 
a much stronger emphasis on ‘valorisation’, i.e. the process by which 
scientific knowledge is made profitable for society:
“Our emphasis will be: from Publication to Product […]. All money 
and effort put into research must result in more applications. 
Valorisation is the motto, in terms of patents, licenses and new 
businesses.”40
NGI’s shift in emphasis put the consortium’s members in a difficult 
position. The mid-term review of EC, which took place during the second 
half of 2006, had already pointed out that “achieving interdisciplinarity 
and […] realizing the societal mission” (Kloet et al. 2013, 213) were 
weaker points of the programme needing attention. The review 
committee had argued that, whereas the consortium’s achievements in 
terms of scientific excellence were quite impressive,41 it had difficulties 
employing “the knowledge to effect positive changes for society” 
Netherlands Genomics Initiative [http://www.genomics.nl/News%20
archive/24%20April%202008.aspx] – last accessed 13 September 2013.
During the 2004-2009 period, EC generated 510 scientific publications (Kloet 
et al. 2013, 214).
40
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Even though NERO presented PEEG and ECOLINC as “two intertwined 
research programs” (Ouborg et al. 2009, 3), the friction between the two 
institutes became painfully clear during the very first National Ecogenomics 
Day (February 2008), the inaugural event in a series of annual meetings 
aimed at exploring the future of Dutch ecogenomics research. Moreover, 
it was on this occasion that NERO was to be officially introduced to 
the academic community at large. Position papers by leading experts 
while exploiting existing fundamental knowledge” (Ouborg et 
al. 2009, 3).42
The umbrella organisation was called the Netherlands Ecogenomics 
Research Organisation (NERO). Its founding was not only considered a 
strategic move to calm things down, but also an effort to remain attractive 
for the financing parties. For indeed, to ensure continued funding the 
Dutch ecogenomics community needed to come across as a robust and 
solid party (Ouborg, interview, August 2013). NERO described its mission 
as follows: 
“NERO will provide a platform function for ecogenomics, will act 
as co-ordinating organization, facilitating communication between 
the research field, financing agencies and end-users, will facilitate 
knowledge transfer in the form of workshops, thematic presentation 
days, and advanced international courses” (Ouborg & Kammenga 
2008, 27).
In his pre-proposal of ECOLINC, Brouwer also refers to the connection 
between the two ecogenomics programmes: “… a fundamental ecogenomics 
research program will be added to the ECOLINC proposal, funded by a 
separate source, namely the Earth & Life Science Program of the Netherlands 
Science Foundation” (Brouwer 2008, 2).
42
development of basic and fundamental scientific knowledge” (Ouborg 
et al. 2009, 3), the latter started a parallel initiative, in cooperation with 
external research groups, entitled Platform Ecological and Evolutionary 
Genomics (PEEG), sometimes referred to as the National Program 
Ecological and Evolutionary Genomics (NP-EEG). PEEG was established 
in early 2007, a few months after a meeting in Soeterbeeck, aimed at 
getting a complete overview of ecogenomics research activities in the 
Netherlands. Initially, Brouwer and his allies were strongly opposed to 
the launching of PEEG, as they saw the new platform as a competitor. 
The members of PEEG, however, claimed that their programme should 
not be seen as a rival of ECOLINC, but rather as the continuation of 
the fundamental research project that was initiated by EC. PEEG’s 
financial sources were different from those for ECOLINC: for the 2009-
2014 period, it received a funding of 1MEUR from the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), enabling four PhD projects 
to be carried out (Van Straalen, interview, September 2013).
3.5 Joining forces: the establishment of  
  NERO
The establishment of PEEG did not put an end to the tensions within 
the Dutch ecogenomics community. To prevent the community from 
falling apart, the members of PEEG and ECOLINC decided to set up an 
umbrella organisation, by means of which the two programmes could be 
presented as ‘intertwined’, albeit with different orientations:
“While both proposals have strong connections, they differ 
in the emphasis: NP-PEEG places emphasis on extending 
fundamental ecogenomics knowledge, as a requirement for 
developing applications, while ECOLINC places emphasis on 
the development of ecogenomics knowledge for biotechnology, 
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research in the field of ecological genomics. 
 However, the tensions between the various research parties involved 
in NERO do not only give evidence of a strategic conflict concerning the 
(future) direction of Dutch ecogenomics research; they also show a more 
fundamental difference between NERO’s rank and file. NERO had united 
researchers coming from different branches of the biological sciences: 
ecologists with a “comprehensive way of looking at the earth’s fabric 
of life” (Worster 1994, x), molecular biologists with a more “mechanical 
picture of nature” (Idem, 40), industrial biotechnology experts interested 
in new research equipment for exploiting microbial systems, as well 
as representatives of various intermediate positions. All these parties 
brought along their own normative perspectives, their particular ways of 
interpreting the natural world as a morally significant order. This normativity 
usually remains hidden, but as a result of Brouwer’s presentation, and 
more specifically his use of the term ‘nature mining’, it suddenly came to 
the surface.
 In the introduction, I explained that Leopold wrote about a ‘chasm’ 
between different images of nature as early as in the 1940s. He observed 
a divide which he considered to be common to many specialised fields, 
such as forestry, agriculture, and wildlife management. Each of these 
fields can be divided into a group that “regards the land as soil, and its 
function as commodity-production,” and a group that “regards the land 
as a biota, and its function as something broader” (Leopold 1949, 221). 
In all these divides, Leopold recognised the same basic ‘paradoxes’:
“[M]an the conqueror versus man the biotic citizen; science the 
sharpener of his sword versus science the searchlight on his 
universe; land the slave and servant versus land the collective 
organism” (Idem, 223 – author’s emphasis).
In the following sections, I will use Leopold’s ‘paradoxes’ as a guideline 
for exploring the different existing conceptions of nature within the Dutch 
ecogenomics community.
from the Dutch ecogenomics community were presented, stressing the 
importance and the relevance of ecogenomics for various sub-disciplines 
of biology. Brouwer was one of the speakers. Faithful to the new strategy 
of NGI, he argued that Dutch ecogenomicists should put more emphasis 
on the ‘valorisation opportunities’ of their field of research. He suggested 
that one way in which ecogenomics research could be translated into 
viable opportunities, was by means of ‘nature mining’ (cf. Brouwer 
2008). With this term, he referred to one of the two basic experimental 
approaches within the metagenomics field: the function-driven approach, 
in which microbial DNA is screened for potential applications in medicine, 
agriculture, and industry (Handelsman 2007).43 Natural ecosystems 
contain a huge number of valuable assets, such as antibiotics, vitamins, 
and enzymes. Function-based metagenomics enables us to ‘mine’ 
environmental samples – soil, sediment, groundwater – for these hidden 
goods (cf. Brouwer 2008).
 Brouwer’s use of the term ‘nature-mining’ instantly revealed the 
existing discord within the Dutch ecogenomics community. Part of the 
audience – especially those with a background in industry – immediately 
embraced the term. They expressed their enthusiasm by persuading the 
organising committee to give Brouwer the opportunity to finish his talk 
(he had to cut short his speech due to a lack of time) at the end of the 
meeting. Others – notably the ecologists associated with PEEG – were 
very reluctant. In spite of their efforts to emphasise the importance of 
“extending fundamental ecogenomics knowledge” (Ouborg et al. 2009, 
3), Brouwer now suggested ECOLINC’s strategy as a model for all Dutch 
ecogenomics research. Some of the attendants even had the impression 
that Brouwer wanted the term ‘nature mining’ as the new ‘brand name’ for 
The second approach, known as the sequence-driven approach, concentrates 
on the screening of microbial communities to reveal the overwhelming 
diversity of its members: “DNA from the environment of interest is sequenced 
and subjected to computational analysis. The metagenomic sequences are 
compared to sequences deposited in publicly available databases […]. The 
genes are then collected into groups of similar predicted function, and the 
distribution of various functions and types of proteins that conduct those 
functions can be assessed” (Handelsman 2007, 4).
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 The image of nature as a slave and servant became dominant 
during the Scientific Revolution and the rise of a market-oriented culture 
in early modern Europe. In her famous book The Death of Nature (1989), 
philosopher and historian of science Carolyn Merchant argues that in 
the Renaissance era, a different image of nature was still prevalent. 
Inspired by ancient Greek philosophers such as Anaxagoras (500-
428 B.C) and Theophrastus (370-278 B.C.), the Earth was viewed as 
a living organism and nurturing mother. This image had functioned as 
a normative constraint against the mining of Mother Earth: “One does 
not readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold or mutilate her 
body” (Merchant 1989, 3). During the Scientific Revolution, this vitalistic 
image was replaced by a mechanistic view of nature: the Earth was no 
longer seen as a bountiful mother, but as an inanimate physical system. 
Merchant explains that the conception of the Earth as “a passive 
receptor” came to imply an approval of its exploitation, especially under 
the influence of Francis Bacon (1561-1626). She describes Bacon’s line 
of thought as follows:
“Due to the Fall from the Garden of Eden […], the human race 
lost its ‘dominion over creation’. […] Only by ‘digging further and 
further into the mine of natural knowledge’ could mankind recover 
that lost dominion. In this way, ‘the narrow limits of man’s dominion 
over the universe’ could be stretched ‘to their promised bounds’” 
(Idem, 170).
Merchant thus claims that in Bacon’s view, God had not forbidden the 
‘inquisition of nature’. Enslaving nature was, on the contrary, according 
to His plan: “Nature must be ‘bound into service’ and made a ‘slave’, 
put ‘in constraint’ and ‘molded’ by the mechanical arts. The ‘searchers 
and spies of nature’ are to discover her plots and secrets” (Idem, 169). 
Merchant explains that for Bacon, miners and smiths were the models 
for a new class of explorers, as
3.7 Industrial mining
At the beginning of this paper, I explained that for some members of 
the Dutch ecogenomics community, the term ‘nature mining’ invoked 
an image of nature as a reservoir to be exploited using the latest 
technologies. As Joop Ouborg, co-founder of PEEG, put it: the term 
as such conveys a technocratic and human-centred image of nature. It 
echoes the question: how can we exploit nature to meet human needs? 
(Ouborg, interview, September 2012). In the field of environmental 
ethics, the interpretation of nature as a mere means to human ends is 
said to reveal an instrumental approach to nature (e.g. Rolston 1981; 
Curry 2006). Such an approach is based on the assumption that nature 
cannot have value independently of human needs and desires; it is 
thought to possess “meaning and value only when it is made to serve 
the human […] as a means to his or her ends” (Plumwood 2002, 109).
 Why is the term ‘nature mining’ so strongly associated with an 
instrumental approach to nature? Obviously, this association largely 
revolves around the use of the term ‘mining’, i.e. the industrial process 
of extracting valuable minerals or other geological materials from the 
Earth. Mining is one of the most pronounced examples of a process in 
which nature appears as a resource, as a slave and servant (cf. Leopold 
1949, 223). By polluting “the ‘purest streams’ of the earth’s womb”, 
mining operations “have altered the earth from a bountiful mother to a 
passive receptor of human rape” (Merchant 1989, 38-39). In order to 
mine, trees and vegetation often have to be cleared. Moreover, large 
scale mining operations depend on industrial-sized machinery to extract 
the metals and minerals from the soil. Severely polluting chemicals, 
such as cyanide and mercury, are required to extract these valuable 
materials. Large amounts of waste materials are often discharged into 
rivers, streams, and oceans.44
Pink goes Green [http://www.dzpinkgoesgreen.org/blog.aspx?item=Blog/
Blog%2052%20-%20Have%20You%20Heard%20About%20Responsible%20
Jewelry.xml] – last accessed 16 September 2013.
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 Earlier, I explained that the term ‘nature mining’ was only rejected by 
part of Brouwer’s audience. NERO’s industrial partners, notably, received 
this term with warm enthusiasm. One possible explanation for this might 
be that they overlooked what this particular vocabulary meant for nature; 
the latter was merely seen “as the ‘environment’ or invisible background 
condition […] against which the ‘foreground’ achievements of reason or 
culture [...] take place” (Plumwood 1993, 4). Thus, in interpreting the term 
‘nature mining’, the non-academic partners might have zoomed in on its 
positive impact on human progress, rather than on its destructive effects 
on nature. After all, the products of the mining industry have been, and 
still are, essential to human development.
 Another explanation might be that the industrial partners – including 
Brouwer himself – had a different, more innocent and ‘neutral’ association 
in mind, namely ‘data mining’.46 Since the beginning of the digital 
information era, data overload has become a very common problem; 
we simply gather more data than we can process. The field “concerned 
with the development of methods and techniques for making sense 
of data” (Fayyad et al. 1996, 37) is known as ‘knowledge discovery in 
databases’ (KDD). Data mining officially refers to one of the steps in 
the knowledge discovery process, namely “the application of specific 
algorithms for extracting patterns from data” (Idem, 39). However, today 
the term is frequently used as a synonym for KDD, thus defined as “the 
nontrivial extraction of implicit, previously unknown, and potentially useful 
information from data” (Frawley et al. 1992, 58).
 What is the image of nature that comes to mind when we interpret 
‘nature mining’ as a derivative of ‘data mining’, i.e. as the extraction of 
previously unknown, and potentially useful, information from large soil 
data sets? Contrary to industrial mining, data mining is a non-invasive 
approach: rather than extracting valuable ‘hardware’ (gold, coal, ore, 
Van Straalen explained that, because of the resistance evoked by the 
term ‘nature mining’, EC’s leadership team sometimes preferred to use the 
term ‘unlock’, e.g. in the title of the NGI-funded ecogenomics programme: 
“Assessing the living soil: An ecogenomics approach to explore and unlock 
sustainable life-support functions of soils” (Interview, September 2013).
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3.8 Data mining
The term ‘nature mining’ cannot easily be disconnected from its association 
with disruptive mining practices. Yet, this association was amplified with 
other, similar elements in the vocabulary used by Brouwer. As mentioned 
before, he refers to the soil as a treasure at human disposal:
“The application of metagenomics approaches […] will greatly 
extend our ability to discover hitherto hidden functional capabilities 
of (un)cultivable microorganisms. Unleashing these hidden 
treasures will create a huge potential for applications in the fields 
of sustainable chemistry, alternative energy, in biorefineries, and in 
bio-construction materials” (Brouwer 2008, 2).
Another example of ‘tainted’ terminology was Brouwer’s description of 
ecogenomics as part of “the ‘Biotechnology for Nature’ field,”45 as if it 
goes without saying that nature itself will benefit from our biotechnological 
interventions. Thus it was the “particular combination of terms, as well as 
the distinctive ways in which these terms [were] interpreted and related 
to each other” (Van Wensveen 1999, 11), that underlined the provocative 
and controversial view of nature in Brouwer’s speech.
“they had developed the two most important methods of wresting 
nature’s secrets from her, ‘the one searching into the bowels of 
nature, the other shaping nature as on an anvil’. […] For ‘the truth 
of nature lies hid in certain deep mines and caves,’ within the 
earth’s bosom” (Idem, 171).
ECOLINC [http://www.ecogenomics.nl/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=11&Itemid=33&lang=english] – last accessed 11 
February 2014.
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community together from the very start. In June 2014, NERO will organise 
the 6th National Ecogenomics Day with funding from NWO. Apart from this 
annual meeting, not much has been heard from NERO in recent years 
(Hans van Veen, e-mail correspondence, September 2013).
 Compared to the situation in 2008, ECOLINC and PEEG have 
drifted even further apart. ECOLINC has put the valorisation issue even 
higher on its agenda. In 2010, it became part of the BE-Basic Foundation 
(Bio-based Ecologically Balanced Sustainable Industrial Chemistry), 
“an international public-private partnership that develops industrial 
bio-based solutions to build a sustainable society.”47 Brouwer is a key 
member of its leadership team, together with chemical engineer Luuk 
van der Wielen. Earlier, I pointed out that NGI had reserved a follow-
up grant of 3MEUR for ECOLINC. As part of the BE-Basic programme, 
ECOLINC succeeded in obtaining an additional grant of no less 
than 18MEUR from the Economic Structure Enhancing Fund (FES), a 
policy-driven research fund. Officially, the BE-Basic programme would 
come to an end in 2015, but because of its success, it will continue 
until mid-2017.
 The research conducted by BE-Basic is organised in ten ‘Flagships’, 
each addressing a significant scientific or socio-economic challenge. 
The seventh Flagship, entitled “High-throughput experimentation and 
(meta)genomic mining”, seeks to develop and apply “high-throughput 
approaches and tools to explore and mine the metagenome.”48 The 
vocabulary of the BE-Basic team reminds us of Brouwer’s speech during 
the first National Ecogenomics Day: nature appears as a resource for 
exploitation without constraint (cf. Plumwood 2002, 100). The term ‘nature 
mining’ has been replaced by ‘DNA-mining’, referring to the “search 
for enzyme variants in the total DNA pool found in […] soil and water 
samples.” Moreover, the study of nature is described in terms of hunting: 
BE-Basic Foundation [http://www.be-basic.org/] – last accessed 2 September 
2013. BE-Basic builds on the breakthroughs of the B-Basic and the 
Ecogenomics consortia. 
BE-Basic Foundation [http://www.be-basic.org/research/hte-metagenomic-
mining.html] – last accessed 2 September 2013.
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petroleum, shale gas, etc.) from the Earth, it seeks to extract valuable 
‘software’ (tangible knowledge) “adrift in the flood of data” (Frawley et al. 
1992, 57). In an analogous manner, ‘nature mining’ attempts to screen 
large soil databases for useful information. Following this particular 
interpretation, the term ‘nature mining’ seems to be closely related to 
biomimicry, a scientific approach “that studies nature’s models and then 
imitates or takes inspiration from these designs and processes to solve 
human problems” (Benyus 2002, front pages). However, although this 
interpretation does not evoke images of slavery or the ‘raping of mother 
Earth’, the approach to nature still seems primarily instrumental. By 
comparing the soil to a database, “the natural world [is presented] as 
something that is passive and malleable in relation to human beings” 
(Rogers 1998, 244). The reduction of nature to a “passive object of 
knowledge” (Cheney 1992, 229) is one of the core themes in eco-feminist 
literature (e.g. Griffin 1995; Warren 2000; Plumwood 2002). Val Plumwood, 
an eminent Australian exponent of this particular movement, defines the 
interactions that originate from this reduction as monological, “because 
they are responsive to and pay attention to the needs of just one [namely 
the human] party to the relationship” (Plumwood 2002, 40). In a similar 
fashion, cultural theorist Richard Rogers argues that “objectification 
negates the possibility for dialogue […]. By transforming what exists into 
what is useful to us life is silenced” (Rogers 1998, 249-250 – author’s 
emphasis; cf. Evernden 1993, 88-94). Thus, even if we follow this more 
humble interpretation of Brouwer’s words, we still cannot escape the 
commodification of nature. Both analogies resonate the message: “Nature 
is (a) mine: it is ours!”
3.9 After 2008
How has the Dutch ecogenomics field developed since the memorable 
research meeting in February 2008? As we have seen, NERO has 
had trouble keeping the different fractions of the Dutch ecogenomics 
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3.10 Hopes for the future
The ways in which the research programmes of ECOLINC and PEEG have 
developed up till now remind us of one of the ‘paradoxes’ mentioned by 
Leopold. In the BE-Basic programme, science appears as the sharpener 
of the researcher’s sword (cf. Leopold 1949, 223), or, to stick to the 
vocabulary of the leadership team, as a hunter’s weapon. It is interesting 
to see that this specific vocabulary is embedded in a programme that 
seeks to contribute to the development of “new sustainable production 
processes”54. Apparently, this instrumental language can be part of the 
rhetoric of sustainability. The two ESF-funded programmes – especially 
ConGenOmics – are based on a different vocabulary. As they seek to 
improve our overall understanding of critical ecological interactions, 
science does not appear as a ‘weapon’, but rather as a ‘searchlight’ 
for spotting complex ecological processes (cf. Leopold 1949, 223). 
Moreover, instead of understanding natural ecosystems as mere 
“commodity-production” (Idem, 221), ConGenOmics explicitly seeks to 
protect natural ecosystems and its inhabitants from destructive human 
interventions.
 In my view, there are various opportunities to include this more 
modest way of speaking into the BE-Basic programme, as well. Earlier, I 
explained that, in order to implement NGI’s valorisation demands, Brouwer 
and his research team increasingly concentrated on the development 
of metagenomics and other ‘-omics’-based tools. Compared to the 
organism-centred approach, this approach offers more opportunities for 
developing useful applications and products (e.g. medicines, vitamins, 
enzymes). At the present time, the usefulness of metagenomics to solve 
various complex human problems seems to encourage an instrumental 
approach to nature. However, this does not necessarily need to be so: 
the field also harbours other interpretations of nature as a significant and 
Luuk van der Wielen. 6 December 2012. “BBE Beyond Bioethanol”. 
Presentation as part of the ESF Research Conference Towards a Sustainable 
Bio-Based Society, Amsterdam.
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“Nature will be the main hunting ground for [uncovering] novel enzymes 
with very special properties.”49 
 And what has become of PEEG, the fundamental research programme 
that was developed out of discontent with ECOLINC’s move towards 
valorisation? The five-year NWO-funding will expire in 2014. In 2010, 
members of PEEG started to collaborate with international colleagues 
in the European Collaborative Research programme ‘Ecological and 
Evolutionary Functional Genomics’ (EuroEEFG). The programme, which 
was terminated in May 2013, was funded by the European Science 
Foundation (ESF) and consisted of “eight collaborative research projects, 
spanning all kingdoms of life and various levels of biological organization 
(i.e. individuals, populations, communities, ecosystems)”50. The main goal 
of this collaboration was to bring about “a more successful scientifically-
based management of ecological resources”51.
 Another ESF-funded project joined by (former) members of PEEG 
is the Conservation Genomics (ConGenOmics) Research Networking 
Programme. In this programme, the function of ecosystems is clearly 
understood “as something broader than mere economic value” (Leopold 
1949, 223). This becomes apparent, for instance, in the statement that 
“conservation biology seeks to protect species and their habitats from 
the negative effects of [human-induced] changes”52. Moreover, one 
of the aims of ConGenOmics is to “promote development of adequate 
conservation management programmes for endangered species at a 
European scale”.53 ConGenOmics started in 2011 and will end in 2016.
BE-Basic Foundation [http://www.be-basic.org/research/hte-metagenomic-
mining/new-robust-enzymes-for-bioplastic-production.html] – last accessed 2 
September 2013.
EuroEEFG [http://www.nioo.knaw.nl/euroeefg] – last accessed 16 September 
2013.
ESF [http://www.esf.org/index.php?id=5453] – last accessed 12 May 2014. 
ESF [http://www.esf.org/coordinating-research/research-networking-
programmes/life-earth-and-environmental-sciences-lee/current-esf-
research-networking-programmes-in-life-earth-and-environmental-sciences/
conservation-genomics-amalgamation-of-conservation-genetics-and-
ecological-and-evolutionary-genomics-congenomics.html] – last accessed 12 
May 2014. 
Idem
49
50
51
52
53
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forms of life” (Plumwood 2002, 99). Therefore, one might say, even the 
field’s huge potential for products and applications does not necessarily 
need to go hand in hand with instrumental approaches to nature, but 
might, on the contrary, function as a basis for respect. But all this is no 
more than hope for the future. As Rogers argues: “The reconstruction 
of a different relationship to the environment in which we live requires 
radically alternative conceptions of humans, nature, material conditions, 
and discourse” (Rogers 1998, 268).
Figure 3. 
Overview of the research parties involved in the Dutch ecogenomics community
meaningful order, which could form the basis for a more humble and 
respectful approach to natural systems. For example, metagenomics 
might cultivate the image of land as a ‘collective organism’, as has been 
proposed by Leopold; it shows us the interdependence of all life forms, 
or, to speak with Leopold, it shows us that we are all “member[s] of a 
biotic team” (Leopold 1949, 205). Traditionally, life is considered “to be 
organized around the pivotal unit of the individual organism” (O’Malley & 
Dupré 2010, 189). Metagenomics invites us to replace this ‘monogenomic’ 
conception by an organism- and species-free context: by demonstrating 
how genes “influence each other’s activities in serving collective 
functions” (Committee on Metagenomics 2007, 13), the field encourages 
us to “explain and predict […] the behavior of the biosphere as though it 
were a single superorganism” (Idem, 139 – my emphasis). Thus, for some 
practitioners, the field moves us “inexorably in the direction of a Gaia-like 
concept of the world” (Dupré 2007, 200 – my emphasis; cf. Committee on 
Metagenomics 2007, 139).55
 Another way in which metagenomics might endorse a more respectful 
approach to natural systems is by confronting us with the essential role of 
microbes in fulfilling all kinds of highly important human needs. Microbial 
communities – notably those residing in the soil – play a crucial role in 
the health and productivity of crops and in cleaning up contaminated 
environments. Moreover, they are essential for purifying drinking water 
and the development of new medicines (cf. Handelsman 2007; Committee 
on Metagenomics 2007). From this angle, metagenomics could even 
encourage us to embrace a conception of nature that connects with the 
mythical image of the Earth as a nurturing mother (cf. Merchant 1989); the 
field reminds us of the fact that we humans “are not only cultural beings 
but also natural beings, just as dependent on a healthy biosphere as other 
This Gaian perspective is not only applicable to natural ecosystems, but 
also to our human bodies. Metagenomics has demonstrated that our bodies 
consist for 90 per cent of microbial, rather than ‘human’ cells. As a result, 
metagenomics encourages us to conceive ourselves as collective organisms 
or ‘supraorganisms’ as well (Turnbaugh & Gordon 2008; O’Malley & Dupré 
2007; Drenthen et al. 2009).
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Chapter 4
Hunting for nature’s treasures or 
learning from nature?
The narrative ambivalence of the 
ecotechnological turn
113112
Words are like empty balloons, inviting us to fill them up with associations. 
As they fill they begin to gain intrinsic force and at last to shape our 
perceptions and expectations.
– Donald Worster, 1994
Over the past few decades, biological knowledge has grown rapidly. 
We have discovered that the mechanisms and processes of nature are 
much more complex, intricate and interwoven than we ever imagined. As 
“[w]e can see, more clearly than ever before, how nature works 
her miracles” (Benyus 2002, 6), an increasing number of scientists, 
designers, and engineers claim that we are entering a new technological 
era, in which we are ‘re-inventing’ our relationship with nature (cf. Ball 
2001; McDonough & Braungart 2002; Benyus 2002). Whereas more 
traditional technological approaches are based on principles that 
are different from, and often disturb or interfere with the dynamics of 
nature (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006), new technological approaches are 
increasingly inspired by “nature’s surprisingly effective design principles” 
(McDonough & Braungart 2002, 6). This desire to produce technological 
devices that mimic the natural world as closely as possible reveals an 
‘ecotechnological turn’, meaning that nature’s own strategies, developed 
in the course of the long and winding road of evolution, provide the 
models for our innovations.
 Scientists have found various ways to express this shift towards more 
‘natural’ approaches to nature, making use of different narrative structures, 
metaphors, and images. With these ‘narrative self-presentations’, they 
seek to express in what ways the new approach to technology can be 
distinguished from the old, as well as to legitimise their research activities. 
4.1 Introduction56
This chapter is co-authored by Martin Drenthen and has been submitted to 
Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment.
56
Treasure Island. Illustration by N.C Wyeth for the book by R.L. Stevenson, ed. 1911.
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narrative comes with a promise as well, albeit a rather different one: if 
we listen carefully to nature’s lessons, pay close attention to the ways in 
which our teacher tackles design challenges, we will ourselves become 
smarter and better problem solvers as well. Here, the ‘prize’ is not so 
much a material, but rather an intellectual reward.
 Yet, as we will argue in this paper, both the treasure quest 
and the teacher-student narratives are much more ambivalent and 
multidimensional than the scientists using those narratives seem to 
realise. They are embedded in larger, more common narratives which 
can be found throughout our culture, for instance in literature, art, and film. 
We will show how these genres reveal the ambivalence and complexity 
of both narratives, using two well-known movies as illustrations. As an 
example of an archetypical moral narrative about treasure hunting, 
we will concentrate on Steven Spielberg’s first Indiana Jones movie 
Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981). Subsequently, to illustrate what is at 
stake in the teacher-student narrative, we will focus on the theme of the 
sorcerer’s apprentice, which achieved global popular fame through Walt 
Disney’s 20th century animated cartoon version entitled The Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice (1940).
4.2 Metagenomics as a practice of  
  treasure hunting
A typical example of an emerging field of research that endorses an 
ecotechnological perspective, is metagenomics, i.e. “the culture-
independent genomic analysis of microbial communities” (Schloss & 
Handelsman 2003, 303). In the 1990s, most microbiologists still assumed 
that the majority of microorganisms in a sample could be recovered by 
culturing them in the laboratory. An increasing amount of evidence has 
nevertheless shown that “fewer than 0.1% of the microorganisms in soil 
are readily cultured using current techniques. […] the other 99.9% of soil 
microflora is emerging as a world of stunning, novel genetic diversity” 
(Handelsman et al. 1998, 245). By enabling the culture-independent 
In this paper we will explore two of these ‘narratives of ecotechnology’. 
Firstly, researchers in the emerging field of metagenomics compare the 
new practice of uncovering the Earth’s microbial diversity with a quest 
for a treasure (e.g. Oh et al. 2003, 248; Committee on Metagenomics 
2007, 76; Schoenfeld 2010, et al. 20). This narrative is meant to draw 
attention to the wealth of products yet to be discovered in nature: the 
ecotechnological turn is presented as a quest for the ‘goods’ nature has 
produced in the process of evolution. But there are also more critical 
voices claiming that the treasure quest narrative does not provide a 
full picture of what is at stake in ecotechnology. One of them is Janine 
Benyus, co-founder of the Biomimicry Guild (Montana). If we want to do 
justice to nature’s own creative processes, argues Benyus, we should 
“view nature as a source of ideas instead of goods”57. She expresses 
this alternative view by referring to a different type of narrative, one that 
sees the new ecotechnological practice of ‘biomimicry’ as a tutorial 
practice. By referring to nature as our ‘mentor’, Benyus shows that for 
her, the ecotechnological turn not only implies that we acknowledge the 
superiority of the ‘goods’ produced by nature; it is also connected with 
“a new way of viewing and valuing nature” (2002, front pages). Once we 
recognise nature as our mentor, we simultaneously have to recognise 
ourselves as nature’s students, open to the lessons nature could teach 
us.
 Benyus presents the tutorial relationship as the opposite of the 
practice of treasure hunting. However, we will show that these two narrative 
self-presentations are strikingly similar in one respect: ecotechnologists 
have selected these narratives because they are believed to provide 
sympathetic models with positive connotations only. The treasure quest 
narrative stresses that although the development of ecotechnology 
will require full commitment and high investments, these sacrifices will 
result in a great material reward in the end, in the form of new products 
beneficial to humans (e.g. antibiotics, vitamins, enzymes). The tutorial 
Biomimicry 3.8 [http://biomimicry.net/about/biomimicry/conversation-with-
janine/] – last accessed 18 November 2013.
57
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Metagenomics claims that the discovery of new genes and functions in 
soil “is one of the potential treasure troves of metagenomics” (2007, 76).59
 By presenting metagenomics as a quest for the valuable ‘goods’ 
still hidden in nature, researchers in this field not only seek to make 
understandable, but also to legitimise their research activities. This 
particular self-presentation gives the field an aura of adventure: it brings 
to mind the age of the great explorations. That metagenomics can also 
be an adventure in a literal sense is best illustrated by the global ocean 
sampling expeditions carried out by scientists at the J. Craig Venter 
Institute. For more than a decade, these scientists “have been on a 
quest to unlock the secrets of the oceans by sampling, sequencing and 
analyzing the DNA of the microorganisms living in these waters.”60  
 Most importantly, however, the treasure quest narrative reflects an 
investment that will require full commitment, yet with the promise of great 
reward in the end. This reward should primarily be understood in material 
terms; the narrative self-presentation especially refers to products to be 
developed based on the as-yet-undiscovered goods that lie hidden in 
the soil (or other natural ecosystems), such as enzymes and antibiotics 
(Handelsman 2007, 6). The confidence that the metagenomic quest is an 
effort worth making, is also expressed by the amount of money invested 
in metagenomic research. Research projects at the J. Craig Venter 
Institute, for instance, are funded not only by government institutions 
(such as NSF and NIH), but receive great sums of money from family 
foundations as well.61 Thus, the prospect of new products beneficial to 
humans plays an important role in the justification of metagenomics, and 
is instrumental in helping to raise the required funding for what is yet 
a very open endeavour with a very uncertain outcome; metagenomics 
Even though metagenomics started as a method to study the collective 
genomes of the soil, the term nowadays covers the investigation of any 
microbial community: not only terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, but also the 
human microbiome. The treasure quest narrative, however, is especially used 
to emphasise the wealth of natural ecological niches (e.g. soil, water, air). 
J. Craig Venter Institute [http://www.jcvi.org/cms/research/projects/gos/
overview/] – last accessed 25 January 2014.
Idem
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analysis of microbial populations, metagenomics has revolutionised the 
field of microbiology in two ways. Firstly, “it offers a window on an enormous 
and previously unknown world of microorganisms” (Handelsman 2007, 
8). Knowledge of this world can help us solve various complex human 
problems:
“Metagenomics […] promises to provide a more complete 
understanding of the global cycles that keep the biosphere 
in balance, offer clues to the basis for many diseases, lead to 
development of new antimicrobial therapies and present solutions to 
environmental and biotechnological challenges” (Idem, 8).
Secondly, metagenomics allows the study of microbial communities under 
nature’s own conditions. Researchers in this field are aware of the fact that 
the artificial environments created in labs are very different from natural 
environments. In order to obtain a critical and realistic understanding 
of microbes in nature, they consider it essential to investigate microbial 
populations in their native habitats. Metagenomics can therefore be said 
to announce a new era in biology, “that of ecosystems biology” (Xu 2010, 
1).
 To draw attention to the wealth of products and applications yet 
to be discovered with the help of metagenomics, in various scientific 
publications and programmatic documents, this new practice of 
uncovering the Earth’s microbial diversity is compared to a quest for a 
treasure (e.g. Oh et al. 2003, 248; Park & Kim 2008, 163; Schoenfeld 
et al. 2010, 20;).58 For instance, Brouwer argues that “unleashing these 
hidden treasures will create a huge potential for applications in the fields 
of sustainable chemistry, alternative energy, in biorefineries, and in bio-
construction materials” (Brouwer 2008, 2). Moreover, the Committee on 
Apart from describing metagenomics as a practice of treasure hunting, some 
scientists refer to this research field as revealing “the earth’s bounty” (cf. 
Rondon et al. 1999, 403; Sleator et al. 2008, 361). Moreover, the metagenomic 
process of uncovering the Earth’s microbial diversity has also been referred to 
as ‘nature mining’ (cf. Brouwer 2008).
58
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is the strict separation between human and non-human nature. This 
feature is strongly represented by the American conservationist Gifford 
Pinchot (1865-1946), who believed that there were “just two things on 
this material earth – people and natural resources” (1947, 325). Evernden 
explains that this belief implies “the total dedication of the planet to 
human purposes – or rather to the contemporary human economy” (1993, 
150). Another result of separating the world in merely two realms – i.e. 
a human and a non-human realm – is that the complexity of the latter 
is severely underestimated. As Evernden argues: nature is treated “as 
homogeneous matter in search of a use” (Idem, 23). Val Plumwood, 
in a similar vein, claims that this homogenisation makes us insensitive 
to nature’s marvellous diversity. The variety of nature is only taken into 
consideration if it is expected to contribute to human prosperity: “Nature 
is conceived in terms of interchangeable and replaceable units, (as 
‘resources’, or standing reserve) rather than as infinitely diverse and 
always in excess of knowledge and classification” (2002, 107).
 However, according to Evernden, resourcism entails an even more 
dangerous aspect, namely “its apparent good intention. By describing 
something as a resource we seem to have cause to protect it. But all 
we really have is a license to exploit it” (1993, 23 – our emphasis). The 
transformation of “all relationships to nature into a simple subject-object or 
user-used one” (Idem, 24) goes hand in hand with the devaluation of nature. 
Reducing a tree to a device that produces oxygen, argues Evernden, 
is debasing to being itself. In a similar fashion, describing microbial 
ecosystems as treasure troves reduces the world of microorganisms 
to “another material thing that can be utilized by humans” (Idem, 24). 
4.4 Biomimicry as a tutorial practice
The resource approach to nature is not only criticised by environmental 
thinkers, but increasingly also by scientists. In an attempt to give a less 
instrumental, less reductionist account of the stakes of ecotechnology, 
4.3 Resourcism
In the context of metagenomics, the ecotechnological turn is presented 
as a quest for the ‘goods’ that nature has produced in the process of 
evolution. Nature appears as a super-innovator whose creations we can 
incorporate into our own technologies. There are, however, also more 
critical voices, claiming that the treasure quest narrative does not give a 
full picture of what is at stake in ecotechnology. Although this narrative 
underlines the superiority of nature’s innovations, nature is still presented 
as a ‘resource’. Resourcism has been the object of fundamental criticism 
by environmental thinkers for a long time. Neil Evernden describes 
resourcism as “a kind of modern religion which casts all of creation 
into categories of utility” (1993, 23). It is based on the conviction “that 
nature is for something” (Idem, 10) and should therefore be protected.62 
Resourcism was in itself a justified reaction against earlier forms of 
environmental advocacy, “preoccupied with aesthetics and metaphysics” 
(Idem, 4). It sought to replace the impractical and emotional testimonies 
of nature lovers like Henry David Thoreau and John Muir by rational 
arguments, underlining that wise management of natural resources is 
necessary to maintain current standards of living. Thus, “[w]here once 
only an anguished cry could be expected in defence of a threatened 
mountain or an endangered species, now a detailed inventory and a 
benefit-cost analysis [were] sure to be forthcoming” (Idem, 9).
 According to Evernden, one of the typical features of resourcism 
is one of the ‘-omics’ research fields that “give rise to quite substantial 
promises and expectations for society”, a ‘promisory’ practice which has 
been referred to as promisomics (Chadwick & Zwart 2013, 1).
The resource approach to nature is also known under different names: 
utilitarianism, cost-benefit analysis, etc. A popular present-day term expressing 
the idea that ecosystems are, above all, providers of goods and services, is 
‘ecosystem services’.
62
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scientists who gained inspiration from nature (cf. Ball 2001, 413). A 
classic example are the Wright brothers, who succeeded in flying the 
first heavier-than-air airplane in 1903, taking inspiration from observations 
of turkey vultures in flight. In the 1950s, the American engineer Otto 
Schmitt turned this nature-inspired approach into a more or less formal 
discipline. Instead of biomimicry, Schmitt used the term ‘biomimetics’ to 
describe the “transfer of ideas and analogues from biology to technology” 
(Vincent et al. 2006, 471). Benyus, however, appears to be (one of) 
the first to explicitly connect this discipline with “a new way of viewing 
and valuing nature” (2002, front pages). She explains that biomimicry is 
much more than a particular approach to solving engineering problems:
“In a society accustomed to dominating or ‘improving’ nature, 
this respectful imitation is a radically new approach, a revolution 
really. Unlike the Industrial Revolution, the Biomimicry Revolution 
introduces an era based not on what we can extract from nature, 
but on what we can learn from her” (Idem, 2).
What does Benyus seek to express with her presentation of biomimicry as 
a tutorial practice? By introducing this alternative narrative, she distances 
herself from interpretations of the ecotechnological turn that – implicitly 
– support the conviction that “the world was put here exclusively for our 
use” (Idem, 8). To enable more respectful approaches to nature, it is not 
enough to recognise the excellent quality of the ‘goods’ produced by 
nature, nor will it suffice to see nature as a superior innovator; it requires 
that we start looking differently at ourselves as well. The recognition of 
nature as our mentor implies that we simultaneously recognise ourselves 
as nature’s students, open to the lessons that nature has in store for us:
“Once we see nature as a mentor, our relationship with the living 
world changes. Gratitude tempers greed, and, […] “the notion of 
resources becomes obscene.” We realize that the only way to keep 
learning from nature is to safeguard naturalness, the wellspring of 
good ideas” (Idem, 9).
some of them have proposed another narrative; one that does more 
justice to nature’s own creative processes. The American science writer 
and innovation consultant Janine Benyus argues that we should “view 
nature as a source of ideas instead of goods”63. In her influential book 
Biomimicry: Innovation Inspired by Nature (2002), Benyus describes 
how her outlook on nature management went through a change. During 
her forestry studies, a reductionist, human-centred approach to nature 
management prevailed: 
“In reductionist fashion, we studied each piece of the forest 
separately […]. There were no labs in listening to the land 
or in emulating the ways in which natural communities grew 
and prospered. We practiced a human-centered approach to 
management, assuming that nature’s way of managing had nothing 
of value to teach us” (2002, 3). 
When Benyus started writing books on wildlife habitats, she was surprised 
by “the exquisite ways that organisms are adapted to their places and to 
each other” (Idem, 4). She began to wonder why human beings, while 
facing the same physical challenges as all other living beings, sought to 
meet those challenges through human cleverness alone. It was then that 
Benyus decided to develop an alternative approach, in which organisms 
and natural systems are no longer regarded as resources available for 
unrestricted use, but as “the ultimate teachers” (Idem, 4 – our emphasis). 
Benyus gave this approach the label ‘biomimicry’, derived from the 
Ancient Greek βιος, meaning life, and μιμησις, meaning to imitate. She 
describes biomimics as “men and women who are exploring nature’s 
masterpieces […] and then copying these designs and manufacturing 
processes to solve our own problems” (Idem, 2).
 What is so revolutionary about this “conscious emulation of life’s 
genius” (Idem, 2)? After all, there is a long history of engineers and 
Biomimicry 3.8 [http://biomimicry.net/about/biomimicry/conversation-with-
janine/] – last accessed 18 November 2013.
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consciously refer to more general narrative structures, they seem to 
be insufficiently aware of the fact that the broader treasure quest and 
teacher-student narratives are quite ambivalent and multidimensional. 
What is more, some of these broader stories are explicitly moral: they 
show us what is at stake in the practical situations we humans can find 
ourselves in.
 When ecotechnologists ignore the inherent ambivalence of 
these broader moral narratives, they may find that their narrative self-
presentations evoke unintended responses among audiences; the 
ambivalence that is repressed in a superficial and straightforward use of 
the narrative will re-emerge in the way in which the message is perceived 
and appreciated by others. What is intended to be an unambiguous 
story about our effort to do something univocally ‘good’ can unwillingly 
evoke moral sentiments of a much more complicated nature. In the next 
sections, we will show the ambivalence of both the treasure quest and 
teacher-student narratives by using well-known movies as an illustration. 
As an example of an archetypical moral narrative about treasure hunting, 
we will look at Steven Spielberg’s first Indiana Jones movie Raiders of 
the Lost Ark (1981). To illustrate what is at stake in the teacher-student 
narrative, we will focus on the theme of the sorcerer’s apprentice, a 
story that is based on Goethe’s classic poem Der Zauberlehrling (1797), 
but achieved global popular fame through Walt Disney’s 20th century 
animated cartoon version entitled The Sorcerer’s Apprentice (1940).
4.6 Raiders of the Lost Ark
Treasure hunting is a classical theme in literature, art, film, etc. As 
explained in the above section, most stories dealing with this theme are 
surprisingly multi-layered and ambivalent. Typically, they show sympathy 
for those who yield to the temptations of treasure hunting, but also contain 
a lesson about the risks of giving in to this temptation. In many treasure 
quest stories, we meet two types of hunters: one most of us sympathise 
What kind of promise is contained in the presentation of biomimicry as 
a teacher-student relationship? How can this particular self-presentation 
legitimise the research activities of biomimics? Whereas the treasure 
quest narrative spoke of a material reward in the form of new products 
beneficial to humans, in the context of the teacher-student narrative the 
‘prize’ is, above all, of an intellectual nature: if we listen carefully to 
nature’s lessons, pay close attention to the ways in which our teacher 
tackles design challenges, we will ourselves become smarter and better 
at solving problems as well. Benyus explains that nature has 3.8 billion 
years of design brilliance available for free: “After 3.8 billion years of 
research and development, failures are fossils, and what surrounds us 
is the secret to survival” (Idem, 3). Benyus’s message did not fall on 
deaf ears: since the foundation of the Biomimicry Guild in 1998, she has 
inspired thousands of scientists, architects, designers, and innovators 
to use nature’s models to create sustainable technologies, or, to put it 
differently, to become biomimics themselves.
4.5 Stories small and large
Benyus presents the tutorial narrative of biomimicry as being 
radically different from the treasure quest narrative of metagenomics. 
Nevertheless, these two narrative self-presentations are also strikingly 
alike in one respect: adherents of both sides have chosen these 
narratives because they are believed to provide unproblematic models 
with positive connotations only. By connecting their research activities to 
these ‘positive’ stories, metagenomicists and biomimics seek to legitimise 
their work. However, the two narrative self-presentations are embedded 
in larger, more common cultural narratives, to which they implicitly refer 
and which lend them their motivational force. This especially applies 
to the treasure quest narrative: by mentioning the word ‘treasure’, the 
audience immediately thinks of adventure and feels the excitement of 
discovery. However, even though ecotechnologists may more or less 
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Indy does not keep the treasures for himself: they will be stored in a 
museum, accessible to the public.
 We find out more about the ‘academic’ side of Indy in the second 
scene, where Indy, wearing glasses and a suit, teaches archeology to 
a class of mainly female students, who clearly adore him. At the end of 
his lecture, Indy is interrupted by the curator of the National Museum 
of Washington, and two US Army intelligence agents, who appoint him 
with the mission to find the Ark of the Covenant before the Nazis do. The 
spectator discovers that Indy’s search for the Ark is not only curiosity-
driven, but also ethically motivated: Indy wants to prevent the Nazis from 
becoming unconquerable. The Ark is believed to hold immense mystical 
power: 
“The Bible tells of it leveling mountains and wasting entire regions. 
Moses promised that when the Ark was with you, your enemies 
will be scattered and your foes fell before you. […] An army which 
carries the Ark before it is invincible” (Raiders of the Lost Ark).
Indy’s heroism becomes even more pronounced in contrast with his 
French nemesis René Belloq. Despite being an archeologist like Indy, 
Belloq is driven by the quest for personal glory and power only. His 
immorality is underlined by his willingness to collaborate with the Nazis. 
Throughout the film, Belloq is trying to convince Indy that the two of 
them are one of a kind. Belloq’s first attempt occurs when he meets a 
depressed and drunken Indy. The latter assumes that his (former) lover 
Marion has died in an explosion. It is then that Belloq tells him:
“You and I are very much alike. Archaeology is our religion, yet we 
have both fallen from the purer faith. Out methods have not differed 
as much as you pretend. I am a shadowy reflection of you. It would 
take only a nudge to make you like me, to push you out of the light” 
(Raiders of the Lost Ark).
with – a character who seeks the treasure mainly to satisfy his (or her) 
intellectual curiosity, but nevertheless shows not to be immune for its 
material value; and another who seeks the treasure for his profit alone, 
whose greed has turned him into a villain. Usually, the latter comes to a 
bad end in the dramatic closing scene, whereas the former has gained 
a new perspective on the trivial meaning of the search for personal gain.
 One of the best-known contemporary treasure hunter tales is that 
of Indiana Jones. In our paper, we will concentrate on the first part of 
the Jones series: Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981).64 The film, directed 
by Steven Spielberg and produced by George Lucas, tells the story of 
the archaeologist Indiana ‘Indy’ Jones. Indy, played by Harrison Ford, 
is hired by the American government to prevent the Nazis from getting 
hold of the Ark of the Covenant, which is believed to still hold the Ten 
Commandments. The anti-Semitic Nazis seek to turn this Jewish artefact 
into a weapon of world conquest and domination.
 In the opening scenes, Indy is portrayed as an adventurous treasure 
hunter. As spectators, we get the impression that he is one of the raiders 
referred to in the title of the film. We see images of the thick jungle on the 
South American continent. The year is 1936. Indy narrowly escapes death 
in an ancient temple, in which he is searching for a golden idol. Finally 
standing face to face with the incredibly well-protected statuette, he 
does not hesitate to remove it from its resting place. We are nevertheless 
sympathetic to Indy. Why do we consider him a hero, in spite of the fact 
that some of his actions are morally dubious? The main reason appears 
to be that Indy does not fit to the picture of an ordinary plunderer, who is 
blinded by greed. More than a raider, Indy is an archaeologist who seeks 
to fulfill his intellectual curiosity. He is searching for rare and ancient 
artefacts because of their cultural and historical significance. Moreover, 
Examples of other movies in this genre are Treasure Island (e.g. 1950 and 
1990), based on the novel by Robert Louis Stevenson (1883); King Solomon’s 
Mines (e.g. 1937 and 1950), based on the novel by Henry Rider Haggard 
(1885); Mutiny on the Bounty (e.g. 1935 and 1962); The Mummy (1999, 2001, 
and 2008); National Treasure (2004 and 2007); The Librarian (2004, 2006, 
and 2008).
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keeps coming back almost until the end of the movie. Belloq, who has 
again ‘stolen’ the Ark from Indy, tells the Nazis that he wants to test its 
power before presenting it to Hitler (whereas in fact, he wants to keep the 
Ark for himself). When they arrive on a desert island, Indy reveals himself 
and threatens to destroy the Ark with a bazooka. Belloq, however, realises 
that Indy wants to know what the Ark contains as much as anyone:
“Yes, blow it up! Blow it back to God. All your life has been spent in 
pursuit of archaeological relics. Inside the Ark are treasures beyond 
your wildest aspirations. You want to see it open as well as I. Indiana, 
we are simply passing through history. This… this is history. Do as 
you will” (Raiders of the Lost Ark).
While Belloq performs a ceremonial opening of the Ark, Indy and Marion 
are fastened to a post. At first, the Ark appears to contain nothing but 
sand dust, the remains of the stone tablets. Suddenly, however, spirits 
emerge from the Ark. It is at this exact moment that the crucial difference 
between Belloq and Indy becomes clear: aware of the supernatural 
danger of looking at the unveiled Ark, Indy warns Marion to close her 
eyes: “Marion, don’t look at it. Shut your eyes, Marion. Don’t look at it, no 
matter what happens!” (Raiders of the Lost Ark). Meanwhile, the spirits 
change into angels of death; Belloq and all the Nazi soldiers die terrible 
deaths.
4.7 Contextualised criticism
The scene in which Indy warns Marion to close her eyes is the film’s 
pivotal moment. We have seen that Indy starts his quest for the Ark with 
noble intentions. But in the process of getting closer to it, he yields to 
the temptation of making it his own. Face to face with the Ark’s mystical 
powers, Indy realises – and we as his spectators with him – that power 
and greed almost blinded him: he now understands that not the Ark, 
As spectators, we can see the doubt in Indy’s eyes: he almost seems to 
believe that Belloq is right. Not only Indy, but also the spectator is invited 
to ponder the extent to which Belloq’s reflections are correct. Indy is very 
eager to find the Ark before Belloq and the Nazis do, not only to prevent 
them from increasing their power, but also to keep up his reputation; 
the quest for the Ark is also a competition between two prominent 
archaeologists, having their own professional pride, and defending their 
countries’ honour.
 Indy’s persistence is confirmed by the fact that he does not heed 
the warnings of his wise friend Sallah. When the two friends discuss the 
Well of Souls, the secret chamber in which the Ark is buried, Sallah’s 
face gets a worried expression. After some hesitation, he tells Indy: “Indy, 
there is something that troubles me. […] The Ark. If it is there, at Tanis, 
then it is something that man was not meant to disturb. Death has always 
surrounded it. It is not of this earth” (Raiders of the Lost Ark). 
 The film does not show Indy’s response to Sallah’s worries, but the 
spectator becomes aware that the stakes are high: if Indy fails to respond 
appropriately, things will go seriously wrong. Indy is warned again when 
his digging party finds the actual location of the Well of Souls. The opening 
of the chamber is joined by the sound of thunder and lightning. When 
Indy looks inside, he does not only see a stone altar, but also a thick grey 
moving carpet.
“It’s alive. It’s thousands and thousands of deadly poisonous snakes 
– Egyptian asps. And the only thing that seems capable of avoiding 
this venomous groundcover is the altar. The snakes ebb and flow 
near it, but never encroach on it, as though repelled by some 
invisible force” (Kasdan & Lucas 1979, 64).
Although frightened, Indy is not taken aback by the mysterious forces that 
seem to be at work here: he fends off the snakes and seizes the Ark. But 
he is not able to keep it in his possession for long: Belloq and the Nazis 
take it from him, leaving Indy inside the well, together with Marion.
 The question concerning the likeness between Belloq and Indy 
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contrast, the philosopher’s criticism on resourcism remains to a large 
extent external. If we express Evernden’s and Plumwood’s criticism in 
terms of treasure hunting, they seem to focus on one form of treasure 
hunting only, namely the greedy, Belloqian variant. As the criticism 
expressed in Raiders of the Lost Ark is much more subtle, it seems 
more capable of showing metagenomic researchers what is at stake: we 
ourselves are at stake if we become obsessed by the material reward 
awaiting us.
 By looking at the broader cultural narrative of treasure hunting, we 
learn that moral knowledge about the risks inherent to this practice is 
at least implicitly present in the popular cultural domain. Of course we 
could have referred to more ‘highbrow’ forms of art and literature. But 
what the Indiana Jones example shows us, is that even a Hollywood 
blockbuster narrative on treasure hunting is much more ambivalent 
than the univocal self-presenting narrative of metagenomicists. It 
should therefore not come as a surprise that their self-presentation is 
not univocally applauded but rather meets with skepticism and moral 
reservation. It is not enough to know that the metagenomic quest for the 
goods of nature contains the promise of a treasure; we also need to be 
assured that this quest is not blinded by greed. For as ‘we’ all know, not 
much good can come from that.
4.8 The Sorcerer’s Apprentice
What about the alternative narrative of ecotechnology? As we showed 
earlier, Benyus seeks to provide a different perspective on the implications 
of the ecotechnological turn. It is not enough to recognise the superiority 
of nature’s goods; we have to become nature’s humble students, showing 
respect for nature’s superior wisdom (cf. Benyus 2002, 9). But here, 
again, the self-presentation relies on a larger, more widely shared moral 
narrative about what it means to be a pupil, and about what can go wrong.
 A classical story that resonates in Benyus’s presentation of 
but the wisdom obtained during the expedition, is the most important 
prize. Belloq’s refusal to learn this lesson leads to his gruesome end. 
By featuring two types of treasure hunters, the narrative structure of 
the movie reminds the audience that treasure hunting has its moral 
challenges, and that we are at risk of losing our souls if we let ourselves 
be blinded by greed.
 In the second Jones-film, Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom 
(1984) – which, apart from the end, has a rather thin storyline – this moral 
message is expressed even more clearly. The inhabitants of a small 
Indian village ask Indy to retrieve a sacred rock that has been stolen 
from them by the followers of an evil cult. Having survived an incredible 
number of deadly traps, Indy hands over the rock to the village leader. 
Night-club singer Willie, who earlier in the film was shown to have a 
weakness for diamonds, notes that he could have kept the rock, on 
which Indy answers her: “What for? They’d just put it in the museum, it’d 
be another rock collecting dust.” Willie counters him by saying: “But then 
it would have given you your fortune and glory.” However, Indy realises 
that the value of his quest lies in the lessons learned, not in possessing 
the sacred rock. He tells the village leader that he “understand[s] its 
power now” (Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom).
 What lessons could metagenomic researchers learn from Raiders of 
the Lost Ark? What is the film’s surplus value compared to the criticism 
on resourcism expressed by Evernden and Plumwood? Raiders reveals 
a strikingly subtle stance towards treasure hunting. The main reason for 
this appears to be that the criticism is an inherent dimension within the 
story: it is not an external comment or afterthought, but a dimension that 
unfolds as the story progresses. By introducing Indy and Belloq as two 
opposites (who nonetheless seem to show at least some resemblances), 
the film pictures treasure hunting as a practice that is not by definition 
‘good’ or ‘bad’. Raiders is sympathetic to the temptations of treasure 
hunting, yet at the same time confronts us with one of its inherent 
dangers, namely that the promise of possessing the ‘prize’ may become 
an obsession, obscuring any insight. It shows us that, in the process 
of getting closer to the treasure, we run the risk of losing our soul. By 
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dreams that he is a powerful sorcerer standing on a mountaintop, from 
where he commands the stars and the sea.
 Suddenly, Mickey wakes up to find the room awash with water: 
the cauldron is overflowing, as the broom keeps carrying water to it. 
Being unable to stop the broom, Mickey grabs an axe and chops it into 
pieces. Just when things seem to have calmed down, Mickey’s attempt 
to break the spell turns against him: each of the pieces transforms into 
a whole new broom. Soon, a whole army of brooms is fetching water to 
the cauldron. Mickey turns over the leaves of his master’s book, hoping 
to find the right formula to stop the brooms. Just as Mickey is about to 
drown, a stern and angry Yen Sid appears. With a wave of his hands, the 
waters recede. Mickey, looking very guilty, takes off the sorcerer’s hat and 
returns it to its rightful owner. Then he picks up the buckets and continues 
with his chores.
4.9 Hubris
The tale of The Sorcerer’s Apprentice confronts us in a lighthearted 
manner with the dangers of overestimating oneself. Mickey Mouse’s 
hubris seems to be twofold. Firstly, he is not aware of his incompetence 
and assumes that he already fully understands and controls his master’s 
powers. Having been successful in enchanting the broom, this assumption 
is initially confirmed. Only after things have gone wrong, he realises that 
he is not yet ready to imitate Yen Sid. But there is also a more fundamental 
hubris at work in Mickey’s attempt to use his master’s magic for his own 
purposes. Mickey seems to be unaware of the difference between tricks 
and magic; he mistakenly assumes that magic is only about tricks. 
Mickey does not understand that there are things that cannot be learned 
by reading textbooks or diligent practice. This second form of hubris 
brings to light an (other) important difference between Mickey and his 
master. Yen Sid is not only smart, but also wise: he knows how to separate 
essentials from trivialities. Mickey, on the contrary, does not (yet) fully 
biomimicry as a tutorial practice is The Sorcerer’s Apprentice.65 Reflecting 
on this story can help us to understand what is at stake in biomimicry. 
The tale of The Sorcerer’s Apprentice knows many versions. Its original 
goes back almost 2000 years, and is attributed to the rhetorician and 
satirist Lucian of Samosata (2nd century AD). Probably today’s most 
well-known version of the story is Walt Disney’s ten-minute animated 
version of The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, which is the third segment of the 
film Fantasia (1940). This particular version is based on Paul Dukas’s 
symphonic interpretation L’apprenti sorcier (1897) of Goethe’s poem Der 
Zauberlehrling (1797). The popularity of the Disney version is shown by 
the fact that in Fantasia 2000, the sequel to the 1940 film, the segment 
about the apprentice Mickey Mouse is the only one retained. Following 
the story from Goethe’s poem closely, Disney introduced the tale to a 
worldwide audience. The dialogue-free cartoon is introduced by a 
narrator, who gives a characterisation of the apprentice, a role played by 
Mickey Mouse: 
“He was a bright young lad; very anxious to learn the business. As 
a matter of fact, he was a little bit too bright, because he started 
practicing some of the boss’s best magic tricks before learning how 
to control them” (Fantasia).
The cartoon starts with images of the powerful sorcerer Yen Sid (Disney 
in reverse), who is practicing his magic. His apprentice Mickey is fetching 
water to fill a cauldron. After a long yawn, Yen Sid puts his hat down 
and retires to his chambers. Mickey is visibly happy with the opportunity 
to take his master’s place: tired of carrying the buckets, he puts Yen 
Sid’s hat on and tries to enchant a broom to do the work for him. The 
spell works, which seems to encourage Mickey in thinking that he is 
his master’s equal. He sits down in Yen Sid’s chair and falls asleep. He 
In describing the learning process that turned her into a real biomimic, Benyus 
compares herself to the Sorcerer’s Apprentice: “… but like the Sorcerer’s 
apprentice, I managed only to create more duckweed” (2002, 286).
65
133132
are also at play in current technology development.
 The above shows that, although Benyus opposes the tutorial 
narrative to presentations in which nature appears as a source of ‘goods’, 
her narrative self-presentation has its own ambiguity. In the end, the ‘bad’ 
student who uses his teacher’s lessons merely to empower himself is not 
that different from the greedy treasure hunter who seeks the treasure for 
his own profit alone. Thus, the proposal to view nature as a source of 
‘ideas’ rather than ‘goods’ does not protect Benyus from the dangers 
inherent to the latter narrative self-presentation: not only nature’s goods, 
but also her wisdom can be used in a reductionist and instrumental 
fashion.
4.10 Conclusion
Science needs narrative structures, metaphors, and images to explain 
and legitimise research practices that are usually described in an abstract 
and technical manner in academic publications and programmatic 
documents. Yet, in their narrative self-presentations, scientists tend 
to underestimate the complexity and multi-layered character of these 
narratives, notably in terms of the moral message they convey. This also 
applies to the two narratives of ecotechnology that were analysed in this 
paper. Ecotechnologists seem to use them to emphasise the positive 
potential for society and nature of the research field in question. Yet, 
as we have shown, even popular cinematic versions of these narratives 
reveal the moral ambivalences they entail. And this applies both to the 
treasure hunting and to the tutorial narrative. This means that genres of 
the imagination (novels, fairytales, poems, but also movies) can be used 
as a window into the ambivalences and ambiguities of the narratives 
employed. Rather than refraining from using narrative self-presentations, 
we argue that, whenever scientists use them, this richness must be more 
explicitly addressed.
recognise the insignificance of some of his objectives. Unable to see the 
bigger picture, he uses his master’s magic powers for something as trivial 
as fetching water. If Mickey would have used the sorcerer’s powers for 
more serious purposes, the latter probably would not have gotten angry. 
Yen Sid seems especially annoyed by the fact that Mickey’s decision to 
use his master’s spells is motivated by laziness, and does not serve any 
serious goal.66
 What could Benyus and other biomimics learn from the tale of The 
Sorcerer’s Apprentice? The tale shows us that the knowledge acquired 
during our teacher’s lessons can bring us into trouble, especially if we do 
not realise that our knowledge is only fragmentary and finite. Even in the 
process of getting smarter and smarter, we have to remember that we are 
still students, and, in a certain manner, will always remain so. Moreover, 
the tale encourages biomimics to reflect on the question whether they 
keep their eyes on the bigger picture, for instance when they compare 
nature to “a superior R&D department”67. We just argued that Mickey, 
capable of performing (at least some) spells, still needs to learn to choose 
his goals carefully. Or, to cite another Hollywood hero, Mickey has not yet 
fully grasped that “with great power comes great responsibility” (Spider-
Man). In a similar vein, it is important that biomimics continue to look 
critically at the objectives to which they apply nature’s lessons. They have 
to keep asking the question: “Why do we want what we want?” Comparing 
nature to a research and development department involves a projection 
of what we consider to be important. The realisation that nature is much 
more than a ‘problem solving machine’ could help distinguish between 
serious demands for new technologies and the more trivial motives that 
Unlike Yen Sid, Goethe’s sorcerer is not angry with his apprentice for having 
tried to equal his master. He tells off the broom for having followed the orders 
of someone other than his old master: “Back now, broom,/into the closet! /Be 
thou as thou/wert before!/Until I, the real master/call thee forth to serve once 
more!” (translated by Brigitte Dubiel).
Bas Sanders. 31 October 2013. “Biomimicry – Leren van de natuur?” 
Presentation as part of the symposium “Het wezen van duurzaam”, Hortus 
Arcadië, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen. Benyus also describes nature in 
terms of R&D: “After 3.8 billion years of research and development, failures 
are fossils, and what surrounds us is the secret to survival” (2002, 3).
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Chapter 5
The homeotechnological turn: 
Sloterdijk’s response to the 
ecological crisis
139
With great power comes great responsibility 
– Spider-Man
5.1 Introduction68
Since the late 20th century human beings have become increasingly 
aware of the vulnerability of planet Earth. Reports such as The Limits to 
Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) have confronted us with the boundaries of 
nature’s tolerance. Moreover, we have discovered that the mechanisms 
and processes of nature are much more complex, intricate and interwoven 
than we ever imagined. According to various contemporary environmental 
thinkers, these insights into the vulnerabilities and dynamics of nature 
have transformed the character of modern technologies; increasingly, 
our technologies become biomimetic, i.e. similar to nature. Since 
biomimetic technologies pretend to act and think in accordance with 
nature’s own principles of operation, they are expected to bring about a 
more sustainable and peaceful co-existence of humans and nature than 
more traditional technological approaches (Benyus 2002; McDonough & 
Braungart 2002).
 In this paper, I will analyse the writings of one particular author who 
tries to take the idea of biomimetic technologies seriously, namely the 
German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (1947). Instead of biomimicry, he 
prefers to use the term homeotechnology (derived from the Ancient Greek 
όμοιος, meaning ‘alike’ or ‘similar’). Sloterdijk presents his work on the 
‘homeotechnological turn’ as a Heideggerian “critical theory of being-in-
the-world” (Sloterdijk 1989, 13).69 Yet he explores this “in-der-Welt-sein” 
This chapter has been published in Environmental Values (2014), Volume 23, 
pp. 423-442. I would like to convey my special thanks to Martin Drenthen, 
Hub Zwart, Pieter Lemmens, Simon Hailwood and two anonymous reviewers 
for valuable comments that helped to improve this text.
In the reference list, I have added the English language editions that I have 
used as guidelines in translating Sloterdijk’s work from German to English.
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Icarus. Engraving by Hendrik Goltzius, 1588.
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turned into one big ‘interior space’ [Innenraum]. As each of our individual 
actions might affect the global ecology, “the practice of externalisation 
is faced with an absolute boundary” (Sloterdijk 2009a, 712). We are 
forced to consider the ecological dimension of our being-in-the-world. 
Sloterdijk believes that the rise of homeotechnology should be thought of 
as an attempt to immunise ourselves against the threats of a worldwide 
cataclysm. Contrary to classic ‘allotechnology’, in which humans are 
opposed to nature, homeotechnology presupposes a conception of 
humans as ecological beings. In his contribution to the special issue 
of Society and Space, Van Tuinen puts the human–nature relationship 
underlying homeotechnology as follows: “nature or physis itself appears 
as the integral production process in which we are embedded and with 
which we cooperate” (Van Tuinen 2009, 109).
 Although I appreciate the evocative and inspiring manner in 
which Sloterdijk fleshes out the ‘rescue potential’ of homeotechnology, 
I will argue that his reflections are based on a series of problematic 
assumptions. For example, he not only claims that homeotechnology 
is “founded on an imitatio naturae” (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006, 
329), but also assumes that the ability to incorporate nature’s basic 
operating principles – such as replication, selection, and transgenesis 
– in our own technologies is inextricably bound up with a co-operative, 
domination-free approach to nature. As I will argue, the conviction that 
we (already) understand nature’s principles of operation sufficiently to 
imitate them appears to be fairly hubristic. Moreover, it presupposes that 
nature reveals itself in a particular way, namely as an assembly line of 
biomolecular processes. Even if we assume that at some point we will 
succeed in imitating nature’s most complex and refined processes, this 
does not as a matter of course preclude domination. Rather, “doing it 
nature’s way” (Benyus 2002, 2) opens up new prospects for exploitation, 
for instance in the case of genetic manipulation. What is more, since 
current technoscience obscures the classical distinction between 
‘biomachines’ and ‘manmade machines’, this exploitation runs the risk of 
becoming increasingly subtle and invisible. Thus, homeotechnology may 
result in strengthening our sway over nature even on a molecular level. 
from a new dimension. In a special issue of Society and Space on The 
worlds of Peter Sloterdijk, Elden and Mendieta argue that “Sloterdijk […] 
is engaged in a Heideggerian project concerning the nature of being, 
but not in relation to time […], but in relation to space” (Elden & Mendieta 
2009, 8 – my italics). Hence, Sloterdijk invites us to regard his magnum 
opus, the Spheres Trilogy (1998; 1999; 2004, published together 2005),70 
as the sequel (Being and Space) to Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(Sloterdijk 1998, 345). In his Spherology, Sloterdijk attempts to rewrite 
the history of western metaphysics by understanding human beings as 
inextricably – almost symbiotically – connected with the artificial ‘interiors’ 
or ‘envelopes’ in which they exist. From the beginning of human history, 
Sloterdijk argues, we have been building artificial ‘spheres’ in order to 
immunise – i.e. protect – ourselves against the threatening outside 
world. These self-created spaces not only exist as material environments 
(houses, villages, cities, states), but also as symbolic immune systems 
(religions, metaphysical systems, or ideologies such as humanism). 
With these “self-spun illusory bubbles” (Sloterdijk 1998, 23), we aim to 
transform reality into a secure and habitable dwelling place.
 In Foams, the final part of his Spherology, Sloterdijk argues that, as a 
consequence of scientific and technological developments, our symbolic 
bubbles have burst. Since we killed God with the dissecting knives of 
science, the “monosphere” of metaphysics has lost its immunological 
function. We are left with the fragments of the comprehensive spheres 
in which human beings used to feel secure. To restore our feelings of 
security, we have replaced our symbolic immune systems by technological 
immunisations. In this way, we regained a certain amount of control over 
our environment. Although this transition towards technological forms 
of immunisation started with the 17th century scientific revolution, in 
Sloterdijk’s view, the 21st century has laid the foundation of a new chapter 
in the history of immunisation. Due to the looming threats of a worldwide 
environmental catastrophe, the global environment of planet Earth has 
Blasen (Bubbles), 1998; Globen (Globes), 1999; Schäume (Foams), 2004; 
published together as Sphären (Spheres), 2005.
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demonstrate to you, sooner or later, what you failed to do during the 
time of portents!” (Sloterdijk 2009a, 702). How can we live up to this 
imperative? In answering this question, Sloterdijk builds on the writings 
of Hans Jonas. In The Imperative of Responsibility (1984), Jonas claims 
that, due to technological developments, the range and impact of 
human action has increased dramatically. In ancient times, ethics was 
concerned with the “intrahuman frame” (Jonas 1984, 4). It focussed 
on the duties of human beings towards their fellow human beings. 
Since we were incapable of inflicting permanent damage on nature on 
a sizeable scale, our obligations towards the natural realm remained 
outside the scope of ethics. Jonas further argues that traditional ethics 
was restricted to proximity, in terms of time as well as space: “Ethics 
[…] was of the here and now, of occasions as they arise between men, 
of the recurrent, typical situations of private and public life” (Idem, 5). 
In Jonas’s view, modern technology has changed this; it has added a 
whole new dimension to our sense of responsibility: “the nature of human 
action has de facto changed, and [...] an object of an entirely new order 
– no less than the whole biosphere of the planet – has been added to 
what we must be responsible for because of our power over it” (Idem, 
7). According to Jonas, we are only capable of adequately evaluating 
the ethical significance of contemporary science and technology with 
the help of a new kind of ethics, that is anticipatory and forward-
looking, an Ethics of Responsibility. Ethics must develop, assess and 
critically compare scenarios for the future. As part of this future-oriented 
ethics, Jonas developed a new imperative, sometimes referred to as 
the ecological imperative: “Act so that the effects of your action are 
compatible with the permanence of genuine human life” (Idem, 11).
 Jonas’s line of thinking is taken up by Sloterdijk. He explains 
that the prospect of a worldwide, man-made cataclysm urges us to 
consider how each of our actions affects the global ecology. We have 
to be constantly aware that we are members of a world-wide nation. 
According to Sloterdijk, this is extremely difficult for us. Building on his 
Spheres Trilogy, he argues that, up till now, our systems of solidarity 
have been effective only on a smaller scale, for example within families, 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first section, I will discuss 
Sloterdijk’s core message as brought forward in his recent monograph 
You Must Change Your Life (2009a)71, in which he urges us to consider 
how each of our actions affects the global ecology. Next, I will show 
how he relates this message to the possibility of increasing the Earth’s 
carrying capacity by means of homeotechnology. After analysing the 
ways in which, in Sloterdijk’s view, homeotechnology distinguishes itself 
from traditional forms of technology, I will critically reflect on the ‘rescue 
potential’ of homeotechnology. In the final section, I will argue that the 
‘homeotechnological turn’ can only be effected if it is developed within 
the context of an ecological ethos different to the technocentric ethos 
that currently dominates our attitude towards nature. Sloterdijk claims that 
homeotechnology is based on the recognition of the ecological dimension 
of our being-in-the-world. Nonetheless, he has not thoroughly considered 
the practical and moral implications of our ecological situatedness. An 
example of a philosopher who has more adequately reflected on the 
broader cultural framework within which (homeo)technology could be 
successfully implemented, is the Australian eco-feminist Val Plumwood 
(1938-2008). Building on her final work Environmental Culture: the 
Ecological Crisis of Reason (2002), I will present some preliminary 
thoughts on how we can develop “an integrated democratic science that 
is dialogical, non-reductionist and self-reflective” (Plumwood  2002, 53) 
as a necessary moral supplement to Sloterdijk’s homeotechnologies. 
5.2 Change your life!
Du mußt dein Leben ändern71
At the end of You Must Change Your Life (2009a), Sloterdijk claims that, 
since the prospect of a worldwide catastrophe has become a disquieting 
threat, we are confronted with a new imperative that addresses each of 
us personally: “Change your life! Otherwise its complete disclosure will 
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of global moderation – to which he also refers as ‘ecological Puritanism’ 
and ‘ecological Calvinism’ – appears to be the only sensible answer 
to the looming worldwide catastrophe. Such an ethics would imply the 
reversal of the direction in which civilisation has moved up to now:
“the ethics of the future […] calls for a decrease where the agenda 
to date has been to increase, it demands minimization where thus 
far all that counted was maximization, it urges restraint where until 
now explosion was in order, it decrees thriftiness where to date 
extravagance was felt to be the greatest excitement, it admonishes 
us to restrict ourselves where up till now self-liberation was 
celebrated” (Sloterdijk 2011, 103).
On second thoughts, however, an ethics of moderation must be 
regarded as illusory; it clashes with the forces driving advanced cultures 
such as ours. Building on the work of Nietzsche, Sloterdijk argues that 
the human condition is characterised by an inherent tendency towards 
luxury and extravagance.73 He describes the style in which modern 
humanity exists as ‘kinetic expressionism’, i.e. “the style of being-in-
the-world […] enabled primarily by the easy availability of fossil fuels” 
(Idem, 97). This way of life “penetrates the entirety of our ‘metabolism 
with nature’, our production, our consumption, our living, our transport, 
our arts and communications” (Idem, 103). According to Sloterdijk, 
modern human beings will refuse to give up their kinetic lifestyle: 
“They will remain convinced that it is the task of evolution through 
constant growth to globalize material prosperity and the expressive 
privileges they themselves enjoy. They will refuse to come to terms 
with a future that is based on reduction and restraint” (Idem, 107). 
 If an ethics of global moderation on its own is unrealistic, how 
should we face the challenges ahead? The ecological Puritans claim 
Cf. Nietzsche, Daybreak 405: “The tendency towards luxury is rooted in the 
depths of a man’s heart: it reveals that the superfluous and immoderate is the 
water wherein his soul prefers to float.”
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or tribal, regional and national unities. Now, the scale of our responsibility 
is crossing all borders. As the terrestrial sphere has turned into one 
big ‘interior space’, Sloterdijk urges us to move away from a traditional 
dualistic scheme based on ‘self’ versus ‘other’, or ‘culture’ versus ‘nature’. 
We must move towards a mentality in which the ‘we’ and the ‘us’ are the 
prevailing categories of moral thinking. To put it differently: we must get 
rid of the distinction between environmental and other contexts. There is 
nothing beyond the environmental context (Mathews 2011):
“Since the ‘global society’ reaches its limits and the earth with its 
fragile atmospheric and biospheric systems has presented itself 
once and for all as the limited collective scene of human operations, 
the practice of externalisation is faced with an absolute boundary” 
(Sloterdijk 2009a, 712).
5.3 The carrying capacity of the Earth
During the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen, Sloterdijk gave a lecture on the metaphor of ‘Spaceship 
Earth’ (Buckminster Fuller 1969), elaborating on his views in You Must 
Change Your Life.72 Until recently, Sloterdijk argued, human beings 
were allowed a large degree of ignorance as regards navigation 
and maintenance of their spaceship, as the system was designed to 
accommodate a high degree of human stupidity. But this has now 
changed. We sense that we have reached a limit and are using up our 
last resources. Due to this growing awareness, the admonition “Change 
your life” stands at the core of our ethical intuitions. It confronts us with 
a binding commitment to create a modus vivendi that corresponds with 
the ecological-cosmopolitan insights of our culture. How to develop such 
a responsible way of life? Sloterdijk argues that, at first sight, an ethics 
A lecture entitled How big is “big”? (Wie groß ist “groß”?).72
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5.4 Human machines versus  
  biomachines
According to Sloterdijk, the various contrivances and machines that 
human beings have developed throughout the ages are fundamentally 
different from the ‘biomachines’ – the living organisms – produced 
by nature. Whereas biomachines are the temporary result of complex 
processes of mutation, natural selection and other evolutionary 
mechanisms, the vast majority of human technologies developed up to 
now display a tendency to counteract or disturb the dynamics of nature:
“Nature knows of no pure rotations; it knows nothing that corresponds 
to the technical principle of the bow and arrow, and has seen barely 
anything that is equivalent to the prototechnics of tying and knots; 
in nature there exist no piston engines and certainly nothing of that 
which metallurgists do” (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006, 328-329).
According to Sloterdijk, the anti-natural tendency of traditional human 
technologies resulted from our inability to imitate nature’s processes: 
“as engineer of life [nature] developed its own strategies of evolution, 
strategies that until now were too complex for us to mimic” (Idem, 
328). Manmade machines tended to be characterised by radical 
simplifications. Thus, we produced a plethora of tools (from the wheel 
up to the combustion engine) that were nowhere to be found in nature. 
Sloterdijk understands these simplifications as practices of immunisation: 
they allowed us to stand up against uncertainties and granted us a 
certain amount of control over our environment.
 Inspired by Gotthard Günther’s distinction between ‘classic’ and 
‘trans-classic’ – i.e. cybernetic – technology (Günther 1963), Sloterdijk 
refers to traditional human technology as ‘allotechnology’.76 With the 
“Domestikation des Seins”, included in Nicht gerettet: Versuche nach 
Heidegger
Die Sonne und der Tod 
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that, in the long run, the affluent people of today have no other choice 
than to give in to the ecological facts. Sloterdijk, however, maintains 
that this conviction is based on a false assumption. The Puritans view 
the Earth and its biosphere as a single, non-multipliable monad. They 
argue that, since we have only this one Earth at our disposal, “we must 
accept that the limits take precedence over the impulse to exceed 
them” (Idem, 107). Sloterdijk claims that, thanks to recent technological 
advances, this ‘monadological’ interpretation of the Earth might prove to 
be outmoded. In the course of social evolution, the biosphere has joined 
forces with “the technosphere, which is in turn animated and directed 
by a noosphere [i.e. the sphere of human cognition]” (Idem, 108 – my 
emphasis). Thanks to the possibility of a convergence of these three 
dimensions, the resilience of the Earth can be increased. As Sloterdijk 
puts it: “It is not excluded a priori that this could produce effects that would 
be equivalent to the Earth’s multiplication” (Idem, 108 – my emphasis). 
Sloterdijk explains that until now, we regarded technology from the angle 
of environmental damage and bionegativity. Technology, however, has 
not yet played its final card: “By re-aligning the technosphere to meet 
homeotechnological and biomimetic standards, in the course of time a 
completely different image of the interaction between the environment 
and technology will arise” (Idem, 109).
 In order to grasp Sloterdijk’s view of the role of technology 
in increasing the Earth’s carrying capacity, we must see how the 
considerations discussed above build on his earlier work. In the next 
section, I will analyse how, in Sloterdijk’s opinion, the supportive 
potential of the planet could be amplified or even multiplied thanks to 
“a sort of turn [i.e. a Heideggerian ‘Kehre’] in the process of technology 
itself” (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006, 329-330). My analysis will draw from 
his essay “Domestication of being” (2001)74 and the book Neither Sun 
nor Death (2006),75 in which Sloterdijk answers questions concerning 
technological catastrophes posed by the German writer Hans-Jürgen 
Heinrichs.
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5.5 The image of nature
Yet, according to Sloterdijk, a ‘turn’, a new chapter in the history of 
technology seems to be emerging. The 21st century represents “a 
paradigm shift in the basic idea of technology” (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 
2006, 329). With the rise of modern technoscience – biotechnology, 
neuroscience, nanotechnology, cybernetics – the fundamental principles 
of traditional human technologies are under revision. Increasingly our 
technologies become biomimetic, i.e. similar to and compatible with 
nature. Notwithstanding the fact that all human operations are essentially 
technological, new technologies approach the natural world in a 
radically new and different way: they borrow from nature’s own pool of 
technologies and initiate applications that are strikingly similar to nature’s 
own processes, on a molecular and microscopic level. According to 
Sloterdijk, modern technoscience has dealt with the necessity to simplify 
the most minute and intricate mechanisms of nature: “It seems that we 
find ourselves, for the first time, on the threshold of a form of technology 
which will be sufficiently developed to pass itself off as a radical imitation 
of nature” (Idem, 329).
 Whereas most contemporary thinkers use the term ‘biomimicry’ to 
refer to this new type of technology (e.g. Hawken, Lovins & Lovins 1999; 
Benyus 2002; Bensaude-Vincent et al. 2002; Mathews 2011), Sloterdijk 
introduces the term ‘homeotechnology’ – derived from the Ancient 
Greek όμοιος, meaning ‘alike’ or ‘similar’. He describes the revolutionary 
nature of homeotechnology with the aid of the following three concepts. 
Firstly, as mentioned above, homeotechnology aims at achieving an 
imitatio naturae. This “only became possible after far-reaching insight 
was attained into the modus operandi of the self-organisation of 
living matter” (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006, 329). Secondly, Sloterdijk 
characterises homeotechnology as a “non-dominant [nicht-herrische] 
form of operativity” (Sloterdijk 2001, 227). Whereas allotechnology 
enslaved and exploited nature by neglecting nature’s own principles 
of operation, in the homeotechnological age, “the ‘materials’ are […] 
conceived in accordance with their own stubbornness, and are integrated 
concept of ‘allo’ – derived from the Ancient Greek άλλος, meaning ‘other’ 
or ‘alien’ – he indicates that the classic design of human technology is 
based on principles that are different from, and often disturb or interfere 
with, nature’s own dynamics and processes. Moreover, allotechnologies 
put to work “reductionist and authoritarian intentions” (Sloterdijk & 
Heinrichs 2006, 330). They display a “reckless exploitation of life chances 
[…] as well as a senseless wasting of so-called resources” (Idem, 330). 
Sloterdijk understands the exploitative nature of allotechnology as a 
result of its dualistic conception of reality. Drawing on Günther’s work on 
philosophy and cybernetics, he argues that traditional western culture 
– i.e. classical metaphysics – has approached ‘being’ with a false 
dichotomy. Classical metaphysics has divided reality in two separate 
ontological domains: subject vs. object, spirit vs. matter, nature vs. 
culture, etc. According to Sloterdijk, this has led to “the absolute inability 
to describe in an ontologically adequate manner ‘cultural phenomena’ 
such as tools, signs, artworks, laws, customs, books, machines and all 
other artifices” (Sloterdijk 2001, 217). These phenomena are neither fully 
subjective, nor fully objective:
“All cultural objects are by their very constitution hybrids with a 
spiritual and a material ‘component’, and any effort to say what they 
‘really’ are in the framework of a bivalent logic and a monovalent 
ontology, inevitably results in hopeless reductions and destructive 
shortenings” (Idem, 217).
Sloterdijk sees the metaphysical divide reflected in the allotechnological 
tendency to use natural materials and energy sources to ends that are 
indifferent or even alien to nature: “the division of being into subject and 
object [shows itself] in the difference between master and slave, as well 
as that between workman and raw material” (Idem, 224).
In his later work, Sloterdijk sometimes uses the term ‘heterotechnology’ instead 
of ‘allotechnology’ to refer to the classic type of technology (e.g. Sloterdijk 
2011: 108).
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relies on “co-intelligent, co-informative strategies. It is characterised 
by co-operation rather than domination” (Sloterdijk 2001, 228). 
 What is Sloterdijk’s motivation for using the term ‘homeotechnology’ 
instead of the more established ‘biomimicry’? First of all, whereas the latter 
term refers to a particular approach to solving engineering problems, 
the philosophical concept of homeotechnology seeks to describe how 
modern technology presents itself to us. Secondly, it is important to 
keep in mind that for Sloterdijk, homeotechnology belongs to a pair of 
concepts: it is the counterpart of allotechnology. As mentioned before, 
these twin concepts are inspired by Günther’s distinction between 
‘classic’ and ‘trans-classic’ technology. A third motivation might relate to 
the difference between imitating and incorporating biological machinery. 
Sloterdijk considers biotechnology – i.e. the incorporation of biological 
systems in industrial and scientific processes – the ultimate example 
of homeotechnology. However, in biomimicry literature, biotechnological 
uses of nature are generally seen as running counter to the principles of 
biomimicry. For instance, the French philosopher of science Bernadette 
Bensaude-Vincent argues that “biomimicry […] aims to mimic life, not 
to reproduce it” (Bensaude-Vincent et al. 2002, 1; cf. Benyus 2002, 2). 
Fourthly, homeotechnology refers to the imitation (or incorporation) of 
nature’s principles at a particular level. Whereas the term biomimicry 
covers the imitation of life on all possible scales – e.g. learning from 
humpback whales how to create efficient wind power, and from termites 
how to create sustainable buildings (cf. the Biomimicry Institute, 
Montana), homeotechnology refers to the imitation (or incorporation) of 
nature’s molecular and microscopic processes. 
5.6 Responsible citizenship
Earlier I explained that according to Sloterdijk, the imperative “Change 
your life!” addresses each of us personally. Since the Earth has 
presented itself as the limited scene of human operations, we must all 
into operations with respect to their maximum aptitude” (Idem, 227). 
According to Sloterdijk, this shift from a dominating to a domination-free 
approach entails a rupture with the traditional metaphysical classification 
of being. In his view, we have to thank Günther for replacing the dualistic 
conception of reality with a bivalent ontology and a polyvalent logic. 
Günther developed this post-dualistic toolkit from his experiences in 
the field of cybernetics. In the 1940s and 1950s, this discipline began 
to demonstrate the technological modifiability of processes we used to 
classify as entirely subjective. From that time onwards, properties that 
were thought to belong exclusively to the human realm – e.g. intelligence 
– have been simulated by machines. Sloterdijk claims that, in our time, 
the most spectacular interference of the mechanical with the subjective 
is brought about in the field of biotechnology. Gene technologies 
especially “draw a broad variety of physical preconditions of the Self 
into the range of artificial manipulations” (Idem, 221).77
 The third concept related to homeotechnology is co-operation. We 
can identify two different interpretations of this term in Sloterdijk’s writings. 
‘Co-operation’ first of all refers to the incorporation of nature’s operating 
principles – replication, selection, transgenesis – into our own technologies. 
Here, the co-operative nature of homeotechnology should be interpreted 
in a technological or instrumental sense: modern technoscience connects 
with the principles of life itself. However, the kind of co-operation enabled 
by homeotechnology exceeds the sheer technological or instrumental 
level. We can also discern in Sloterdijk’s work what I would like to 
call a normative interpretation of this term, as denoting a co-operative 
attitude towards nature. Since homeotechnology acts and thinks in 
accordance with nature’s own operationality, its co-operative nature 
should be seen as opposed to the dominating stance of allotechnology. 
As Sloterdijk puts it in “Domestication of being”: homeotechnology 
In section 5.3, I have shown that in his Copenhagen lecture, Sloterdijk speaks 
of homeotechnological as well as biomimetic standards: “By re-aligning the 
technosphere to meet homeotechnological and biomimetic standards, in the 
course of time a completely different image of the interaction between the 
environment and technology will arise” (2011, 109).
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who guarded their lamps until the bridegroom arrived. The readiness 
for the Call of Being is all” (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006, 127). 
In explaining how human beings can live responsibly, I have focussed 
on how Sloterdijk assesses the role of individual citizens. But what about 
policy and governance? For Sloterdijk, the attitude of the current political 
elite underlines the importance of citizens taking up their personal 
global responsibility. The 2009 UN summit in Copenhagen is only one 
example of a political event that proved a big disappointment. Instead 
of opening up a new era of responsibility, the conference ended in a 
frustrating stalemate and a diplomatic debacle. According to Sloterdijk, 
the Copenhagen Conference and other similar fiascos show that the 
political elite currently in power does not have the will to effect the 
necessary change through concerted action on a global level. Sloterdijk 
ascribes this to ‘national egoism’; most politicians are only interested 
in protecting their own national spheres. Hence, the technological 
transition must occur elsewhere, not in the context of political summits, 
but through a bottom-up combination of technological innovation (the 
emergence of homeotechnology) and responsible citizenship (adoption of 
homeotechnology in response to the looming cataclysm). In an interview 
at the UN summit, Sloterdijk elaborated on his lecture by explaining that 
the will to change must eventually become the will of the majority. Even 
if, in the beginning, Europe will be alone in adopting homeotechnology, 
in due course it will be implemented by all important partners on a truly 
global scale. Why is Sloterdijk so convinced of this? Because “we live in 
a world that is helpless against the better example” (Sloterdijk 2009b). 
5.7 The rescue potential of
  homeotechnology
In the previous section I explained that, for Sloterdijk, the fact that modern 
technoscience takes the lead in tackling the environmental crisis does 
join forces in order to prolong its fitness for human habitation. As we 
have seen, Sloterdijk doesn’t urge us to secure the planet’s condition 
– in order to safeguard human life on Earth – by means of an ethics 
of global, state-enforced moderation; as humanity is characterised by 
an inherent tendency towards luxury and extravagance, such an ethics 
would be illusory. In fact, the solution to the crisis Sloterdijk suggests in 
his Copenhagen lecture refers to a change of technology rather than a 
change of lifestyle: thanks to the emergence of homeotechnology, the 
resilience of the Earth can be increased.
 The promise of modern technoscience to provide a fitting solution 
to the crisis appears to overshadow the importance of Sloterdijk’s call 
to change our lives. If homeotechnology is the answer to the worldwide 
catastrophe, to what extent are we still expected to work on ourselves 
as well? It is important to stress that, for Sloterdijk, the shift towards 
homeotechnology is not brought about by us as agents, but rather emerges 
as a ‘turn’, a moment of transformation in the history of technology as 
such. However, this does not mean we can afford to sit back. Sloterdijk 
urges us to be responsive to the way in which nature and technology 
manifest themselves as a consequence of this technological change. We 
can support and boost this change by displaying a readiness to shape 
our modus vivendi using an alternative technological framework. This is 
a typical Heideggerian element in Sloterdijk’s approach. The crisis calls 
for a responsive form of activity rather than an activist one. We have to 
open ourselves to the opportunities offered by technology itself. This is 
the moment we have been waiting for, the new tide. As Sloterdijk himself 
points out, the homeotechnological turn involves an ethos of confidence 
and preparedness that is almost Gospel-like in nature. Human beings 
are like the shepherds of Being awaiting the coming dawn:
“what on earth are the guardians of Being? […] This much is clear, 
namely, that Heidegger’s pastoral discourse is eminently ethical, 
insofar as it demands a particular form of restraint, of concentration, 
of modesty, of listening, of preparation […]. We are called upon to 
pay attention and to attend, like the five wise virgins of Matthew 25, 
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largely unknown world of uncultivable microbes, the field offers great 
opportunities to revolutionise our understanding of planet Earth as a 
microbial planet (Handelsman 2007). Paradoxically, however, precisely 
by improving our knowledge of microbial life, metagenomics confronts 
us with the fact that for the greater part, the Earth is still a terra incognita. 
In fact, more than 99 per cent of soil microbes are still unknown to us 
(Handelsman et al. 1998; Riesenfeld et al. 2004).
 The metagenomics example shows that, even though modern 
technoscience proves how little we actually know of nature’s complexity, 
many scientists still assume that eventually, its mechanisms and 
processes will not only be knowable, but also controllable and even 
(re)makeable. This idea, which is of course not restricted to metagenomics, 
has raised many critical responses. Eric Katz, for instance, expresses 
moral objections against the idea “that we can discover the plan, the 
methods, the processes of nature, and mold them to our purposes” 
(Katz 2000, 87):
“The human presumption that we are capable of this technological 
fix demonstrates (once again) the arrogance with which humanity 
surveys the natural world. Whatever the problem may be, there 
will be a technological, mechanical, or scientific solution. Human 
engineering will modify the secrets of natural processes and effect 
a satisfactory result” (Idem, 85-86).
Even if we imagine that at a certain point we will gain access to even 
nature’s most complex and refined mechanisms, we need to look critically 
at the process that precedes this imitation of nature. How do we obtain 
the knowledge required in order to copy nature? Taking metagenomics 
as our example again, it becomes apparent that microbial systems can 
only come to serve as models after being completely uprooted, after a 
kind of vivisection of these systems. More generally, it could be argued 
that we can only start to imitate nature after first unlocking nature’s 
secrets by means of technology. In other words, we can only imitate a 
nature that has been made technologically reproducible.
not mean that we are exempted from the obligation to work on ourselves 
as well in order to live up as citizens to the opportunities and challenges 
ahead. Accordingly, one could argue that a change of technology is not 
the whole answer to the worldwide catastrophe; on top of this, we will 
have to acknowledge our personal global responsibility by embedding 
homeotechnology in our own lives. Still, there is something paradoxical in 
Sloterdijk’s reflections on homeotechnology. Sloterdijk seems to suggest 
that, due to the seriousness of the current ecological situation, in the 
course of time, homeotechnology will force itself upon us anyhow. We 
need homeotechnology in order to secure future human life on Earth; we 
simply cannot escape homeotechnology. Paraphrasing a famous line 
from Heidegger’s Spiegel interview (September 1966), Sloterdijk seems 
to assume that “only (the new god of) homeotechnology can save us.” 
In this section, I will critically reflect on, what I will call, the ‘rescue 
potential’ of homeotechnology by problematising some of Sloterdijk’s 
assumptions. I will focus on the three concepts used by Sloterdijk to 
describe the revolutionary nature of homeotechnology: imitation, non-
domination and co-operation.
Homeotechnology: an imitatio naturae?
I explained that Sloterdijk attributes to modern technoscience the ability 
to copy even nature’s most intricate and refined processes. But is our 
understanding of nature’s own operating principles (already) sufficiently 
developed to imitate them? To put it differently: why is Sloterdijk so 
convinced that (in due course) we will be able to adjust our actions to 
comply with nature’s own processes? This conviction appears to be fairly 
hubristic. Moreover, it conflicts with the ways in which nature reveals itself 
as a consequence of technological change. Let me elucidate this by 
means of an example taken from the domain of the life sciences, namely 
the emerging field of metagenomics, i.e. “the cultivation-independent 
genomic analysis of DNA extracted from naturally occurring microbial 
biomass” (DeLong 2005, 459-460). This is an area of research driven 
by a will to understand and collaborate with nature on a molecular 
scale. As metagenomics provides insight into the functioning of the 
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conveys a co-operative, non-dominant message.
 Yet one could still argue that “doing it nature’s way” (Benyus 2002, 
2) does not, as a matter of course, preclude domination. On the contrary, 
opening up the molecular pathways of nature might rather ‘fuel’ our will 
to power, our will to control and rule over living nature (cf. Lemmens 
2008). Returning to the example of metagenomics, it becomes clear 
that, precisely by uncovering nature as a domain of complexity and 
sophistication, modern technoscience opens up new prospects for 
exploitation, for instance by means of genetic manipulation and ‘nature 
mining’ – exploring the soil to unearth its hidden treasures. Following 
Eugene Thacker, one could argue that, in the homeotechnological age, 
biological information – i.e. information about biochemical processes, 
protein folding, DNA-replication, etc. – has become the raw material; it 
plays the same role as coal, petroleum and ore did (and still do!) in the 
industrial age (Thacker 2005).
 So, rather than unleashing a domination-free ethics, mere 
technological or instrumental forms of co-operation might pave the 
way for even more radical intrusions of humans into nature than 
those achieved by classic allotechnology. Whereas allotechnological 
interventions are in general rather flagrant and indelicate, and as such 
clearly visible to the eye, homeotechnology enables the domination of 
nature in more sophisticated, subtle and hence concealed ways. This 
invisibility is increased by the fact that homeotechnology obscures the 
traditional distinction between ‘biomachines’ and ‘manmade machines’. 
Citing Katz again, we could argue that homeotechnology is – or threatens 
to become – the “unrecognized manifestation of the insidious dream of 
the human domination of nature” (Katz 2000, 84).
Homeotechnology: opposed to allotechnology?
I have argued that we not only have to look critically at the extent to 
which homeotechnology is capable of imitating nature’s molecular and 
microscopic processes; we also need to question Sloterdijk’s claim 
that homeotechnology will – more or less in and of itself – lead to a 
co-operative, domination-free approach to nature. If homeotechnology 
Homeotechnology: a co-operative, non-dominant technology?
When it comes to clarifying some of the ambiguities entailed by 
Sloterdijk’s concept of homeotechnology, the two possible meanings of 
the term co-operation become important. As already indicated, the term 
co-operation can be used first of all in a technological or instrumental 
sense, namely in the sense that we actually develop specific tools 
allowing us to interact with natural processes on a molecular scale. But 
the development of such tools is inspired by the idea of co-operation in a 
more normative sense: the idea that human beings should see themselves 
as partners or collaborators rather than as masters of nature. Sloterdijk 
himself doesn’t draw a clear distinction between these two meanings; 
he presents them as if they are two sides of the same coin, in other 
words, as if they presuppose each other. Why does Sloterdijk assume 
that our ability to incorporate nature’s principles in our own technologies 
is inextricably bound up with (and will more or less automatically lead 
to) an attitude towards nature that no longer strives for mastery and 
domination? Sloterdijk’s answer is basically that nature’s own feedback 
mechanisms will simply shut the door to authoritarian practices. Nature 
will only share her secrets of operation if we adjust our actions to her 
own processes: “Nature can only be imitated after the rupture with the 
technology of wastage, which is always also something of a technology 
of violation” (Sloterdijk & Heinrichs 2006, 330). Homeotechnology “can 
lead to successes to the extent that it proceeds in a fashion that is 
analogous to nature and without authoritarian encroachments” (Idem, 
330).78 In “Domestication of Being”, Sloterdijk even goes so far as to 
connect homeotechnology with a new kind of ethics: “One may even 
ask whether or not homeotechnological thought […] has the potential 
to unleash an ethics of relationships free of enmity and domination” 
(Sloterdijk 2001, 230-231). In other words, a domination-free ethos does 
not precede or inspire the development of homeotechnology, but is 
rather embedded and entailed in it. Homeotechnology as such already 
This statement strongly reminds us of Francis Bacon’s famous quote in Novum 
Organum (1620), that “Nature to be commanded must be obeyed.”
78
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5.8 Homeotechnology as part of an 
  Environmental Culture
How should we assess the ‘rescue potential’ of homeotechnology in 
light of the aforementioned considerations? I have tried to demonstrate 
that, on the normative level, the difference between allotechnology and 
homeotechnology is not as black and white as Sloterdijk pretends; both 
can have a positive as well as a negative impact on nature. However, 
this does not alter the fact that our growing understanding of nature’s 
own principles of operation offers specific opportunities for a more 
peaceful co-existence of humans and nature. How to ensure that 
homeotechnology will live up to its potential for nature-friendliness? In 
my view, the question of whether homeotechnology will contribute to 
a more sustainable future largely depends on the broader framework 
within which it is implemented. This has been argued by Val Plumwood, 
for instance. Had Plumwood been familiar with the work of Sloterdijk, 
she would have asked him: “In what political and social circumstances 
could [homeotechnological] solutions be stable and effective?” 
(Plumwood 2002, 8). In the following, I will describe how, in Plumwood’s 
view, modern technoscience must change in order to become part of 
a society that is “ecologically rational”. As a detailed analysis of her 
work is beyond the scope of this paper, I will merely present some key 
elements of her thoughts as a tool for assessing and coming to terms 
with Sloterdijk’s ideas.
 In her last book Environmental Culture: the Ecological Crisis of 
Reason (2002), Plumwood explores the origins and cultural illusions 
that lie behind the contemporary environmental crisis. Like Sloterdijk, 
she explains the degradation of the Earth’s ecosystems as a result 
of western culture’s dualistic conception of reality. We human beings 
situate ourselves not only outside, but also above nature. Thus, we have 
developed conceptions of ourselves as “belonging to a superior sphere 
apart, a rational sphere of exclusively ‘human’ ethics, technology and 
culture dissociated from nature and ecology” (Idem, 100). Plumwood 
claims that this self-image has made us vulnerable to illusions of 
is not necessarily and by definition ‘good’ for nature, it seems 
appropriate to ask ourselves in what ways it actually distinguishes itself 
from allotechnology. Paraphrasing Janine Benyus, co-founder of the 
Biomimicry Guild (Montana): “What will make the Homeotechnology 
Revolution any different from the Industrial Revolution? Who’s to say we 
won’t simply steal nature’s thunder and use it in the ongoing campaign 
against life?” (Benyus 2002, 8).
 On the technological level, the difference between allo- 
and homeotechnology is quite clear. Contrary to allotechnology, 
homeotechnology explicitly aims to copy or incorporate the ‘design 
principles’ of nature itself. On the normative level, however, the difference 
between allo- and homeotechnology is less obvious. If homeotechnology, 
in spite of its likeness to nature, is not by definition ‘good’ for nature, 
the question arises as to whether allotechnology is necessarily ‘bad’ for 
nature. From my point of view, allotechnology does not automatically 
estrange us from nature; it might also strengthen our relationship with 
our natural surroundings (cf. Kockelkoren 1994). This is illustrated by 
our first space travels. It was only after (allo)technology allowed us to 
see the Earth from the perspective of the moon-traveller that we were 
able to develop an Earth awareness (Lemmens 2011). By taking the 
‘God’s eye view’, we became aware of the uniqueness of “this small 
blue ball in the vastness of black space” (Scott 2001, 411). We started 
to realise that if we do not take care of the Earth as such, we ignore the 
lives of its inhabitants. The author Norman Cousins clearly expresses 
how space travel laid the foundation of our ecological awareness: “What 
was most significant about the lunar voyage was not that men set foot 
on the moon but that they set eye on the earth” (cited in Scott 2001, 
411). This is just one example of how even our most dominant and anti-
natural forms of technology can deepen our relationship with nature.
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its ends under critical and democratic scrutiny. We need above all an 
ethical science” (Idem, 53). The alternative road proposed by Plumwood 
“involves a major cultural project with ramifications through many areas 
beyond science and epistemology” (Idem, 50). Crucial to the project’s 
success is that we abandon the idea that human life takes place in a 
self-enclosed sphere called ‘culture’ while non-human life is part of a 
non-ethical sphere called ‘nature’. We must learn to recognise that all 
life-forms are situated in culture as well as in nature.
 How do we shape ethical forms of science? Plumwood advises 
us to take Care models of knowledge as an example. Because such 
models empower ethical and socially engaged perspectives, they allow 
us to move beyond the knowledge dualisms rooted in Enlightenment 
empiricism. Plumwood explains that, up to now, the formal articulation 
of these models has only been partial. Unfortunately, she herself only 
offers a few suggestions on how to develop them further. One option 
would be to confront scientists with genres of writing in which non-
human nature is assigned an active, rather than a passive role, for 
instance the nature writing of Annie Dillard (1945), or “Aldo Leopold’s 
encounters with thinking mountains” (Idem, 54). In Plumwood’s view, 
imaginative literature “can help us retell the mechanistic narratives told 
by reductionist science in more memorable, more generous and more 
helpful ways” (Idem, 54). Anthropology could also play a role. Plumwood 
explains that in recent years, this field has been challenged greatly to 
rethink the subject/object model and to switch to a “model in which 
knowledge is based on the consenting and cooperative disclosure 
of other active subjects, and which carries an ethic of care for, and 
attention and accountability to those who are studied” (Idem, 54). All 
these recommendations build on the basic conviction that in order for 
new nature-friendly technologies to be successful, we must change our 
basic attitude towards nature as well.
autonomy, service and control. We take the functioning of the ecological 
systems which support us entirely for granted; they only deserve our 
attention when they fail to perform as expected. Plumwood sets out to 
demonstrate the ecological irrationality of human–nature dualism. At one 
time, the old human- and reason-centered culture of the West may have 
facilitated the dominant culture’s comparative advantage over other 
more modest and ecologically-adapted cultures on this planet. In the 
age of ecological limits, however, it has become a threat to our survival.
 According to Plumwood, the dualistic approach of the West has 
also affected our image of the relationship between science and the 
environmental crisis. Since science has played a key role in exposing 
and controlling environmental damage, it is often presented as the 
solution to the ecological crisis. However, “modern technoscience also 
has an uglier but less remarked face: [it] has contributed to producing 
the environmental crisis at least as much as to curing it” (Idem, 38):
“Thus we can link overfishing to fisheries science and fishing 
technology, land salination and degradation to irrigation and 
agricultural technology, the disasters of intensive agriculture and 
genetic engineering to biological, agricultural and forestry science, 
[…] and transportation, combustion and refrigeration technology to 
global warming and the ozone hole” (Idem, 38).
To ensure the preservation of our planet, we are in need of alternative 
forms of science. In fact, Plumwood believes that, at the technological 
level, we already have the means available to accomplish the changes 
needed to live sustainably on and with the Earth. Unlike Sloterdijk, 
however, she argues that technology itself cannot initiate this shift towards 
peaceful co-existence. Her main criticism on technofix solutions is that 
they don’t urge us to reconsider our dominant lifestyles and demands 
on nature, but rather aim to meet these demands more efficiently by 
means of smarter technology. In Plumwood’s view, “what we need for 
a viable future is an integrated ‘democratic’ science that is dialogical, 
non-reductionist and self-reflective – a science that can bring itself and 
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5.9 Conclusion
Although I appreciate the evocative and inspiring way in which Sloterdijk 
fleshes out the potentials of homeotechnology for realising a more 
sustainable future, I agree with Plumwood that the transition towards 
‘nature-friendly’ forms of technoscience will not be effectuated by 
the emergence of biomimetic forms of knowledge and technology as 
such, but presupposes, and must be supported by, a broader cultural 
transformation in which technoscientific developments as outlined by 
Sloterdijk can become firmly embedded.
 Yet, this does not mean that I side with Plumwood against Sloterdijk 
or vice versa. Rather, I think both perspectives can and should be 
combined, as their strengths and weaknesses tend to mirror each 
other. Whereas Sloterdijk tends to overestimate the ‘rescue potential’ 
of homeotechnology, he does provide a positive notion of what 
technology could afford, built on a well thought through notion of the 
role of technology in human nature. Plumwood on the other hand, 
tends to underestimate or neglect the sustainability potential of modern 
technoscience. Yet she passionately reminds us of the notion that we 
should somehow resist merely technological fixes. And although I agree 
with Plumwood that, in itself, technoscience cannot initiate the shift 
towards a peaceful co-existence of humans and nature, I agree with 
Sloterdijk that the technological turn we witness today is itself already a 
result of the way in which we are changing our lives. By confronting us 
not only with nature’s genius, but also with our dependency on a healthy 
biosphere, modern technoscience urges us to embrace more humble 
and subservient approaches to nature.
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6.1 Between ‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches 
  to nature
The question society wants answered is not how to be right, but how to 
be smart – how to go on doing what it has been doing, without paying 
the price. 
– Neil Evernden, 1993
In the concluding section of the preceding chapter, I argued that the shift 
towards a more peaceful co-existence between humans and (the rest of) 
nature will not be brought about by the emergence of homeotechnology 
as such. Drawing on the writings of Val Plumwood, I maintained that this 
transition presupposes, and must be supported by, a broader cultural 
transformation in which technoscientific developments as outlined 
by Peter Sloterdijk can become firmly embedded. At the same time, 
however, the homeotechnological or ecotechnological turn we witness 
today is itself already the result of the ways in which we are changing 
our lives (cf. Sloterdijk 2009a); the emergence of ecological genomics 
and other ecotechnologies demonstrates that we are in a process 
of ‘re-inventing’ our relationship with nature. The desire to develop 
technological devices that do not disturb or interfere with the dynamics 
of nature, but instead seek to mimic nature’s strategies, results from the 
“growing understanding that it cannot go on like this” (Idem, 699).
In this thesis, I have used ecological genomics as a case study to reflect 
on the promises of ecotechnology. As ‘ecotechnology in practice’, 
this field of research not only endorses the expectations concerning 
the potential of ecotechnology for realising a more sustainable future, 
but also shows the difficulties entailed in the transition towards a new 
relationship with nature. I have concentrated on the following research 
question: To what extent does ecological genomics discourse, as 
an exemplification of the ecotechnological turn, reflect the possibility 
of a new relationship between humans, technology and nature? This 
Mother Earth. Engraving by Matthaeus Merian from alchemist Michael Maier’s 
Atalanta fugiens, 1617.
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instrumental outlook on nature. Next, I will show that ecogenomics 
discourse also reveals a different, more humble story of nature, albeit 
as an undercurrent. Finally, building on the work of Val Plumwood, this 
thesis closes with the consideration that, to protect ecological genomics 
and other ecotechnologies from becoming channels of a reductionist and 
instrumental mode of thought, they must be integrated in a ‘democratic’ 
science that sees both human and non-human nature as a partner in the 
production of knowledge.
6.2 Reviewing the ecogenomics  
  promises
In chapter 2, I critically reflected on the promise that ecological genomics 
will bring about a marriage between disciplines that are rooted in different, 
or even hostile, research traditions (promise 1). As field-based ecological 
research, and laboratory-based genomic investigations traditionally 
occupied different areas within the biological sciences, ecological 
genomics is presented as a field of research that will lead to a whole 
new way of looking at natural systems. Ecological genomics promises to 
undermine the deterministic, reductionist approach of laboratory culture; 
by enabling the exploration of both phenotypic biodiversity and genome 
diversity, the field lays the foundation of a more holistic approach to the 
analysis of ecosystems (cf. Kemperman et al. 2010, 3224; Van Straalen 
& Feder 2012, 4). I have shown that the two approaches at the core of 
ecological genomics have already taken some important steps towards 
such a new approach. Thanks to the introduction of next-generation 
sequencing methodology, the organism-centred approach has 
succeeded in applying genomic tools to ecologically interesting species, 
such as reptiles, amphibians and birds. These species are not “selected 
on the basis of particular genetic and developmental features […] and for 
ease of growth in the laboratory” (Jackson et al. 2002, 409), but because 
of their ecological or evolutionary importance and their applicability to 
overarching question contained a number of sub-questions, such as: 
What exactly are the promises entailed in ecogenomics discourse? How 
can a new relationship between humans, technology and nature be 
achieved and how can ecological genomics contribute to this?
 In answering these questions, I have analysed ecogenomicists’ 
self-understandings and self-presentations as articulated in scientific 
publications, programmatic documents, research proposals, conference 
talks, etc. By exploring the tensions and ambiguities revealed in 
ecological genomics discourse, I have not only sought to deepen our 
understanding of what is at stake in this particular field of research, 
but also to shed light on the ecotechnological turn as such. As I have 
shown in the introductory chapter, the tensions at the heart of ecological 
genomics circle around three promises. First, ecological genomics 
promises to bring about a marriage between genomics and ecology. 
Second, the field promises to have great potential for serving agricultural, 
medical, industrial and other societal needs. Third, ecological genomics 
promises to meet these needs in more intelligent, sustainable, and even 
‘natural’ ways. These promises are related to each other: precisely as a 
new form of knowledge production, ecological genomics is expected to 
meet human needs in a manner “consistent with the ecological fabric of 
the greater life system” (Mathews 2011, 366).
 In addition to the analysis of ecogenomics discourse, I have 
explored how the turn towards a more ‘natural’ natural science has 
been addressed in philosophical discourse. How have (contemporary) 
environmental thinkers reflected on the kinds of promises and tensions 
in ecological genomics and other ecotechnologies? I have ‘zoomed in’ 
on the work of a number of thinkers who have studied the relationship 
between science and technology and the ecological crisis, notably Val 
Plumwood and Peter Sloterdijk.
In the following sections, I will present the main conclusions of this thesis, 
starting with a review of the promises entailed in ecological genomics 
discourse. In spite of the promise of bringing about a new bond between 
humans, technology and nature, ecogenomics still strongly reflects an 
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the beneficial ‘goods’ produced by nature. Whereas part of the audience 
saw no harm in this commodification of nature, others had difficulties 
with the reduction of nature to a reservoir to be exploited using the latest 
technologies. 
 The inaugural ecogenomics meeting took place in February 2008. 
Considering how the Dutch ecogenomics field has developed over 
the past few years, we must conclude that ecogenomics discourse 
still strongly reflects an instrumental outlook on nature. In the BE-Basic 
programme (i.e. the foundation of which ECOLINC became part in 2010), 
nature is presented as a resource for unrestricted use. Instead of ‘nature 
mining’, function-driven metagenomics is now referred to as ‘DNA-
mining’. Moreover, the study of nature is described in terms of hunting: 
“Nature will be the main hunting ground for [uncovering] novel enzymes 
with very special properties.”79  
 The treasure quest narrative, used internationally to illustrate the 
metagenomic practice of uncovering the Earth’s microbial diversity, also 
endorses an instrumental approach to nature. As has been argued in 
chapter 4, this narrative self-presentation seeks to underline the genius 
of nature’s innovations; nature appears as a super-innovator whose 
creations we can incorporate into our own technologies. Nevertheless, 
nature is still presented as a resource; emphasis is put on the ‘goods’ – 
antibiotics, vitamins, enzymes – hidden in the soil. Comparing microbial 
ecosystems to treasure troves reduces the world of microorganisms 
to “another material thing that can be utilized by humans” (Evernden 
1993, 24).
BE-Basic Foundation [http://www.be-basic.org/research/hte-metagenomic-
mining/new-robust-enzymes-for-bioplastic-production.html] – last accessed 2 
September 2013.
79
ecological questions. The metagenomic approach enables the study of 
microbial communities in their native habitats, rather than in controlled 
laboratory settings. Thanks to this move from lab to field, metagenomics 
has provided “access to environmental communities in their whole 
complexity” (George et al. 2010, 121). 
 Despite these promising developments, we can still observe a 
tension between reductionist and more comprehensive approaches to 
nature. In the ecogenomics marriage, genomics is still the dominant 
partner. This applies especially to the organism-centred approach, 
which continues to study its new ecological models in the laboratory. 
The artificial environments created in labs lack the unpredictability and 
variability of natural ecosystems, even if they are studied with the “right” 
model (cf. Kohler 2002). Furthermore, in understanding ecosystem 
processes, both the organism-centred and the metagenomic approaches 
are mainly interested in the genetic mechanisms underlying critical 
ecological interactions. The ‘genomic language’ at the heart of ecological 
genomics tends to push aside other narratives that aim to describe nature 
in general, and complex ecological processes in particular.
In the third and fourth chapter, I explored the ambivalence between the 
societal and ecological promises in ecogenomics; the field will enable us 
to meet human needs (promise 2), while at the same time respecting the 
integrity of ecosystems (promise 3). Yet, ecological genomics discourse 
reveals a tension between these two promises; the wish to exploit the 
field’s potential for useful applications threatens to undermine the 
ecological promise. In chapter 3, I ‘zoomed in’ on the first Dutch National 
Ecogenomics Day to show that the difficulty of integrating societal and 
ecological goals is symptomatic of quite a fundamental difference 
between the various parties active in this area. I argued that the turmoil 
caused by Bram Brouwer’s presentation did not merely reveal a strategic 
conflict about the field’s (future) research direction; by using the term 
‘nature mining’, Brouwer unintentionally exposed that the members of 
the Dutch ecogenomics community endorse different, even conflicting 
conceptions of nature. The term is part of a vocabulary that emphasises 
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attitudes towards nature is by revealing the interdependence of all life 
forms. By demonstrating how genes “influence each other’s activities in 
serving collective functions” (Committee on Metagenomics 2007, 13), 
the field might persuade us to further develop the image of land as 
a ‘collective organism’, as proposed by Aldo Leopold. The Committee 
on Metagenomics has already moved in this direction by defining the 
metagenomic approach as the “genomics of Gaia”, and by referring to 
the biosphere as “a single superorganism” (Idem, 139). In this particular 
vocabulary, nature is interpreted differently than in the treasure trove 
and mining terminology. Although to some scientists, the Gaia concept 
might be (even) more problematic than the terminology just mentioned 
(cf. Doolittle 1981),80 the Earth and its biospheres appear as a significant 
and meaningful order.
 The emergence of a vocabulary in which nature appears as 
something ‘broader’ than mere commodity-production can also be 
found in other examples of ecotechnology. In chapter 4, we have 
seen that Janine Benyus describes the ecotechnological practice of 
biomimicry as a tutorial practice (cf. Benyus 2002, 4). In order to do 
justice to nature’s own creative processes, argues Benyus, we should 
“view nature as a source of ideas instead of goods.”81 By introducing 
this alternative narrative, she distances herself from interpretations of 
the ecotechnological turn that (implicitly) support the conviction that 
“the world was put here exclusively for our use” (Idem, 8). To enable 
more respectful approaches to nature, it is not enough to recognise the 
excellent quality of the ‘goods’ produced by nature, nor will it suffice 
to see nature as a super-innovator; it requires that we start looking 
differently at ourselves as well. The recognition of nature as our mentor 
implies that we simultaneously recognise ourselves as nature’s students, 
According to Doolittle, evolutionarily speaking, organisms cannot work for the 
distant benefit of a vague collective entity. Notwithstanding his opposition 
to the notion of Gaia, Doolittle is one of the proponents of the concept of 
‘metaorganism’ (cf. O’Malley & Dupré 2010, 193).
Biomimicry 3.8 [http://biomimicry.net/about/biomimicry/conversation-with-
janine/] – last accessed 18 November 2013.
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6.3 A different story of nature
But this is not the only story ecological genomics has to tell: the discourse 
also reveals a more humble and respectful attitude towards nature, albeit 
(still) as an undercurrent. This undercurrent was for instance revealed 
by the already mentioned discomfort the term ‘nature mining’ evoked by 
part of the Dutch ecogenomics community. As I have argued in chapter 
3, this unease has been most clearly expressed by Joop Ouborg, who 
maintained that the term ‘nature mining’ as such conveys a technocratic 
and human-centred image of nature. It echoes the question: how can 
we exploit nature to meet human needs? (Ouborg, interview, September 
2012). Furthermore, this more humble attitude towards nature is reflected 
in the ESF-funded projects ensuing from the fundamental research 
programme of PEEG. Compared to the BE-Basic programme, these 
projects express a more modest vocabulary, underlining the knowledge 
rather than the ‘goods’ hidden in nature.
 Of the two approaches at the core of ecological genomics (i.e. the 
organism-centred and the metagenomic approaches), metagenomics 
most strongly encourages an instrumental outlook on nature. This clearly 
has to do with its huge potential for useful products and applications. But 
this potential could also function as a basis for respect; metagenomics 
confronts us with our dependency on microbes in meeting agricultural, 
medical and industrial needs. Microbial communities – notably those 
residing in the soil – play a crucial role in the health and productivity of 
crops and in cleaning up contaminated environments. Moreover, they 
are essential for purifying drinking water and the development of new 
medicines (cf. Handelsman 2007; Committee on Metagenomics 2007). 
Thus, rather than comparing the Earth’s microbial diversity to a treasure 
trove or (gold) mine, the metagenomic approach might also urge us to 
embrace an image of nature which connects with the mythical image of 
the Earth as a nurturing mother (cf. Merchant 1989). 
 Metagenomics not only shows us that humans are “as dependent 
on a healthy biosphere as other forms of life” (Plumwood 2002, 99); 
another way in which this approach could support more humble 
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to its potential for sustainability or ‘nature-friendliness’, is not a matter 
of more knowledge or more technology; the homeotechnological or 
ecotechnological turn demonstrates that on the technological level, 
we already have the means to accomplish the changes needed to live 
sustainably on and with the Earth. Yet, ecotechnologies only touch a 
certain range of problems (cf. Plumwood 2002, 6); these technologies 
must become part of a broader cultural transformation. I will conclude 
this thesis by elaborating Plumwood’s thoughts a little bit further, and 
by reflecting on their meaning for ecological genomics and other 
ecotechnologies. 
 Because of its leading role in exposing environmental damage 
as well as in counteracting it, science is often presented as “the ally 
and saviour of the environment” (Idem, 8). Plumwood argues that this 
one-sided presentation of the relationship between science and the 
ecological crisis is based on our tendency to overvalue and overestimate 
human technological ingenuity. We only draw attention to the ‘heroic’ 
role of science, and “vastly underestimate [its] potential for negative 
impacts on us and on the more-than-human world” (Idem, 239). 
Plumwood understands the damaging effects of technoscience as a 
result of its “excessive intimacy” (Idem, 39) with capitalism. She argues 
that “economic rationalism and productivism ensure that the research 
directions of technoscience are increasingly dominated by the narrowly 
instrumental and productive goals of corporations, rather than by 
broader and more integrated knowledge agendas” (Idem, 39). In chapter 
3, I explained that over the past few years, the Dutch ecogenomics 
community – to the great dissatisfaction of some of its members – has 
been under pressure to shift its research emphasis from ‘Publication to 
Product’; due to new funding schemes, the ecogenomics agenda has 
been increasingly determined by “innovative aspects and valorization 
opportunities” (Brouwer 2008, 2). Using the terms of Plumwood, “more 
basic research [has been] neglected in favour of crudely instrumental 
and productivist goals” (Plumwood 2002, 40). As we have seen, a risk 
inherent to this focus on market opportunities is that nature is reduced 
to a passive resource, open for the taking. But Plumwood also points at 
6.4 Change your narratives!
open to the lessons that nature has in store for us. Although Benyus 
does not draw attention to the fact that not only nature’s goods, but also 
her wisdom can be used in a reductionist and instrumental fashion, the 
alternative view proposed by her reflects the willingness to develop a 
new, more humble story of nature.82
How to accomplish that this more humble story of nature does not 
remain an undercurrent, but becomes mainstream? In other words: how 
can a new relationship between humans, technology and nature be 
achieved, and how can ecotechnologies such as ecological genomics 
contribute to this? In my view, a necessary step in this process is 
that we acknowledge that ecotechnologies are not the whole answer, 
but only a portion of the answer. This has also been one of the key 
messages of chapter 5, in which I critically reflected on the ‘rescue 
potential’ of homeotechnology, as put forward by Peter Sloterdijk. 
One of Sloterdijk’s basic assumptions is that the ability to incorporate 
nature’s basic operating principles – replication, selection, transgenesis 
– into our own technologies is inextricably bound up with an attitude 
towards nature that no longer strives for mastery and domination. Using 
metagenomics as an illustration, I have argued that mere technological 
or instrumental forms of co-operation with nature might also ‘fuel’ our will 
to power, our will to control living nature; precisely by uncovering nature 
as a domain of complexity and sophistication, metagenomics opens 
up new prospects for exploitation, for instance by means of genetic 
manipulation and ‘nature mining’.
 Drawing on the work of Val Plumwood, I concluded chapter 5 with 
the position that the question of whether homeotechnology will live up 
This comment also applies to the programme of PEEG, which emphasises the 
knowledge rather than the ‘goods’ hidden in nature.
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In other words: democratic forms of science see both human and non-
human nature as a partner in the production of knowledge (cf. Mathews 
1991).83
“The dialogical paradigm stresses […] communicative 
methodologies of sensitive listening and attentive observation, 
and of an open stance that has not already closed itself off by 
stereotyping the other that is studied in reductionist terms as 
mindless and voiceless” (Plumwood 2002, 56). 
The transition from a dualistic to a dialogical paradigm is not only a 
task of scientists, but “involves a major cultural project with ramifications 
through many areas beyond science and epistemology” (Idem, 50). 
Crucial to the project’s success is that we develop narratives that situate 
all life-forms – i.e. both human and non-human life – in culture as well 
as in nature: “We can no longer retain the comfortable human-centred 
illusion of separate casts of characters in separate dramas” (Idem, 52). 
We are all in the same boat (cf. Sloterdijk 1995). A similar message can 
be found in the work of Freya Mathews, who claims that “[i]t is in fact 
important that we try to get rid of the distinction between environmental 
and other ends, or environmental and other contexts” (Mathews 2011, 
371); there is nothing beyond the environmental context. With this thesis, 
I wish to encourage ecological genomicists and other ecotechnologists 
to incorporate this message in their narratives of nature.
“Should we, in the context where we have the possibility of 
developing a more generous narrative and dialogical form of 
rationality that allows more sensitivity to the other, bend and strain 
our reasoning faculties to keep our options confined to the old 
reductive models?” (Plumwood 2002, 61). 
Benyus expresses a similar view by arguing that we should think of ourselves 
“as one vote in a parliament of 30 million (maybe even 100 million) […] 
species” (2002, 8).
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another danger of this instrumental research direction: 
“The dominance of the economic sphere over other spheres means 
that scientific research and warning systems that have a potentially 
corrective role in the ecological crisis have themselves been largely 
compromised” (Idem, 40 – my emphasis).
Applied to ecological genomics, this insight means that the field’s 
potential to contribute to a more sustainable relationship between humans, 
technology and nature, risks being sacrificed for the sake of production 
goals; whereas ecological genomics could play a corrective role in the 
ecological crisis, the field must be careful not to display complicity to 
the environmental problems we are facing today. Plumwood’s reflections 
on the ties or ‘closeness’ between science and capitalism also show 
us that a marriage between ecology and genomics is not necessarily 
desirable. The tensions between ecology and genomics are an 
expression of different ways of being-in-the-world (and, as has been 
shown in the intermezzo, of different ways of being-in-the-language). 
Traditionally, ecology refers to the science of the relationships of living 
organisms to their environments, and the practice of paying tribute to 
this complex web of life. In the ecogenomics marriage, the objective to 
fully understand these relationships threatens to be superseded by the 
societal promises and expectations – i.e. the promisomics (Chadwick 
& Zwart 2013, 1) – of genomics. By integrating ecology with genomics, 
the ‘eco’ of ecology might become part of quite an instrumental (or 
‘economic’) story of nature.
 To protect ecological genomics and other ecotechnologies from 
becoming spokesmen of a reductionist and instrumental mode of 
thought – or, to speak with Benyus, from being used “in the ongoing 
campaign against life” (Benyus 2002, 8) – they must be integrated in 
a ‘democratic’ science which is based on a dialogical, rather than a 
dualistic paradigm. Plumwood explains that such a science is not 
confined to “rational objects of knowledge” (Plumwood 2002, 50), but 
includes the entire “material and sensory world of nature” (Idem, 47). 
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How can we accomplish the changes needed to live sustainably on and 
with the Earth? Today, few other questions seem to have such urgency. 
Because of its crucial role in exposing environmental damage as well as 
in controlling it, technoscience is often presented as the solution to the 
ecological crisis. Looking at recent developments in the life sciences, 
its contribution to achieving the required changes seems very promising 
indeed. Confronted with the vulnerability of planet Earth, we seem to 
have entered a new technological era, in which we are ‘re-inventing’ 
our relationship with nature. Whereas more traditional technological 
approaches tend to counteract the dynamics of nature, new technological 
approaches are increasingly inspired by nature’s own design principles. 
The desire to produce technological devices that mimic the natural 
world as closely as possible reveals an ‘ecotechnological turn’, meaning 
that nature’s own evolutionary strategies provide the models for our 
innovations. 
 This thesis critically reflects on the opportunities offered by 
ecotechnologies to bring about a new, more sustainable relationship 
between humans, technology and nature, by concentrating on a 
particular case study: ecological genomics, sometimes abbreviated to 
ecogenomics. This research field not only gives a clear account of the 
potential of ecotechnology for a more sustainable future, but also shows 
the difficulties of the transition from ‘old’ to ‘new’ approaches to nature. 
The research question addressed in this thesis is as follows: 
To what extent does ecological genomics discourse, as an exemplification 
of the ecotechnological turn, reflect the possibility of a new relationship 
between humans, technology and nature? 
This overarching question contains a number of sub-questions, such as: 
What exactly are the promises entailed in ecological genomics discourse? 
How can a new relationship between humans, technology and nature 
be achieved and how can ecological genomics contribute to this? 
Summary
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 These questions are answered by analysing self-presentations and 
self-understandings of ecological genomics as articulated in scientific 
publications, programmatic documents, research proposals, conference 
talks, etc. These reveal a number of tensions, circling around three 
promises. 
 1. A scientific promise: ecological genomics will bring about a 
  marriage between genomics and ecology.
 2. A societal promise: ecological genomics has great potential for 
  serving agricultural, medical, industrial and other societal 
  needs.
 3. An ecological promise: ecological genomics will meet these 
  needs in more intelligent, sustainable, and even ‘natural’ ways. 
 In addition to the analysis of ecogenomics discourse, this thesis 
explores how the ecotechnological turn has been addressed in 
philosophical discourse. How have (contemporary) environmental 
thinkers reflected on the kinds of promises and tensions at the heart 
of ecological genomics and other ecotechnologies? This second step 
‘zooms in’ on the work of a number of thinkers who have studied the 
relationship between science and technology and the ecological crisis, 
notably the Australian eco-feminist Val Plumwood (1939-2008) and the 
German philosopher and cultural theorist Peter Sloterdijk (1947).
 The two types of discourses unfold in four papers (from now on 
referred to as chapters 2 to 5), which constitute the core of this thesis. 
After having introduced the research themes of this thesis in chapter 
1, chapter 2 starts with an exploration of how the ecological genomics 
research field evolved. How were the most important pillars of ecological 
genomics set up? Which publications played a key role in establishing 
the principles of the field? The main purpose of this chapter, however, 
is to reflect on the promise that ecological genomics will bring about 
a marriage between field-based ecological research and laboratory-
based genomic investigations (promise 1). As ecology and genomics 
traditionally occupied different areas within the biological sciences, this 
integration is expected to lead to a whole new way of looking at natural 
systems; ecological genomics promises to undermine the deterministic, 
reductionist approach of laboratory culture, and to lay the foundation of 
a more holistic approach to the analysis of ecosystems. This promise is 
assessed by an exploration of how ecology and genomics are integrated 
in the two approaches that currently dominate this field: the organism-
centred and the metagenomic approaches. Whereas the former aims to 
improve our understanding of ecosystem functioning by focussing on the 
level of the individual (model) organism, the latter concentrates on (the 
metagenome of) entire microbial communities composed of a variety 
of species. The organism-centred and metagenomic approaches have 
already made important progress towards bridging the gap between 
ecology and genomics. Thanks to the introduction of next-generation 
sequencing methodology, the organism-centred approach does 
not need to stick to classical laboratory-based model organisms like 
Arabidopsis and Drosophila anymore; instead, it now proves to be able 
to apply genomic tools to ecologically interesting species, i.e. species 
that provide insight in critical ecological interactions, such as reptiles, 
amphibians, and birds. The metagenomic approach allows the study of 
microbial communities in their native habitats, rather than in controlled 
laboratory settings. Thanks to this move from lab to field, metagenomics 
has enabled the study of microbial DNA under nature’s own conditions. 
 In spite of these promising developments, genomics still appears 
to be the dominant partner in the ecogenomics marriage. This applies 
especially to the organism-centred approach, which continues to study 
its (new) models in the laboratory. The artificial environments created in 
labs lack the unpredictability and variability of natural ecosystems, even 
if they are studied with the “right” model. Furthermore, in understanding 
ecosystem processes, both the organism-centred and metagenomic 
approaches are mainly interested in the genetic mechanisms underlying 
critical ecological interactions. The ‘genomic language’ at the heart of 
ecological genomics tends to overshadow other narratives that seek 
to describe nature in general, and complex ecological processes in 
particular. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on the ambivalence between the societal 
and ecological promises in ecogenomics; the field will enable us to 
meet human needs (promise 2), while at the same time respecting the 
integrity of ecosystems (promise 3). Yet, ecogenomics discourse reveals 
a tension between these two promises; the desire to exploit the field’s 
potential for useful applications threatens to undermine the ecological 
promise. ‘Zooming in’ on a case study from the Dutch ecogenomics field, 
chapter 3 shows that the difficulty of integrating societal and ecological 
goals is symptomatic of quite a fundamental difference between the 
various parties active in this area. During an important inaugural meeting, 
Bram Brouwer, director of one of the most sizeable Dutch ecogenomics 
centres, gave a presentation in which he introduced the term ‘nature 
mining’. Part of the audience immediately embraced the term, but others 
had major reservations. This mixed response is generally explained as 
a culmination of growing tension about the future direction of the field: 
due to new funding schemes, a shift had occurred from fundamental 
research to research more interested in ‘valorisation’. However, as put 
forward in this chapter, the turmoil caused by Brouwer’s presentation did 
not merely reveal a strategic conflict about the field’s research direction; 
by using the term ‘nature mining’, Brouwer unintentionally uncovered that 
the members of the Dutch ecogenomics community endorse different, 
even conflicting conceptions of nature. The term is part of a vocabulary 
that emphasises the beneficial ‘goods’ produced by nature. Whereas 
part of the audience saw no harm in this commodification of nature, 
others had difficulties with the reduction of nature to a reservoir to be 
exploited using the latest technologies. 
In chapter 4, the normativity hidden in particular stories of nature is 
explored in more detail. To illustrate how ecotechnologies can be 
distinguished from more traditional approaches to nature, scientists make 
use of different narrative structures, metaphors, and images. With these 
narrative self-presentations, they seek to explain and legitimise their 
research activities. This chapter concentrates on two of these ‘narratives 
of ecotechnology’. Firstly, metagenomics researchers compare the 
practice of uncovering the Earth’s microbial diversity with a quest for 
a treasure. This narrative is meant to draw attention to the wealth of 
products yet to be discovered in nature: the ecotechnological turn is 
presented as a quest for the ‘goods’ nature has produced in the process 
of evolution. However, there are also more critical voices claiming that 
the treasure quest narrative does not provide a full picture of what is at 
stake in ecotechnology. One of them is the natural science writer and 
innovation consultant Janine Benyus (1958). To do justice to nature’s 
own creative processes, Benyus argues, nature should be presented 
as a source of ideas rather than goods. She expresses this alternative 
view by referring to the ecotechnological practice of ‘biomimicry’ as a 
tutorial practice. To enable more respectful approaches to nature, it is 
not enough to recognise the excellent quality of the ‘goods’ produced 
by nature, nor will it suffice to see nature as a super-innovator; it requires 
that we start looking differently at ourselves as well. The recognition of 
nature as our mentor implies that we simultaneously recognise ourselves 
as nature’s students, open to the lessons that nature has in store for us.
 Although Benyus presents the tutorial relationship as the opposite 
of the practice of treasure hunting, these two narrative self-presentations 
are strikingly similar in one respect: they were chosen because they 
are believed to provide sympathetic models with strategically useful, 
positive connotations only. The treasure quest narrative stresses that, 
although the development of ecotechnology will require full commitment 
and high investments, these sacrifices will result in a great material 
reward in the end, in the form of new products beneficial to humans 
(e.g. antibiotics, vitamins, enzymes). The tutorial narrative also comes 
with a positive promise: if we listen carefully to nature’s lessons, we will 
ourselves become smarter and better problem solvers, as well. Here, the 
‘prize’ is not so much a material, but rather an intellectual reward. Yet, 
both the treasure quest and the teacher-student narratives are much 
more ambivalent and multidimensional than the scientists using them 
seem to realise. They are embedded in broader cultural narratives to 
which they (implicitly) refer and from which they derive their motivational 
force. Using popular film as an illustration, this chapter shows the moral 
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ambivalence of both ecotechnological narratives. Whereas reflecting on 
Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981) helps us to understand what is at stake in 
presenting ecotechnology as a treasure quest, Disney’s The Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice (1940) shows the moral ambivalence of the teacher-student 
narrative.
In chapter 5, ecogenomics discourse is put aside for a moment, to explore 
how the ecotechnological turn has been addressed in the philosophical 
writings of Peter Sloterdijk. To emphasise how ecotechnologies can 
be distinguished from more traditional technological approaches to 
nature, Sloterdijk draws a distinction between allotechnologies and 
homeotechnologies. Whereas the former are based on principles that 
are different from, and often disturb or interfere with the dynamics of 
nature, the latter seek to act and think in accordance with nature’s 
own modus operandi. In this chapter, it is argued that Sloterdijk’s 
reflections on homeotechnology are based on a series of problematic 
assumptions; Sloterdijk not only claims that homeotechnology is 
founded on an imitation of nature, but also assumes that the ability 
to incorporate nature’s basic operating principles – e.g. replication, 
selection, transgenesis – in our own technologies is inextricably 
bound up with a co-operative, domination-free attitude towards nature. 
However, the conviction that we (already) understand nature’s principles 
of operation sufficiently to imitate them seems fairly hubristic. Moreover, 
it presupposes that nature reveals itself in a particular way, namely as 
an assembly line of biomolecular processes. Even if we assume that 
at some point we will succeed in imitating nature’s most complex and 
refined processes, this does not automatically preclude domination. 
Rather, ‘doing it nature’s way’ opens up new prospects for exploitation, 
for instance by means of genetic manipulation and ‘nature mining’. What 
is more, since technoscience obscures the classical distinction between 
‘biomachines’ and ‘manmade machines’, this exploitation runs the risk 
of becoming increasingly subtle and invisible. Thus, homeotechnology 
may result in strengthening our control over nature even on a molecular 
level. Building on the work of Val Plumwood, this fifth chapter concludes 
with the consideration that the question of whether homeotechnology will 
contribute to a more sustainable future largely depends on the broader 
framework within which it is implemented. 
In the concluding chapter 6, it is argued that, in spite of the promise of 
bringing about a new, more sustainable relationship between humans, 
technology and nature, ecogenomics discourse still strongly reflects an 
instrumental outlook on nature. This is for example expressed in the 
treasure trove and mining terminology, in which nature is pictured as 
a resource for unrestricted use. Yet, ecological genomics discourse 
also reveals a different, more humble story of nature, albeit (still) as an 
undercurrent. This undercurrent is for instance shown by the discomfort 
the term ‘nature mining’ evoked by part of the Dutch ecogenomics 
community, and by the vocabulary used in some of its fundamental 
research programmes. The metagenomic approach, which currently 
mainly supports an instrumental attitude towards nature, also harbours 
other interpretations of nature as a significant and meaningful order. By 
confronting us with our dependency on microbes in meeting all kinds 
of highly important human needs, metagenomics might encourage 
us to embrace an image of nature which is more connected with the 
mythical image of the Earth as a ‘nurturing mother’ (cf. Merchant 1989). 
Moreover, by underlining the interdependence of all life forms, the field 
might persuade us to further develop the image of land as a ‘collective 
organism’, as proposed by Aldo Leopold (1949). The Committee 
on Metagenomics has already taken some steps in this direction by 
referring to the metagenomic approach as the “genomics of Gaia”. 
The emergence of a vocabulary reflecting a more respectful outlook on 
nature can also be found in other examples of ecotechnology, such as 
biomimicry. Although Benyus does not draw attention to the fact that not 
only nature’s goods, but also her wisdom can be used in an instrumental 
and reductionist fashion, the alternative view proposed by her reflects 
the willingness to develop a new, more humble story of nature. 
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How to accomplish that this more humble story of nature does not remain 
an undercurrent, but becomes mainstream? A necessary step in this 
process is that we acknowledge that ecotechnologies are not the whole 
answer, but only a portion of the answer. Drawing on the conclusion of 
chapter 5, this thesis closes with the position that, to protect ecological 
genomics and other ecotechnologies from becoming spokesmen of a 
reductionist and instrumental mode of thought, they must be integrated 
in a ‘democratic’ science that sees nature as a partner in the production 
of knowledge.
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Samenvatting
Hoe kunnen wij de Aarde op duurzame wijze bewonen? Vandaag de 
dag zijn weinig vragen zo prangend als deze. Omdat wetenschap 
en technologie een cruciale rol hebben gespeeld in zowel het 
zichtbaar maken als het bestrijden van milieuschade, worden zij vaak 
gepresenteerd als het antwoord op de huidige ecologische crisis. Als 
we recente ontwikkelingen binnen met name de levenswetenschappen 
in ogenschouw nemen, dan lijkt hun bijdrage in het doorvoeren van de 
vereiste veranderingen inderdaad veelbelovend. Geconfronteerd met de 
kwetsbaarheid van de Aarde voor menselijk ingrijpen, staan wij op de 
drempel van een nieuw technologisch tijdperk, waarin wij onze relatie met 
de natuur als het ware heruitvinden. Waar meer klassieke technologische 
benaderingen doorgaans worden gekenmerkt door een tegennatuurlijke 
tendens – een tendens de dynamiek van de natuur te verstoren en 
tegen te werken – , laten nieuwe technologische benaderingen zich in 
toenemende mate inspireren door de ontwerpprincipes van de levende 
natuur zelf. De opkomst van technieken die met de natuur meewerken en 
meedenken, onthult een ecotechnologische wending, een omslagpunt 
waarbij de evolutionaire strategieën van de natuur het model voor 
menselijke innovatie verschaffen. 
 In mijn proefschrift reflecteer ik kritisch op de kansen van 
ecotechnieken om een nieuwe, duurzame(re) relatie tussen mens, 
techniek en natuur tot stand te brengen. Hierbij richt ik mij op een 
specifieke casus: het wetenschapsveld ecological genomics ofwel 
ecogenomics. Deze casus laat ons niet alleen zien hoe opkomende 
wetenschapsvelden kunnen bijdragen aan een groenere toekomst, 
maar confronteert ons ook met de obstakels die wij tegenkomen bij de 
transformatie van ‘oude’ naar ‘nieuwe’ benaderingen van de natuur. In 
mijn proefschrift staat de volgende vraag centraal:
In hoeverre reflecteert het ecological genomics discours, als een casus 
van de ecotechnologische wending, de mogelijkheid van een nieuwe 
relatie tussen mens, techniek en natuur?
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Deze overkoepelende vraag bevat een aantal sub-vragen: Welke 
beloftes liggen precies besloten in het ecogenomics discours? Hoe kan 
een nieuwe relatie tussen mens, techniek en natuur worden verkregen 
en hoe kan ecogenomics hiertoe bijdragen? 
 Om deze vragen te beantwoorden, volg ik twee routes. Allereerst 
analyseer ik het ecogenomics discours zoals het naar voren komt 
in wetenschappelijke publicaties, programmatische documenten, 
onderzoeksvoorstellen, etc. Hierin komen spanningen naar voren die 
aan drie beloftes kunnen worden gerelateerd: 
 1. Een wetenschappelijke belofte: Ecogenomics zal een huwelijk 
  tot stand brengen tussen laboratorium-georiënteerd genomics 
  onderzoek en veld-georiënteerd ecologisch onderzoek.
 2. Een maatschappelijke belofte: Ecogenomics zal tal van 
  maatschappelijke behoeften vervullen, bijvoorbeeld in de 
  landbouw, industrie en gezondheidszorg.
 3. Een ecologische belofte: Ecogenomics zal in deze behoeften 
  voorzien op intelligente, duurzame en zelfs op ‘natuurlijke’ wijze. 
 Ten tweede onderzoek ik hoe de ecotechnologische wending ter 
sprake komt in het filosofische discours. Hoe hebben (hedendaagse) 
milieufilosofen gereflecteerd op de spanningen en beloftes die ten 
grondslag liggen aan ecogenomics en andere ecotechnieken? Ik zal 
het werk van verschillende denkers bespreken die de relatie tussen 
technowetenschap en de ecologische crisis hebben bestudeerd, in het 
bijzonder de Australische ecofeministe Val Plumwood (1939-2008) en 
de Duitse cultuurfilosoof Peter Sloterdijk (1947). 
De twee routes die ik in dit proefschrift volg, worden uiteengezet 
in vier artikelen (hoofdstuk 2 tot 5). Na de introductie van de 
onderzoeksthema’s in hoofdstuk 1, besteed ik in hoofdstuk 2 aandacht 
aan de geschiedenis van ecogenomics. Hoe hebben de belangrijkste 
pijlers van dit wetenschapsveld vorm gekregen? Welke publicaties 
zijn bepalend geweest voor de totstandkoming van de beginselen 
van het veld? Het voornaamste doel van dit hoofdstuk is echter de 
toetsing van de belofte dat ecogenomics een huwelijk tot stand zal 
brengen tussen ecologie en genomics (belofte 1). Omdat ecologie en 
genomics voortkomen uit verschillende domeinen binnen de biologie, 
belooft de integratie van deze twee wetenschapsvelden een geheel 
nieuwe kijk op ecosystemen te bewerkstelligen; in tegenstelling tot 
traditionele moleculaire technieken, die slechts een beperkt aantal 
variabelen gelijktijdig kunnen bestuderen, maakt ecogenomics een 
gedetailleerde studie van ecosystemen mogelijk op zowel micro- als 
macroniveau. Ik toets deze belofte door te onderzoeken hoe ecologie 
en genomics geïntegreerd zijn in de twee benaderingen die het veld 
vandaag de dag domineren. De eerste benadering – in mijn proefschrift 
aangeduid als de ‘organism-centred approach’ – beoogt ons begrip van 
ecosysteemprocessen te verbeteren door zich te concentreren op het 
niveau van het individuele (model)organisme. De tweede benadering 
– waar ik naar verwijs als de ‘metagenomic approach’ – brengt het 
DNA van complete microbiologische gemeenschappen in kaart; de 
gemeenschap wordt beschouwd als een organisme met één gezamenlijk 
genoom, het metagenoom. Ik zal laten zien dat beide benaderingen 
reeds belangrijke stappen hebben gezet om de kloof tussen ecologie 
en genomics te overbruggen. De ‘organism-centred approach’, die 
tot voor kort werkte met klassieke modelorganismen (Arabidopsis, 
Drosophila, etc.), kan zich dankzij de introductie van ‘nex-generation 
sequencing methodology’ (NGS) concentreren op soorten met een 
ecologische relevantie, dat wil zeggen soorten die inzicht verschaffen 
in kritische ecologische interacties. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn reptielen, 
amfibieën en vogels. De ‘metagenomic approach’ maakt het mogelijk 
om gemeenschappen van microben te onderzoeken in hun natuurlijke 
habitat, in plaats van in het laboratorium. Dit is van groot belang, omdat 
veel micro-organismen niet ‘in vitro’ bestudeerd kunnen worden.  
 Ondanks deze veelbelovende ontwikkelingen is genomics nog 
altijd de dominante partner binnen het genomics huwelijk. Dit geldt in 
het bijzonder voor de ‘organism-centred approach’, die haar nieuwe 
modellen blijft bestuderen onder gecontroleerde laboratoriumcondities. 
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Deze missen de onvoorspelbaarheid en variëteit van natuurlijke 
ecosystemen. Daarnaast is zowel de ‘organism-centred approach’ als de 
‘metagenomic approach’ voornamelijk geïnteresseerd in de genetische 
mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan kritische ecologische 
interacties. Deze ‘genomics taal’ dreigt andere narratieven die complexe 
ecologische processen willen beschrijven, te overschaduwen. 
In het derde en vierde hoofdstuk onderzoek ik de ambivalentie tussen 
de maatschappelijke en ecologische beloftes van ecogenomics; het 
wetenschapsveld zal ons in staat stellen om diverse maatschappelijke 
behoeften te vervullen (belofte 2), terwijl het tegelijkertijd de integriteit 
van ecosystemen respecteert (belofte 3). Het ecogenomics discours 
laat echter een spanning zien tussen deze twee beloftes: de wens om 
het potentieel van het veld voor bruikbare toepassingen ten volle te 
benutten, dreigt de ecologische belofte te ondermijnen. In hoofdstuk 3 
richt ik mij op een casus uit het Nederlandse ecogenomics veld om te 
laten zien dat achter deze spanning een conflict tussen verschillende 
natuuropvattingen schuilgaat. Tijdens een memorabele ecogenomics 
bijeenkomst in februari 2008 gaf Bram Brouwer, directeur van het 
Nederlandse Ecogenomics Consortium, een presentatie waarin hij het 
begrip ‘nature mining’ introduceerde. Een deel van het publiek reageerde 
zeer enthousiast op zijn presentatie, maar andere deelnemers hadden zo 
hun reserves. Deze gemengde reactie wordt doorgaans geïnterpreteerd 
als de culminatie van een conflict over de toekomstige richting van het 
ecogenomics wetenschapsveld: door nieuwe financieringseisen had 
er een verschuiving plaatsgevonden van ‘publicatie’ naar ‘product’. 
Ik zal echter beargumenteren dat wij de onrust die voortvloeide uit 
Brouwers presentatie niet volledig kunnen begrijpen door die te 
reduceren tot een strategisch conflict over de onderzoeksrichting 
van het veld. Door het begrip ‘nature mining’ te gebruiken, onthulde 
Brouwer (onbedoeld!) dat de leden van de Nederlandse ecogenomics 
gemeenschap verschillende, in sommige gevallen zelfs conflicterende, 
natuuropvattingen onderschrijven. Het begrip ‘nature mining’ behoort 
tot een instrumenteel vocabulaire dat de natuur in de eerste plaats 
als ‘product’ presenteert. Een deel van het publiek had geen enkel 
probleem met deze commodificatie van de natuur. Anderen konden zich 
echter niet vinden in deze reductie van de natuur tot een reservoir van 
bruikbare grondstoffen. 
In hoofdstuk 4 zal de normativiteit die besloten ligt in bepaalde narratieven 
van de natuur uitvoeriger worden bestudeerd. Om te illustreren hoe 
ecotechnieken zich onderscheiden van meer traditionele benaderingen 
van de natuur, gebruiken wetenschappers verschillende narratieve 
structuren, metaforen en beelden. Met deze narratieve zelfpresentaties 
willen zij hun onderzoeksactiviteiten niet alleen inzichtelijk maken, maar 
ook legitimeren. Dit hoofdstuk concentreert zich op twee van deze 
ecotechnologische narratieven. Ten eerste de schatgraversnarratief, 
gebruikt door wetenschappers uit het metagenomics veld om hun 
zoektocht naar het leven in de bodem te illustreren. Deze narratief 
benadrukt de rijkdom aan producten die nog in de aarde verborgen 
ligt; de ecotechnologische wending wordt gepresenteerd als een 
zoektocht naar de ‘goods’ die de natuur in de loop van de evolutie 
heeft voortgebracht. Maar er zijn ook kritische geluiden die aangeven 
dat de schatgraversnarratief geen volledig beeld geeft van wat er 
allemaal speelt binnen ecotechniek. Eén van die geluiden is afkomstig 
van Janine Benyus (1958), grondlegger van de ‘learning from nature 
movement’ die bekendstaat als biomimicry. Als wij recht willen doen 
aan de creatieve processen van de natuur, dan zullen wij haar moeten 
presenteren als een bron van ‘ideas’ in plaats van ‘goods’, aldus 
Benyus. Ze probeert deze alternatieve visie te vatten in het beeld van de 
natuur als onze leermeester. Een meer respectvolle benadering van de 
natuur vereist niet alleen dat we de excellente kwaliteit van haar ‘goods’ 
erkennen; noch volstaat het om de natuur voor te stellen als een soort 
‘superinnovator’. De leermeesternarratief impliceert dat we niet alleen de 
natuur, maar ook onszelf met andere ogen gaan bekijken, namelijk als 
leerlingen die zich openstellen voor de wijsheid van de natuur.      
 Hoewel Benyus de leermeesternarratief presenteert als het tegendeel 
van de schatgraversnarratief, vertonen de twee zelfpresentaties een 
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opvallende overeenkomst: ze worden geacht sympathieke modellen 
te verschaffen met louter positieve, strategisch bruikbare connotaties. 
De schatgraversnarratief benadrukt dat de hoge investeringen vereist 
voor de zoektocht naar bodemleven, uiteindelijk zullen resulteren in een 
grote materiële beloning: een rijkdom aan bruikbare producten, zoals 
antibiotica, vitamines en enzymen. Ook de leermeesternarratief wordt 
geassocieerd met een positieve belofte. De prijs is hier echter niet 
zozeer materieel, maar veeleer intellectueel van aard: als we zorgvuldig 
luisteren naar de lessen van de natuur, zullen wij zelf ook slimmere en 
betere probleemoplossers worden. 
 De twee narratieven zijn echter veel ambivalenter en dubbelzinniger 
dan de wetenschappers die ze gebruiken zich lijken te realiseren; ze zijn 
ingebed in bredere culturele narratieven waar ze niet alleen (impliciet) 
naar verwijzen, maar ook hun motiverende kracht aan ontlenen. Met 
behulp van twee populaire ‘Hollywood Blockbusters’ zal dit hoofdstuk 
de morele ambivalentie van beide ecotechnologische narratieven laten 
zien: de Indiana Jones film Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981) en de Walt 
Disney-versie van The Sorcerer’s Apprentice (1940). 
In hoofdstuk 5 zal ik het ecogenomics discours tijdelijk terzijde schuiven, 
om te onderzoeken hoe de ecotechnologische wending ter sprake 
komt in het werk van Peter Sloterdijk. Met Sloterdijks onderscheid 
tussen traditionele allotechnieken en opkomende homeotechnieken 
als uitgangspunt, zal ik de belofte dat ecotechniek een nieuwe relatie 
tussen mens, techniek en natuur tot stand zal brengen, kritisch 
onder de loep nemen. Sloterdijk beschrijft het revolutionaire karakter 
van homeotechnieken met behulp van drie concepten: ze zijn niet 
alleen gebaseerd op een imitatio naturae, maar maken ook een niet-
dominerende en co-operatieve benadering van de natuur mogelijk. In 
dit hoofdstuk zal ik beargumenteren dat Sloterdijks reflecties gebaseerd 
zijn op een reeks problematische assumpties. Sloterdijk veronderstelt 
dat onze kennis van de natuur inmiddels zo ver is gevorderd, dat wij 
zelfs haar meest complexe en verfijnde principes – replicatie, selectie, 
transgenese, etc. – in onze eigen technieken kunnen incorporeren. 
Getuigt deze overtuiging echter niet van hybris? Bovendien sluit het 
vermogen om de processen van de natuur na te bootsen, een niet-
dominerende houding tegenover de natuur niet per definitie uit; 
dit vermogen verschaft ook nieuwe mogelijkheden voor exploitatie, 
bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van genetische manipulatie en ‘nature mining’. 
Omdat homeotechnieken het klassieke onderscheid tussen natuurlijke 
en door de mens ontwikkelde technieken vertroebelen, wordt deze 
exploitatie bovendien steeds subtieler en (daardoor) minder zichtbaar. 
Homeotechnieken zouden derhalve onze controle over de natuur ook 
kunnen vergroten. Voortbouwend op het werk van Val Plumwood, 
besluit dit vijfde hoofdstuk met de overweging dat de bijdrage van 
homeotechnieken aan een duurzame(re) toekomst in grote mate afhangt 
van het bredere kader waarbinnen zij worden geïmplementeerd.
In het concluderende hoofdstuk 6 wordt beargumenteerd dat het 
ecogenomics discours, ondanks de belofte een nieuwe, duurzamere relatie 
tussen mens, techniek en natuur tot stand te brengen, in sterke mate is 
gebaseerd op een instrumentele natuuropvatting. Dit komt bijvoorbeeld 
tot uitdrukking in de schatgraversnarratief en het begrip ‘nature mining’, 
waarin de natuur wordt voorgesteld als een bron die beschikbaar is 
voor ongelimiteerd menselijk gebruik. Maar het ecogenomics discours 
onthult ook een bescheidener benadering van de natuur, zij het (nog) 
wat aarzelend. Deze onderstroming komt bijvoorbeeld tot uitdrukking in 
het ongemak dat de term ‘nature mining’ losmaakte bij een deel van de 
Nederlandse ecogenomics gemeenschap. De ‘metagenomic approach’, 
die vooralsnog in sterkte mate leunt op een instrumentele benadering 
van de natuur, herbergt ook andere interpretaties van de natuur als een 
belangrijke en betekenisvolle orde. Door ons te confronteren met onze 
afhankelijkheid van microben in het vervullen van tal van menselijke 
behoeften, zou metagenomics ons kunnen aanmoedigen een natuurbeeld 
te omarmen dat gerelateerd is aan het mythische natuurbeeld van de 
aarde als ‘nurturing mother’ (vgl. Merchant 1989). Door de onderlinge 
afhankelijkheid van alle levensvormen te benadrukken, zou het veld ons 
bovendien kunnen stimuleren om Aldo Leopolds beeld van het land als 
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‘collective organism’ verder te ontwikkelen (1949). Het Committee on 
Metagenomics (2007) heeft al een stap in deze richting gezet door naar 
de metagenomics benadering te verwijzen als “the genomics of Gaia”.
De opkomst van een vocabulaire dat een meer respectvolle visie op 
de natuur uitdrukt, kan ook worden herkend in andere voorbeelden van 
ecotechniek, zoals biomimicry. Hoewel Benyus geen aandacht besteedt 
aan het feit dat niet alleen de ‘goods’, maar ook de wijsheid van de 
natuur voor instrumentele doeleinden kan worden ingezet, geeft haar 
alternatieve leermeesternarratief blijk van de bereidheid een nieuwe, 
bescheidener visie op de natuur te ontwikkelen.
 Hoe zouden we ervoor kunnen zorgen dat dit bescheidener 
perspectief geen onderstroming blijft, maar de heersende stroom wordt? 
Een noodzakelijke stap in dit proces is in mijn optiek dat we erkennen 
dat ecotechniek niet het gehele antwoord, maar slechts een deel van 
het antwoord is. Voortbouwend op de conclusie uit hoofdstuk 5, sluit dit 
proefschrift af met de positie dat, om te voorkomen dat ecogenomics en 
andere ecotechnieken woordvoerders worden van een reductionistische 
en instrumentele denkwijze, zij moeten worden geïntegreerd in een 
democratische wetenschap die de natuur beschouwt als partner in de 
productie van kennis (vgl. Plumwood 2002). 
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